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2PREFACE
At the time I  began my thesis in 1992 at the Institute of Political Science, Oslo University,  
Latvia had restored independence and the first post-Soviet national elections were coming up.  
My initial interest concerned the inter-war democracy and its collapse in 1934. I was advised 
to include the outcome of the first post-Soviet elections and draw a line between the inter-war 
party system and the new one. I chose it as my topic, which I resumed working with in late 
2002. The fourth post-Soviet national election had been held in Latvia in autumn 2002; the 
same number of elections as before the subversion of democracy in 1934.
There were few sources about political history in Latvia available in Norwegian 
libraries in the early 1990s. Norges forskningsråd (Norwegian Research Council) sponsored a  
stay in Riga to look for additional sources. I received invaluable help from the staff at Riga 
University’s newly founded Institute of Politology. I would name especially head of the 
institute, Einars Semanis, and professor Feliciana Rajevska,  who largely arranged my stay 
and programme and were generally forthcoming. Directors of the Baltic Institute of Social 
Science (Baltijas Datu Nams) Aldis Paulins and his successor Brigita Zepa have been very 
helpful by providing results of post-election polls. 
There are a number of people in Norway I want to thank for assisting my work in 
several ways; my supervisors Olav F. Knudsen, then director at the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI), research assistant Arne Kommisrud, and candidate for the 
doctorate, Herman Smith-Sivertsen, who kindly read and commented on the completed first 
draft in 2003. Herman generously let me use his private post-election poll material of 1998, 
prepared for his doctoral thesis. Thanks to Vigdis Nygaard and Torunn Hasler who carried out 
own research on Latvian topics in 1992 and 1993, for valuable discussions and cooperation. 
Not least, thanks to my girlfriend Eva Kristin Friis who has contributed with her computer-
technical skills for the multivariate analysis, and I have received additionally great assistance 
from Suzanne Schönkopf, former director of  CAMO, the developer of  the “Unscrambler” 
statistical programme. 
3ABSTRACT
Latvia had a brief experience with democracy and party pluralism between 1920 and 1934 
when an authoritarian regime took over. After restoration of Latvia’s independence in 1991, a 
large number of political groups and parties emerged, some re-emerged. The restoration of 
independence is formally based on the proclamation of independence 18 November 1918 and 
the Constitution of 1922, and citizenship was restored to Latvian citizens before the Soviet 
occupation in 1940 and their descendants. The question is: Do cleavages and contrasts that 
were underlying the structure of  political opposition in the 1920s and 1930s re-emerge? Has 
nearly 50 years of Sovietization and communism, the absence of political contestation and 
independent political organizations, fundamentally changed the structure of cleavages and 
produced new conflicts? In the 1960s, Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset found that  
party systems of Western democracies reflected fundamental cleavages that emerged in the 
course of history, and  the party systems “froze” with the full extension of the franchise, 
leaving a stable system of political alternatives that reflected the most important historical 
contrasts. 
This thesis identifies the most profound political contrasts in Latvia between the wars 
as national-cultural identity, class and urban/rural residence/economy. The society was based 
for centuries on a feudal social system where language and culture served as markers of one’s 
social class. Also, there were a distinct difference between Eastern and “Catholic” Latgale 
district and “Germanized” Latvia. Religion played an important political role in Latgale. 
The most significant change in the current party system is the apparent absence of the 
class conflict in the aftermath of Communism. The Socialist Party is an overwhelmingly 
“Russian” or “Non-Latvian” party. The development of a new social pluralism and social 
contrasts may lead to the re-emergence of the class conflict. The salient cleavage since 1990 
has a strong ‘nationality’ component and relates to the struggle for restoration of 
independence, the definition of citizens and the position of the Latvian language and culture. 
The cleavage has its roots far down in history. The urban/rural contrast is another cleavage 
that has re-emerged, while the regional (Latgale) contrast seems to be both less significant, 
and has changed. In stead of “Catholic”, a stronger “Russian/Non-Latvian” component in the 
social structure and a poorer “Eastern” economy makes Latgale socially and politically still 
somewhat different from the three other districts. 
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71. INTRODUCTION
The sudden collapse of communist regimes in East Europe and the Soviet Union 1989-1991 
gave way to re-democratization of states, and in the case of Soviet union, the reestablishment 
of independent states. Several of these countries have formerly been independent democracies 
for a period of time, before the Second World War. Does earlier patterns of political 
opposition repeat today in post-communist countries, or do communism, and sovietization, 
represent a significant break with past in terms of parties and party systems? 
I have chosen Latvia as a case. I will compare Latvia’s party system structure in the 
pre-war period (1920-1934) and after the restoration of democracy and independence (1990-
2004). The huge social and demographic changes enforced upon Latvia during the Soviet 
annexation and occupation (1940-41/1944-1991) and Nazi occupation (1941-44) have  
produced a different social structure,  new conflicts, as well as new kinds of political 
oppositions and alliances. 
Last autumn, Latvia went to the polls to vote for or against membership in the 
European Union. 67 per cent of the voters (72.5 per cent participation) voted in support of 
membership. The same per cent of voters in Daugavpils, the main city of Latgale, voted 
against membership. Daugavpils voters were the “great exception” to the vote elsewhere in 
the country, Sweden’s news agency Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå (TT) reported on 21 
September. The voting pattern fitted into the picture of  post-Soviet political contrasts in 
Latvia, as will be described in this paper. Latgale stood out also in the 1920s and 30s as very 
different from germanized Latvia. 
Through four national elections since the restoration of independence in 1991, 
conflicts related to the nation-building process have dominated the political agenda – the 
issues of citizenship, education and language rights are the most profoundly controversial, and 
have divided the voters according to national identity and mother tongue. 
Pre-World War II era parties, which were restored in the early 1990s, have struggled 
to re-gain their positions within the Latvian party system. One is the Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party, which is the oldest and was the largest party in Latvia between the wars, and 
the most important opposition.1 The so-called “centre-right” parties – liberal and conservative 
- have formed the governments after 1993, as they also did in the 1920s and early 1930s. The 
1
 All political parties got prohibited after Karlis Ulmanis’ coup d’etat on 15 May, 1934. He suspended the 
Constitution and installed an autocratic regime that lasted until the Soviet invasion in June 1940.
8dominant government party in the pre-war era, the Farmers’ Union, is back on the scene as 
well. It has been a member of several government coalitions, but not in a dominant position. 
This chapter contains a brief  presentation of the case and introduces some central theories 
and concepts regarding the study of parties and party systems. A more thorough presentation 
of the theory and concepts relevant for this paper is found in Chapter Two. Chapter Three
describes the historical-sociological and statistical methods applied. Chapters four, five and 
six present the historical and socio-structural premises for the mobilization of political 
opposition and alignments in the Latvian area (4), political parties and conflicts (5), and the 
voters’ perspective (6). In the analysis, Chapter Seven, figures describing the party systems of 
the 1920s and 1990s will be introduced for comparison, and a multivariate analysis of  
election survey data of 1998 (the seventh Saeima) has been carried out in order to identify 
significant and potential political contrasts among the voters.
Within the last page, this thesis should at least tentatively answer the following questions:   
- Which conflicts and cleavages were decisive for the formation of political opposition 
in Latvia in the 1920s and 1930s? 
- To what extent does conflicts and cleavages mobilized before 1934 express 
themselves in the formation of new oppositions in post-Soviet Latvian politics? 
- Employing Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset’s cleavage concept and party system 
theory: Which are the strengths and weaknesses when applied in the case of Latvia?
1.1 Parties and Party Systems: Theoretical Aspects
The study of party system stability originates in the pre-war era, when several competitive 
democratic systems collapsed. In the 1920s and 30s, the focus shifted from the party 
organization, and the role and functions of  parties in mass democracies, towards inter-party 
dynamics and questions of stability and instability of party systems (Daalder, 1981). An 
aspect has been Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset’s occupation with stable patters of 
cleavages and party system continuity, which led to their well-known hypothesis on “frozen” 
party systems (Rokkan and Lipset, 1967). The concern here is the question of mobilized 
cleavages, their translation into the party system and survival within a context of party 
discontinuity. 
91.2 The Case
This is a case study with a comparative aspect  - the comparison of a single case at different 
times; that of a post-Communist, post-Soviet party system with that of a pre-war democracy. 
The case is Latvia. My aim is to draw a few conclusions about continuity and discontinuity of 
political contrasts and cleavages, in a country where democratic contestation  was interrupted 
for more than fifty years, and independent organizations were illegal. 
On the renewal of independence in 1991, the pro-independence majority of the 
Supreme Council readopted sections of Latvia’s democratic constitution (Satversme) of 
1922.2 On 6 July, 1993, the new national assembly (the fifth Saeima) fully reinstated the 
Constitution.3  The first post-Soviet, national elections in Latvia were held in June 1993. The 
fifth Saeima was, like the previous four, a unicameral body consisting of one hundred seats 
distributed by a proportional vote principle. The first Saeima got elected in 1922, the fourth in 
1931. The distribution of mandates in 1993 and later has been made on the basis of five 
electoral districts, as in the inter-war years – the capital city Riga, the eastern district Latgale, 
southern Zemgale, western Kurzeme and northern Vidzeme. 
Among the amendments made to the election law in 1993, one was especially 
important – the stipulation of a four per cent threshold (five per cent from 1995)4 to prevent 
extreme fragmentation which plagued the national assembly throughout the democratic period 
before Second World War (Vardys, 1978:66). With a country-wide requirement of minimum 
4 and later 5 per cent of the votes, group-specific and district-specific parties are less likely to 
win seats in the national Saeima.  Another amendment is the lowering of the voting age from 
22 to 18 years. That increased the share of younger voters who are the most removed from the 
previous democratic period – three to four generations – and less likely to identify politically 
with a pre-war party.
1.2.1 Legal and Symbolic Continuity With the Past 
The existence of the secret protocols in which Hitler “gave” the Baltic republics to Stalin in 
1939 have become common knowledge. Moscow admitted the existence of the protocols in 
the summer of 1989 (Lieven, 1994:222), revealing that the annexation and incorporation of 
Latvia was illegal. By re-instating the pre-war national constitution (Satversme) and re-
institutionalizing the Saeima as a direct continuation of the pre-war era, the revival of old 
2
 According to SC President Anatolijs Gorbunovs in a meeting with him at his office in May, 1993. Janis Ikstens 
(www.politics.lv/en/satvars/3.1/1.htm) says the complete Satversme was reinstated on 21 August, 1991.
3
 According to Edite Alksne in an e-mail from the Saeima information office, January 2004.
4
 Article 51 in “Law on Elections of the Fifth Saeima” (English translation), Riga 20. October, 1992. 
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organizations, societies and parties represents a legal and symbolic continuity between the 
1918 republic and “post-communist” Latvia.5 To some of the nationalist opposition in the 
1980s and 90s the proclamation of a new,  ‘second’, republic would mean to acknowledge the 
Soviet occupation and annexation as legal. The conflict between adherents of the ‘second’ 
republic and the ‘first’ republic was the first major issue between the independence 
movements in 1988-90. 
Irrespective of the legal and symbolic restoration of the republic, Latvia was a 
different country in 1990 than in 1940. Social and demographic conditions have severly 
changed following five decades of heavy industrialization, migration, deportations, 
collectivization, russification, and planned economy. In addition, the “repatriation” of the 
Baltic German population in 1939-41 and the Holocaust which cost the lives of probably over 
90 per cent of the Latvian Jewish population, contributed to a fundamentally different ethnic 
structure. Ethnic Russians constituted the largest single minority in Latvia also before 1940, 
but its size in terms of numbers and proportion was far smaller than today. Moreover, non-
Russian minorities living in the Latvian SSR chose, or were made, to adopt a Soviet identity 
and the Russian language (Chapter 4.5.2). 
A consequence of the Renewal of independence was the restoration of citizenship to 
pre-war citizens and their descendants, which left 700.000-800.000 Soviet immigrants with  
USSR citizenship, and with an undecided legal status when the USSR was dissolved. The first 
major controversial issue following the restoration of independence was that of citizenship 
and naturalization; about procedures for accepting new citizens. The overwhelming majority 
of Latvian citizens have family roots in the country going back before 1940. About one in 
four descend from non-Latvian nationalities. The majority of non-citizens are Slavs, and the 
majority of the Slavs are Russian. 
“Ethnicity”, or “nationality”, is a strong component in the most important post-Soviet 
conflicts in Latvia. The word refers to the presence of  minorities; diaspora; with Russian, 
Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other origin. They are not minorities in the “indigenous” 
meaning which is true for the Finno-Ugric-speaking Liv population. Most of Latvia’s so 
called “ethnic” minority groups have a reference country, for example Russians/Russia, 
Ukrainians/Ukraine and so on. Latvia, and the regions that were to become Latvia, have 
traditionally consisted of culturally mixed populations, of which the Latvian and the Liv 
(originally one of the tribes that were early settlers) have had no other reference country. One 
5
 Latvia was proclaimed independent on 18 November 1918. The Constituent Assembly got elected in 1920, and 
the Constitution (Satversme) adopted in 1922.
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of many sources fuelling the “national reawakening” in the 1980s and inspired the national 
uprising against the USSR, was the fact that the Latvian proportion of the population was 
steadily shrinking, among other reasons due to migration from other Soviet republics. In 
1989, just above half of the population was Latvian (Lieven, 1994:433). National-cultural 
conflicts have deep roots in Latvia.  
National (cultural) identity became politically salient in the course of  the extensive 
socio-structural transformations in the second half of the nineteenth century. Cultural identity 
was linked to social status. Social as well as cultural issues were dominant in the first years of 
independence (such as the Land Reform Act, Cultural Autonomy of the Minorities) (von 
Rauch, 1995:96). The national-cultural factor has been a predominant component within 
many big political issues and conflicts in Latvia in the nineties, and is linked to ideological
contrasts and the deposed communist regime. 
Traditional class conflicts seems not to play an independent political role today, 
although Hermann Smith-Sivertsen has found that socioeconomic contrasts are increasingly 
identifiable (Smith-Sivertsen, 1998:89, 105-107). The big political conflicts in the first decade 
following the restoration of independence have been related to Soviet rule, communism and 
its consequences. Trade, as well as foreign policy and defence are re-directed to the Western 
sphere, away from the East. This re-orientation, which was similar in the inter-war period, is 
expressed profoundly by Latvia’s early stated ambition for EU and NATO membership, two 
ambitions that materialized in 2004. The absence of a viable and multilateral security 
arrangement before the Second World War was an achilles’ heal to a country in a region 
strategically desired by two imperial powers, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.6 NATO 
membership is an issue which has identified the confrontation line between the pro-
independence camp and the most staunch opposition of every government, the last-day 
defenders of the former regime, mostly Russian speakers.
Socio-economic and -structural realities are however different today compared with 
the inter-war period. Firstly, inter-war Latvia was dominantly agrarian, and industries were to 
large extent based on agrarian products (see von Rauch, 1995:137-138; Swettenham, 1981, 
Kahk/Tarvel, 1997:103-111). The majority of the population lived in the countryside, whereas 
6
 Fore more information about Latvia foreign politics and relations between the three Baltic states in the inter-
war era: See Georg von Rauch (1970): The Baltic States. The Years of Independence, 1974/1995;  I. Feldmanis, 
A. Stranga, M. Virsis: Latvia’s Foreign Policy and International Relations in late 1930’s . Riga, 1993 (in 
Latvian); Feldmanis, Stranga: The Destiny of the Baltic Entente. Riga, 1994.
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today, the agrarian economy makes up only a small part of GNP. The majority of people live 
in urban areas, and a third of the total population in the capital Riga. 
There is little left of the Latvian pre-war society, its demographic and socioeconomic 
structure, nor political landscape, at a glimpse. There is a methodological challenge to the 
comparison of two different historical periods, each having its “own” historical preconditions. 
The presence of new political parties, however, does not mean that (emerging) cleavages are  
without roots much further back than the post-Second World War era. 
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2. NATION-BUILDING, DEMOCRATIZATION  AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
The literature has primarily been concerned with the cases of  ‘continuous’ democracies with 
regard to change and persistence of  parties and party systems. Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. 
Lipset include three ‘discontinuous’ cases in their classical comparison of party systems 
(1967), Germany, Italy and Spain. More recent ‘discontinuous’ democracies are in Central-
and Eastern Europe, including former republics of the Soviet Union. 
2.1 Is the cleavage concept relevant?
Employing the cleavage concept on post-communist cases is challenging, for at least two 
reasons: Firstly, the cleavage concept itself implies development over  time concerning the 
emergence of economic interests, socio-structural and cultural identities, the organization and 
mobilization of interests, as well as the formation of stable systems of alignments and 
opposition. In post-Communist countries this process described by Rokkan and Lipset had 
been going on for only 13-15 years by 2000. In the Latvian case we talk of  7 to 14 years, 
depending on whether one dates the beginning of the re-institutionalization of democracy 
back to the early environmentalist protests in 1986, to the Supreme Soviet elections in 1990 
(the first and only free, competitive election to the SSR’s council), to 1991 when Latvia de 
facto restored independence, or to 1993, when the first post-communist national election was 
held. Whatever year chosen, the time span for mobilizing cleavages and establish a stable 
system of alignments and opposition is very short, and it’s even a question whether we can 
talk about a stable ‘party system’ at all in the Latvian case. Many parties have come and left 
the scene; and there are only three parties that have participated in every one of the four 
Saeimas since 1993.7  The three parties represent altogether only a very small proportion of 
Latvian voters. 
Employing the cleavage concept on an “atypical” case like this may seem futile. On 
the other hand, the concept has been applied to even more difficult cases. Vicky Randall 
discusses the concept in relation to emerging democracies in Third World countries (Randall, 
2001:242-259) where “infrequency and discontinuity of competitive party systems” represent 
just one of very many obstacles to the scholar. As Randall points out: there is no case of party 
politics without comparable tendencies (Rendall, 2001:252). Maurizio Cotta (1994:102) 
notes: “It must be said that Rokkan does not attempt to connect these cleavages to each 
7
 For Fatherland and Freedom (including LNNK), Concord for Latvia and the Socialist Party (/Equal Rights).  
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specific party but rather to categories of parties (conservative, liberal, agrarian, Christian etc.) 
It means that correspondence between cleavages and specific parties may be stronger or 
weaker. For instance, more than one socialist party could represent the workers’ side of the 
class cleavage. In short, a cleavage may be represented by two opposing parties, but also by 
different parties, or clusters of parties. Individual parties may come and go, but the actual 
confrontation line may not change.” Peter Mair (1997:28) makes a similar observation: 
…when discussing the political alternatives deriving from cleavages in modern mass 
politics, and particularly when discussing the alternatives deriving from the class 
cleavage, we cannot simply speak of individual parties. Rather, we must be concerned 
with blocs or families of parties, and with the notion of parties which are cleavage allies 
as against those which are cleavage opponents. 
2.2 Party System Perseverance and the Critics of the Freeze Proposition
A central theme to the discussion of party systems is Rokkan and Lipset’s proposition that 
European party systems have become stable structures of  political alternatives (Rokkan and 
Lipset, 1967:50). Western party systems of  the 1960s were more or less the same as forty 
years before. The major party alternatives seemed to have “frozen” in the wake of the 
extension of the suffrage during the mass mobilization phase. Their explanation for the 
freezing is the narrowing of the support market (Rokkan and Lipset, 1967:51); or in the words 
of Cotta (1994:103): The parties that developed at the start of mass politics would leave little 
space for new parties at the moment when (male) suffrage was fully extended. The
stabilization of oppositions, or freezing, is linked to the party organizations which 
“mobilize and integrate these new citizens (who are included in the electorate by the 
extension of the suffrage, B.S.) and incalculate a set of enduring political identities.” (Mair, 
1997:36). Giovanni Sartori interprets the freezing of the party system as almost solely a 
consequence of political organization, and parties as an ‘independent system of channelment’ 
(Sartori 1969:90). Challenging the proposition, scholars assert that even if it may have proved 
correct at the time of its formulation, the un-freezing of European party systems had already 
begun. A study which challenged the freeze proposition was published already before Rokkan 
and Lipset’s “Political Parties and Voter Alignments”, by Otto Kirchheimer, who in 1966 
suggested that the era of the mass party was coming to an end and the ‘catch-all’ party was 
taking over. To increase its voter segment, the ‘catch all’ party loosen the tie to its core 
electorate. Media and new sources of income become more important than memberships. 
The ‘mass party’ concept was originally used by Maurice Duverger (1954) to explain 
the process of mass democratization. Originally a phenomenon on the political left among the 
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working class, the ‘mass party’ mobilized its numerical superiority against the numerically 
weaker, but financially much stronger (cadre) parties of the old elite. Duverger predicted that 
other parties would have to copy the mass party model to survive. Duverger’s ‘Mass Party’ is 
the type of party closest to the one defined by Rokkan and Lipset . Apparently, in the late 
1960s, Rokkan and Lipset described the past, while Kirchheimer looked to the future.    
A premise for the emergence of the ‘catch-all’ party is the a decline of  traditional class 
contrasts and -identities (Dalton, Scott and Flanagan 1984), as well as a de-ideologization fed 
by economic prosperity in the post-World War II West. The mobilizing potential of  the 
traditional class cleavage has waned. Ronald Inglehart (1977) identifies a value shift among 
voters, from ‘materialist’ to ‘post-materialist’, and the mobilization of a post-materialist 
cleavage (Mair, 1997) consisting of several new issues (environment protection, women’s 
rights etc.) According to Inglehart's observations, new value conflicts have emerged alongside 
socio-structural determinants or even replaced the latter as motivation for party choice. At the 
political level, the new issues have promoted new parties alongside the old (Green parties and 
“the New Left”, for example) or become adopted by existing parties. A third aspect to 
political change is voter volatility, as the parties loose their ties to their core electorate, which 
entails an evaporation of party-voter loyalties.
2.3 Defending the proposition: “Continuity far outweigh Change”
An indication of  de-freezing of a party system is a lower predictability of the outcome of 
elections and especially government negotiations, according to Peter Mair (2001:39). 
Defining party systems by “their patterns of competition”, borrowed from Giovanni Sartori, 
Mair asserts it is at this level predictions are likely to apply (Mair, 2001:39) The crucial 
variable in question is the interaction at the party system level.   
In a response to the criticism of and objection to the relevance of the freeze 
proposition, Mair (1997) argues that the case of the critics has not yet been made. “I contend 
that the freezing hypothesis remain largely valid”, he asserts in the first chapter of  “Party 
System Change”: “The evidence of long-lasting continuities in party systems far outweigh the 
more striking and more immediate evidence of change” (Mair, 1997:3). The average level of 
aggregate volatility from 1945 till 1989 is just 8.7 (Mair, 1997:80ff), meaning that the net
shift is less than one tenth of the votes from one election to the next, indicating a net stability 
of 91 per cent. Mair also concludes on the basis of the index that net volatility was even 
higher in the period studied by Rokkan and Lipset (1945-1965) than from 1966 to 1989. 
Much of the electoral change observed especially in the 1970s and 1980s happened within 
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blocs of parties which are allies on the same side of the relevant cleavages, and that leaves the 
fundamental structure more or less intact, according to Mair. New conflicts replace or add to 
the old, and constitute cleavages that define lasting oppositions or alignments. It means that 
the old left to right-dimension, which was originally based on social class contrast, in the 
course of time will consist of many more and different types of conflicts. Inglehart’s 
identification of post-material values as opposed to material values is important, but the 
emergence of post-materialistic values does not necessarily lead to a decline, or any 
significant decline, in the old cleavages - or any significant change within party systems.
Seymour M. Lipset makes a similar assessment as Mair when he comments on the 
discussion of post-material value systems and the issue of a third, “Post-Materialistic” 
revolution (Lipset, 2001:6): 
Given all the transformations in Western society over the twentieth century, it is 
noteworthy how little the formal party systems have changed, though their 
programmatic content is different. 
Peter Mair emphasizes the significance of party organizations’ adaptability as an important 
factor explaining why West-European post-war party systems have survived, mostly with 
only minor changes, if any. The question is whether the structure of oppositions can survive 
the discontinuity of political parties, as in Latvia.   
2.4 Literature and Definitions
The organization of politics into parties, the electoral system’s impact upon party systems, 
and the stabilizing/destabilizing effects of  party systems are topics that have engaged political 
scientists for the last century. A political party, in the context of mass democracy, can be 
defined as organizations whose goal is the capture of public office in electoral contestation 
with one or more other parties (Kuper and Kuper, 1985). A party is, moreover, an organized 
group of people sharing common policy preferences and usually a general ideological position 
(…) that seeks, or has, political power.” (Robertson, 1993:370).
With the development of mass politics, the ‘mass party’ emerged with the ambition to
secure a maximum of votes as a product of the extension of the suffrage to all adult male 
citizens - meaning the inclusion of the working class. According to Duverger (1954), the mass 
party emerged with the political organization of the working class and the necessity to use 
manpower in the political struggle against the financially stronger old elites and bourgeoisie. 
Whether the emerging mass democracies would have two-party or multi-party systems, would 
depend decisively on the choice of electoral system. Majority vote would favour two-party 
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systems; proportional representation would favour multi-party systems. The size of the party 
system would have different strengths and weaknesses. A two-party system is usually seen as 
more stabilizing and “efficient” than a multi-party system, because it will produce majority 
governments, whereas multi-party systems usually would be regarded as more representative
as the number of  parties will be three or more. Jean Blondel elaborated Duverger’s two-party 
versus multiparty definition into a typologoization in which the number of parties were added 
the strength of parties, their ideological position, type of organization and leadership.
The organization of mass parties and elaboration of functional voting systems have 
contributed to the stabilization of  the political system in most Western democracies, as 
political conflict was set over issues within the state order, and not over the system itself. 
However, irrational aspects of party pluralism could de-stabilize rather than stabilize the 
political system. Giovanni Sartori described the destructive mechanisms of what he called 
‘extreme’ or ‘atomized’ pluralism, one of seven types of party systems he identified (Sartori, 
1976:125). In the case of extreme pluralism (more than five relevant parties), the number of  
parties does not alone decide the workings of the party system. Sartori introduced ‘ideological 
distance’ between parties as a measure. In the case of extreme pluralism, none of the relevant 
parties are dominant, and the presence of anti-system parties (anti-democratic parties) 
contributes to undermine the political system. The Weimar Republic is the profound “model” 
for the concept of atomized pluralism, where a great number of parties made governing 
practically impossible, and the ideological distance was the most extreme, with two anti-
system parties; the national socialists and communists; at each opposing end of the ideological 
spectrum. The Baltic democracies made similar experiences between the wars. Party 
democracy was suspended one by one; in Latvia in 1934; and substituted by autocratic, 
nationalistic regimes. The atomization of  Weimar Germany’s and the Baltic party systems 
was related to flaws in the electoral systems which were without defence (threshold) against 
the patchworks of contrasts existing in these countries.
A sociological alternative to the numerical party system theory was presented by Stein 
Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset’s comparative historical-sociological approach in 1967, 
identifying basic conflicts and cleavages at the foundation of  West-European party systems. 
They found a different aspect to stability; the relatively unchanged nature of the structure of 
oppositions as a reflection of decisive conflicts in the wake of nation-building and mass-
democratization. The approach made possible comparative analyses of variations between 
democratic party systems related to sequences of democratization and the political relevance 
of certain historical conflicts and cleavages above other.  
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2.4.1 Cleavages
The process of nation-building is central to Rokkan and Lipset’s discussion of the formation 
of territorial and cultural cleavages and political opposition in Europe (Rokkan and Lipset, 
1967). Industrialization and economic modernization created the basis of new economic 
contrasts which usually cut across the established cultural and territorial cleavages, and 
thereby reduced potentially polarizing conflicts. According to Rokkan and Lipset, the mass 
party functions as a mediator between the citizens and the state, expressing contrasts in the 
socio-cultural structure, channelling demands and, to gain political power, force the 
spokesmen of contrasting interests to compromise. The political party is a ‘mediator’ between 
the state and the citizens, and between divergent interests. Rokkan and Lipset defined party 
system according to ‘cleavages’ which translated from the social structure (the voters) into the 
party system. Their concern was parties as ‘agencies of mobilization’ which aggregated and 
translated social and cultural conflicts along a set of dimensions rooted in critical historical 
conflicts. In their perspective, the stability of the political system was ensured by the 
crosscutting nature of cultural and economic conflict dimensions and identities, whereas the 
risk of extreme conflict and instability would appear in the case of parallel dimensions.
Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset made this observation with regard to 
Western party systems in the 1960s:
The party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant 
exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s [....] the party 
alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party 
organizations, are older than the majorities of the national 
electorates. (Rokkan and Lipset, 1967).
The basis of the continuity they observed was a fully enfranchised (male) electorate, with 
only few restrictions, such as age limits. The “space” that represents a possibility to mobilize 
new voter segments, had been exhausted. Thus, the system of cleavages represented by the 
parties that made up the party system was connected to social and cultural contrasts and 
conflicts that already existed and were mobilized in the wake of the reformation, nation-
building processes and the industrial revolution. 
2.4.2 Party Systems and Cleavages 
Rokkan and Lipset identified historical, cultural and socioeconomic conflicts that proved 
critical during the development and consolidation of the nation state. These conflicts led to the 
formation of political oppositions, representing social cleavages. A ‘cleavage’ is defined as a 
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cluster of conflicts dividing the population: “It designates a division between groups within 
the society, based on some more or less fixed attribute: One can have cleavages along lines of 
class, religion, language, race or even, conceivably, gender. The patterns of social cleavages, 
their interrelationships, salience, number and nature, used to determine the battle lines of 
competitive politics and generally influence the stability and functioning of the political 
system.” (Robertson, 1993:72).
2.4.3 Centre Versus Periphery (Cultural Cleavages)
Four historically derived cleavages, two cultural and two economic; are identified by Rokkan 
and Lipset: A territorial and a religious-secular cleavage originates in the National-
Democratic (French) revolution, and develops in the early stages of nation-building. (Rokkan 
and Lipset, 1967).  The first cleavages represent critical conflicts between the centralizing 
nation-building elite and local elites in the periphery of a state in defence of their traditional 
local power. It is a conflict over territorial control and would at some point produce parties 
with strong regional identity in opposition to the nation-building centre, and/or religious 
parties and/or parties of cultural minorities. In Roman-Catholic countries, Catholic Parties 
usually formed instead of secular bourgeois parties.
2.4.4 Conflicts in the Labour and Commodity Market (Economic Cleavages)
Two cleavages emerged in the area of labour and economy in the wake of modernization and 
industrialization, as a consequence of the industrial revolution. Rokkan and Lipset identify 
two critical conflicts; one in the commodity market between the interests of the rural-based 
primary economy and the urban secondary economy, the new industries. The second conflict 
is in the labour market between owners and tenants, employers and employees. These 
cleavages would, usually at some time after the mobilization of the cultural/territorial 
cleavage, produce bourgeois parties representing the interests of the conservative urban 
bourgeoisie (usually capital owners), labour parties representing manual workers, and 
sometimes but not always; parties representing agricultural interests, expressing the conflict in 
the commodity market between producers and consumers, between the primary and secondary 
economy. 
All cleavages are not mobilized with equal strength, and different types of conflict may 
become dominant in different parts of a country. For example, Rokkan describe the 
differences within Norway: South-West Norway traditionally consisted of socially egalitarian 
societies where the dominant conflicts were found along the territorial-cultural axis (issues 
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like alcohol consumption and moral values were profound). Class conflicts, between 
employers and employees along the functional axis, have traditionally not generated much 
support for the Labour party in South-West Norway. In Northern Norway, however, class 
contrasts have traditionally run deep and subdued the territorial-cultural cleavage. Fishermen 
and peasants in Northern Norway were likely to vote for the Labour party, whereas fishermen 
and farmers in the south and west of Norway were likely to vote for a non-socialist party, 
either the Christian People’s Party or the Centre Party representing rural interests – both 
representing a so called “counter-culture” – the centre-periphery conflict.
2.5 ‘Discontinuous Democracies’:  Survival of “Old” Oppositions
Discussing Rokkan and Lipset’s theory of ‘frozen oppositions’ in relation to re-emerging 
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, Maurizio Cotta puts forward a set of hypotheses, 
or premises, which may help predict the chance of survival of the old party system in a 
‘discontinuous democracy’ (Cotta, 1994:99ff). In the Latvian case, an immediate conclusion,
based on Cotta’s listed premises, seems to be that it is unlikely to find any high degree of 
correspondence between the new party system and the inter-war party system. Rokkan and 
Lipset (1967) sees the socio-political entity as a marketplace where the voters tend by buy the 
goods only once. With the full extension of the suffrage; when the last segment of the 
population gets enfranchised; there is no space for new parties, as there are no new voting 
segments to mobilize. 
The situation is different in the situation of discontinuity. Cotta is concerned with 
whether old or new parties will fill the new political space (Cotta, 1994:102). Cotta suggests 
that the more space not filled by (or possible to be filled by) the former democratic political 
elite/parties, the lesser the possibility that the old party system will re-emerge. Table 2-1 
shows a number of factors that may give indications about Latvia’s “position” with respect to 
the six hypotheses and the “continuity potential” of political parties:  
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Table 2-1: Step One of Maurizio Cotta’s explanatory model “Weight of Legacies”: Conditions affecting the 
probable survival of the party system of the past. The information about Latvia is added by the author of this 
thesis (Cotta, 1994:107-110).
HYPOTHESES Latvia: Weaker chance of party system 
continuity after Soviet communism
Latvia: Greater chance of 
party system continuity 
after Soviet communism
“The less complete the 
extension of the suffrage 
and/or the less complete the 
mobilization of the mass 
electorate the greater the 
chances of weak continuity.”
Adult suffrage from 21 years 
(Constitution of the Republic 
of Latvia, Section 2, 
Paragraphs 8-9), high degree 
of mobilization.
“The lower the degree of 
institutionalization of parties 
and the degree of partyness of 
political life, the weaker the 
chances of continuity.”
Only the Farmers’ Union and the Social 
Democrats remained of the parties of 1918-
1920. The other parties dissolved or merged 
(von Hehn 1966:10-11 describes many of the 
political groups as without political goals. 
“To the extent that sections of 
the party system have 
undergone a significant 
decline already during the first 
democratic experience the 
chances of continuity are 
diminished.”
The Latvian election law provided for a 
political system with many parties, which led to 
fragmentation and instability, with  frequent 
government turnovers (14 governments in 14 
years, according to Vardys 1978:67, see also 
von Hehn 1966:10-11).
The two larger parties, in government and 
opposition lost support from election to 
election (von Rauch 1995: 93,95-97). 
Political parties dissolved following Karlis 
Ulmanis’ take-over in 1934 (von Rauch 
1995:146, von Hehn 1966:19).
“The chances of revival for 
parties that have been 
involved in supporting the 
authoritarian take-over are 
weaker after the fall of this 
regime, and the all-over 
continuity of the party system 
is reduced.”
The Latvian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 
was outlawed in 1920-1940. In 1991, the 
Latvian Communist Party was again prohibited, 
but participates in the Saeima under  different 
names – Equal Rights and The Socialist Party 
(Kalnins 1971:295.313; von Rauch 1995:95; 
Vardys 1978:67; von Hehn 1966:11; Lieven 
1994:255,290-91). 
“The longer the non-
democratic regime the weaker 
the continuity with the 
democratic past.”
Three generations, 59 years, between Ulmanis’ 
coup d’etat and the 1993 elections.   
“The ‘stronger’ the non-
democratic regime, i.e. its 
mobilizing potential, social 
impact, institutionalization, 
the lesser the chances of 
continuity with the past.”
Authoritarian system since 1934 until 1940, no 
parties, 
totalitarian system 1940-41, 1944-1989/91, 
strong social, economic, cultural and 
institutional control. No party contestation, one 
party.
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In the case of Latvia, Cotta’s list of hypotheses suggest a strong ‘discontinuity factor’, 
meaning the space for new parties is large, and the chance that “old” parties will return and 
re-take a position in the new party system, is weak. However, Cotta does not include social 
cleavages and “critical conflicts” in his discussion which is solely about the survival of 
parties and not cleavages. Thus he does not discuss the topic of whether new parties may 
emerge to express cleavages that are essentially of older origin. 
There is one important point to make in the case of Latvia: The elite as well as the 
electorate is completely renewed. The youngest person who voted for the fourth Saeima in 
1931, would have been 84 years old when the 5th Saeima got elected in 1993. This may 
suggest that the link to pre-war party organizations, in terms of loyalty as well as 
identification with a “historic” party, is weak. 
2.6 The Case
The Latvian pre-war parliament remained fragmented throughout the democratic period, not 
least due to the lack of election threshold. The Saeima’s 100 seats were distributed among up 
to around 30 parties, none of  them dominant enough to form a majority government alone. 
For discussing the party system structure, I will define blocks of parties according to 
categorizations employed in the literature (Chapter Six and Appendix A). The pre-war 
political landscape was dominated by a conservative agrarian party, opposed by a social 
democratic party, with a middle ground of national liberal parties which found support largely 
among Latvian intellectuals (von Rauch, 1995:91). In addition, there were a number of parties 
representing the nationalities; profoundly German, Russian, Jews and Poles, and there were 
several parties emerging from the Latgale region.  
The post-Soviet Saeima has not been as fragmented as the pre-war Saeima. By 1993 
an election threshold was set at four per cent  and increased to five before the next election 
two years later. The Latvian Saeima since 1993 has consisted of  Latvian parties with a 
dominant “nationalist” or nation-building agenda, parties with a predominantly 
socioeconomic agenda, and opposed by Russophone-friendly parties (Smith-Sivertsen, 
1998:92). No party has been dominant enough to form a single-party government. Repeatedly, 
coalitions have been forged between nationalists and socioeconomic (liberal, conservative and 
social democratic) parties. The current (post-Soviet) parties and party structure reflects some 
very profound conflicts that relates to the years of sovietization and renewed independence 
(Smith-Sivertsen, 1998), yet some themes are not new. A struggle for independence preceded 
the founding of the first independent Latvian state. The former “ruling nationality” (German 
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Balts) had to adapt to a new social position in a society where they no longer enjoyed special 
privileges. Today, Latvian Russians are trying to adapt to a “minority” position, to many 
Russians an inferior position due to the dominant position they held as the core nationality 
within the Soviet empire (Hasler, 1996). Old types of conflicts and contrasts appear to have 
re-emerged within a different context.
2.6.1 The Process of Democratization in the Latvian Area and Latvia: an Outline 
The processes of democratization that was involved in most of the cases studied by Rokkan 
and Lipset were processes of  more or less gradual inclusion of new oppositions and gradual 
extending of the franchise. The Latvian case is a different one, concerning the pace of 
democratization in 1918-20 as well as in 1989-91. Within few years the old political systems 
collapsed (1917) or was defeated (1989-1990). 
The former collapsed into a civil war between revolutionaries, nationalists; fighting for 
independence; and remaining German forces supporting the German Balts. Full franchise was 
introduced by the constituent assembly in 1920-22, as well as an election law which laid 
down nearly no restrictions as to participation and led to “an almost unrestricted reign by the 
parliament” (von Hehn, 1966:10). The democratization process had basically begun in the 
Baltics the 1870s with the introduction of municipal reforms which enfranchised some 
Latvian men, big property owners. Only 2 per cent of the Riga residents belonged to the 
bourgeoisie; members of the guilds; and were entitled to vote before the reforms, and the 
majority were German Balts (Haltzel, 1981:137-138). With the reform, instead of a city 
council and two guilds a municipal assembly would be elected by all male subjects of the 
Russian empire 25 years and older who paid taxes on property or trade and were not in arrears 
on tax payment. There were three categories of voting lists. The first included the wealthiest 
men whose taxes taken together made up one third of the total taxes. The second category 
included moderately wealthy men whose taxes made up another one third, and the third 
included all other tax payers. The size of the assemblies varied from city to city, and the 
assembly elected in Riga was the largest, consisting of 72 representatives (Haltzel, 1981:137). 
Each category elected equal numbers of representatives, which means that the biggest 
taxpayers, who were numerically fewer than the second and third category, elected relatively 
more representatives, and similarly the second category of moderately wealthy taxpayers 
elected relatively more representatives than the third category. The weight of the ballot, thus, 
was in favour of the wealthier individuals.
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The upheavals of 1905 forced the Czar to establish a representative institution, the 
Imperial Duma, and political parties were legalized for the first time ever in Russia, between 
1905 and 1907. The Duma was a pseudo-democratic institution which had no real say, yet the 
very existence of the Duma, as well as the preceding municipal reforms, introduced an 
element of political contestation, organization and participation in the society.       
The Soviet communist regime was forced to allow democratic contestation in the late 
1980s as the old regime was crumbling (Lieven, 1994:222ff). Soviet leader Michail 
Gorbachev introduced “Glasnost”, which was an attempt to move the USSR slightly in a 
liberal-democratic direction, one step being an amendment of the USSR Constitution that 
opened up for the election of a new, representative body, the Congress of People’s Deputies, 
in 1989, in the first competitive elections in the USSR (since 1922). Unlike the Imperial 
Duma, the Congress of People’s Deputies possessed real powers, electing the new Supreme 
Soviet, which in turn elected the president. The same year, the Latvian Supreme Soviet 
replaced the Soviet constitution with national laws which then took supremacy, and the March 
1990 elections to the Latvian Supreme Council were held in a democratic fashion. The 
Popular Front Movement, which gathered non-communist, pro-independence candidates, 
emerged as a majority winner. The new Supreme Council declared on  4 May a transitional 
period to restore independence, and a referendum on the issue of national independence in 
March the next year produced a considerable majority in favour of independence. De facto 
independence was declared immediately following the failed coup d’etat in August 1991. In 
June 1993 the first national elections were held, but due to restrictions on citizenship, nearly 
30 per cent of the population was without the right to vote, mostly residents of non-Latvian 
origin. Citizenship was restored to inhabitants that were, or descended from, citizens of the 
pre-war republic.
In the Soviet Union, participation in elections was desired by the authorities, but as an 
act of symbolic confirmation of the ruling Communist party. The ‘party’ was neither 
“representative” nor “responsive”, which in a democratic context is a crucial role of parties 
(chapter two). 
The transition to democracy briefly described above underlines the very different 
nature of democratization experienced by post- as well as pre-Soviet countries like Latvia, 
compared to most of Western democracies, and it is likely to have an impact upon the 
representativeness and responsiveness of parties, as well as the mobilization of cleavages. In 
most Western democracies, the formation of cleavages, their mobilization and political 
expression developed over a longer time. It may take a longer time for a democracy 
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experiencing a rapid transition to develop a stable pattern of political cleavages. Herman 
Smith-Sivertsen points to the problem: “..it can be argued that the short time span and the 
instability of the party system make possible only the observation of political divisions of 
temporary nature, not cleavages” (Smith-Sivertsen, 1998:89). 
The Latvian party system between the World Wars reflected insufficient national 
integration as well as insufficiently developed political alignments. Social conflicts and 
personal contradictions were politically transformed into the national assembly, the Saeima, 
without the “filter” of a threshold. The party system must be defined by concepts covering 
‘categories’ of parties reflecting socio-structural, cultural as well as ideological differences. 
The current party system is pluralist but not nearly as fragmented as between the wars. Less 
fragmentation results partly from the election thresholds of  4 and later 5 per cent. There is 
furthermore an assumed possibility that five decades of occupation may have effected a 
certain social, ethnic and territorial “integration” or “standardization”. 
2.6.2 Parties and Factions
In the Latvian context, parties exists along with ‘factions’ which is the formal designation for 
the various groups and alliances within the national assembly, the Saeima. A ‘faction’ does 
not necessarily correspond to a parliamentary party group, as it may be made up by an 
alliance of two or more parties. If the membership of a faction drops beyond a certain number 
(5), the faction must dissolve, and its remaining members (if any) become independent 
deputies. The factions may change from Saeima to Saeima and even between elections (see 
chapter 5.5, figure 5.1). 
Parties have proved to be short lived as well, and only very few have survived as 
organizations without any representation in the Saeima or in municipalities. Some parties 
appear to serve simply as “election instruments”, and it is questionable whether all the basic 
functions of a party, according to the definition above, is really fulfilled. Yet they qualify 
formally as parties according to the requirements given in the election law. When the goal of 
“election parties” fail; to enter or re-enter the Saeima; the party is likely to dissolve. This is an 
aspect to parties in Latvia and may be attributed to the “shortcut” transition to democracy 
which has shortened the time to establish viable parties with a firm electoral basis. The role of 
parties as stabilizers of the state system therefore remains an open question in this case, at the 
time. 
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3. METHOD AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 Introduction
A challenge to the study of the party system in Latvia is how to define the relevant parties. 
The social structure is currently in a process of change that have impact upon the voters’ 
political preferences as well as the formation of new parties. The operationalization will have 
to include any group, formal party or alliance which at one point or another have become 
voted into the Saeima in national elections. It is the Saeima factions (Parliamentary Groups), 
i.e. the elected representation of parties, groups and alliances, which is the empirical focus, 
and the corresponding party organizations. 
The current Latvian election law requires that a list of candidates be submitted 1) by “a 
legally registered political organization (party); 2) jointly by two or more legally registered 
political organizations (parties); 3) by a legally registered association of political 
organizations (parties) (The Saeima Election Law, Article 9). The Latvian Election Law thus 
establishes the party as the hub of political participation and democratic contestation. The law 
required other types of  political organizations, movements such as LNNK and the Popular 
Front, to formally register as parties in the 1990s.  
3.2 Operationalization of ‘Party’ 
The pre-war party-system consisted of numerous parties, which has become categorised by 
historians and is the point of departure for describing the important and relevant conflicts and 
cleavages in the inter-war party system (see Appendix A). Descriptions and categorizations 
are presented by Albert Zalts (1926), Alfred Bilmanis (1928 and later), Agnis Balodis (1990), 
Georg von Rauch (1995) and Jürgen von Hehn (1966) as the main sources concerning the 
inter-war years. I have also basically adopted the ideological categories employed by von 
Rauch (1995:91): The ‘Left’ (Marxist-based Social Democrats and Communist groups), the 
‘Centre’ (also referred to as liberals, whereas I prefer the designation ‘radical-bourgeois’ 
which refers to the non-Marxist social radicalism of the urban intelligentsia), and the ‘Right’ 
which refers to conservative and moderate bourgeois parties. 
The are other relevant categories of parties in the pre-war Saeima not reckoned 
separately by von Rauch: Agricultural, regional (Latgalian) and parties of other Latvian 
national subgroups (“minorities”). Religious parties were mostly a “sub-division” among the 
other categories, and did not represent a particular “front” - with exception of catholic parties 
in Latgale with its distinctly catholic Latvian culture. Religious parties expressed a variety of 
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faiths among different national (“ethnic”) subgroups, such as Russian Orthodox, Old 
Believers and Jews. I have defined confessional parties as belonging to different blocs of 
parties, and not separately.
A question is whether agricultural parties actually should be seen as one single bloc 
representing peasants and farmers, or whether the parties rather belong to different blocs, 
representing different cleavages, for example as opponents along the class cleavage (see von 
Hehn, 1966:11-12). The old gentry, the independent farmers and the peasants were socially 
divided by class lines, and the parties of peasants (smallholders) and farmers represented the 
interests of different social segments. 
The relationship between the socio-structural basis and the parties/categories of parties of the 
first democratic period are not directly, statistically, established by surveys. The link is 
presumed, based on information by secondary sources. For example, that the party Farmers’ 
Union represented the interests of the landowning farmers in the pre-war party system, and 
the national liberal/radical parties were based on the urban Latvian intelligentsia (von Rauch, 
1995:91-93). 
For the post-Soviet elections, I have been able to use election survey results (1993, 
1995, 1998, 2002) made available by LASOPEC (Latvian Social Research Centre)/Baltic 
Data House, and Herman Smith-Sivertsen (1998). The survey results indicate possible 
relationships between certain variables describing the voters and party preference. 
LASOPEC/Baltic Data House have been engaged in relation with social and socio-political 
projects in Latvia like the extensive “New Baltic Barometer” surveys by professor Richard 
Rose and the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. Scholars of 
Latvian topics at the Institute of Political Science at Oslo University have collaborated with 
LASOPEC/Baltic Data House on several occasions as well. The methods employed by the 
research centre are well established.
For the 1998 election, underlying data for the survey was made available8 and were 
used for a multivariate analysis presented in chapter seven. I will explain the method in 
relation to the analysis later in this chapter and also in Chapter Seven.
Regarding the years 1993 to 2002/03 the thesis focus mainly on the parties that make 
up a more or less stable basis of the democratic contestation or were significant within one or 
more of the Saeimas. Although election alliances are shifting and instrumental, most often 
8
 By Hermann Smith-Sivertsen, Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo.
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created for one purpose only: To secure enough votes to pass the 5 per cent threshold (1993: 4 
per cent), I see alliances as an expression of political closeness.
Finally, names of parties in the inter-war era may be different from one source to 
another. The reasons appear to be a) different translations of the name from Latvian or 
Russian to English or German, or that b) small parties frequently changed name or 
transformed into new parties. When there have been a problem, I have tried to identify parties 
by the name of the party leaders, and if possible by a mouthpiece newspaper or publication. 
3.3 ‘Cleavage’
Henry Valen (1981) explain ‘cleavage’ as referring to contrasts or conflicts of the political 
struggle. The concept has a sociological and/or political component. The social component, or 
the definition employed by sociologists, describes conflicts that originate in the social 
structure; between different ethnic groups, between different religious groups, within the 
labour market between workers and employers or between agricultural and industrial 
interests. (Valen, 1981:12) Political scientists emphasise the political component. ‘Cleavage’ 
means “ideological struggles or contrasts” which are related to certain conflict issues. Valen 
mentions the left-right contrast as a well-known example. An ideological or political cleavage 
may designate certain ideologies, but more often cleavage consists of a number of conflict 
issues that are tied together or connect ideologically (Valen, 1981:13). 
Not all conflicts mobilize cleavages. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the politization 
and mobilization of cleavage is related to critical conflicts. The conflicts (or ‘cluster of 
conflict issues’) have a profound quality, such as the conflict over territorial control expressed 
for example by ‘state versus church’ (secular versus religious control) or by the tug of war 
between a centralizing culture and peripheral cultures. 
The definition of  ‘cleavage’ employed in this thesis involves both the political and 
socio-structural level. The political level is operationalised basically as the factions within the 
Saeima in the years 1990-2003 and the corresponding parties, and as the parties and 
categories of parties within the Constitutional Assembly in 1920-22 and the Saeimas 1922-34. 
The social structure is defined in two ways: As descriptive categories taken from the 
literature (‘peasants’, ‘farmers’/’landowners’, ‘workers’, ‘middle class’/‘middle strata’, 
‘bourgeoisie’= wealthier strata, as well as cultural designations like ‘Latgalian’, ‘Baltic 
German’ etc.). Secondly, the social structure is defined by the sets of variables describing 
voters (respondents) in the election surveys. The variables are not exhaustive, and the survey 
may not include all relevant variables. However, the selection of variables should be regarded 
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as relevant for the purpose of measuring contrasts in the population (nationality, place of 
residence (city/rural area), region, income, education etc.)
Words like cleavage and contrasts are used interchangingly in the literature. Intuitively, 
‘contrast’ appear to describe differences that are not as fundamental or deep as ‘cleavage’. For 
practical purposes, I mainly prefer ’contrast’ to describe previously or presently existing 
differences which may represent cleavages or potential cleavages. 
3.4 Sources
There are two ways for identifying a party’s policy: a) On the basis of the party programme 
and b) On the basis of the actual behaviour of representatives in the Saeima. a) may not be 
consistent with b); actual policy may differ from stated goals and intentions. Ideally, a) and b) 
should both be studied, but for linguistic and other practical reasons I have had to rely 
primarily on party programs and secondary descriptions for this study. In addition, I rely on 
newspapers in English; The Baltic Independent, The Baltic Observer and The Baltic Times (a 
merger of the two former newspapers). Concerning the first democratic period, I have relied 
on secondary literary sources in English and German and their descriptions of the parties and 
their political agendas. Margarethe Lindemuth (1969), Albert Zalts (1926), Jürgen von Hehn 
(1966), Alfreds Bilmanis (1928) are central sources regarding political parties. 
The study is based on mainly three kinds of sources: Written secondary sources 
(historical literature, articles and newspapers, copies of public information such as election 
results, and information, news, analyses, and post-election surveys carried out by the Baltic 
Data House (Baltijas Datu Nams, previously LASOPEC). Additionally, I refer to interviews 
carried out in Riga in 1992 and 1993.
My understanding of Latvian is restricted to making use of simple information sheets 
(information presented in a simplistic form), and I do not read Russian. Language restrictions 
is a disadvantage with respect to the selection of sources. 
When I started to look into this topic in 1992, only two books were available in 
Norwegian libraries, to my knowledge; Georg von Rauch’s “The Baltic States. The years of 
independence 1917-1940” and Boris Meissner: “Die Baltischen Nationen. Estland, Lettland, 
Litauen”. Visits to Riga in 1992 and 1993 made it possible for me to collect copies of a 
number of other historical sources, especially regarding the inter-war period. Visits to other 
University libraries, such as at the University of Konstanz, were equally helpful. Naturally, 
not much was written about post-Soviet developments, as they were only starting. Later, the 
availability of second hand sources about older and recent political and social history in 
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Latvia has multiplied, and so has research publications which provide updated insight in the 
situation after the restoration of independence.
A critical comment to the historical sources concerns possibly the “motivation” by the
author. Literature by Latvian writers (in English or German, or translated) may in some 
respect be coloured by a sense of patriotism which is often understandable – yet representing 
a subjective evaluation of events that must be kept in mind. The same goes with German 
Baltic sources. Usually, in historical methodology, sources are regarded as more reliable the 
closer they relate to the actual events. This may however not always be certain. With regard to 
events that involve conflicts, and extreme conflicts, as has been the case between nationality 
and class groups in Latvia, identification, sympathies and/or own experiences by an author 
may contribute to biases that later interpreters of events may avoid. The bulk of the historical 
literature appear to be reasonably objective, and written largely by recognized scholars. 
Information published on the Internet may be regarded by some as less “trustworthy” 
than printed publications, mainly because the Internet is a new kind of medium, which in 
principle allows anyone to publish views, articles and so on. A basic rule apply to the use of 
internet publications similarly to printed sources: To check the credentials of the author (his 
or her credentials is often presented). I have made use of the parties’ Internet sites when in 
English and public sites like the Saeima’s, and various sites that publish news and articles 
about developments in Latvia such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 
Interviews: I carried out interviews with observers (journalists, social scientists, 
political scientists and historians) as well as politicians and party member and leaders in 
Latvia (Riga) in 1992 and 1993. While the information was useful at the time, some of the 
interviews have in the course of time become less applicable in the context of a thesis which 
in the end comprises a bigger time span and allows very little detail about developments of 
parties and events in 1992-93. 
Secondary sources: statistics. I have used statistics regarding demographics such as 
ethnic distribution, urban/rural distribution etc. The literature presents a huge variety of such 
material. I have compiled the relevant statistical information and compared different sources, 
which not always give similar numbers. Sometimes statistics have been rounded off, 
sometimes they differed slightly. The statistic information used in Chapter Four have been 
cross-checked with similar information presented in different sources, and when cross-
checking is not possible I have relied on the given statistics. In some cases the information 
was missing, and must unfortunately be left out in the tables presented. 
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3.4.1 Election Surveys 1993 - 2002
The sampling sizes of the different surveys are 1000 in 1993, 1025 in 1995, 1541 in 1998 and 
1012 in the 2002 survey. The number of respondents that participated in elections and gave a 
certain answer is 593 in 1993, 558 in 1995, 830 in 2002 and 860 in 1998.
Because of the limited number of respondents some sub-groups in the survey have a 
small number of respondents, and the result of such groups does not ensure the necessary 
confidence interval. These results are thus only indicative. 
The presentation of the surveys differs individually. In the 1993 survey, the actual 
count of respondents regarding party preference is presented. However, with regard to the 
response for the different variables, the actual count is not given. The result for each variable 
is presented as “column %”, meaning that the sum of party preference is 100%. The 1998 
survey give the actual count, as “row %” and “column %” for all the variables. The 1995 and 
2002 surveys state the actual count as well as “Weighted row %” and “Weighted column %” 
for all variables. The data are weighted according to demographic data.9 As small errors 
always appear in the result of the data collection process, the data are weighted to diminish 
this error and achieve more precise data. The sample mistake seems to me to be small, and 
only a very small difference appears between calculated percent based on the unweighted 
count and weighted percent. 
Not all of those who participated in elections and participated in the survey have 
answered all the questions. ‘Party preference’ for those who did not answer a specific 
question is not always included in the original data set. This means that the sum of responses 
for a particular question is not always equal to the total number of responders in the survey.
Selected results are presented in Appendix C. The results in per cent are presented in tables  
(for 1995 and 2002 weighted percent) for each sub-group. This means, for example, that in 
the case of a plot of party preference for different nationalities, the sum of the Russian 
response is 100%, the sum of the Latvian response is 100% and the sum of “Other” is 100%. 
The results are presented in this way to make easier the comparison of  ‘party preference’ of 
each group, particularly in cases where there is a difference in size of the different 
groups/categories. (As is the case for Latvians versus Russians in Latvia.) 
The number of respondents is also specified. In the case where this was not shown in the 
data provided from LASOPEC (the 1993 survey) it has been calculated from the percentage 
9
 Information about the surveys of 1995/2002 are provided by Brigita Zepa, director of the Baltic Data House.
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numbers and total number of respondents, assuming that the given percentages are not 
weighted.
3.4.2 A Multivariate Analysis of the 1998 Survey
The raw data of the 1998 survey was made available for this study by Hermann Smith-
Sivertsen and made it possible to perform multivariate analyses. The computer program “The 
UnscramblerTM”10 was used to perform the analysis, and the actual computer work was 
performed by Eva K. Friis.  The selection and combination of variables for the analyses, and 
the interpretation, is my own responsibility. The multivariate analysis was made to study, 
illuminate and possibly confirm other findings regarding cleavages in the population, and the 
results are presented in chapter seven. 
A PLS 2 (Partial Least Square) regression analysis was performed. PLS regression 
analysis has been designed to cope with fully multivariate (X- and Y-space) regression cases 
(Esbensen et al., 1994:274). The regression analysis reveals relations between voter 
(respondent) characteristics (X-variables) and party choice (Y-variables). 
The program visualizes the results in plots. The X- and Y-variables are plotted in a two-
dimensional figure, with the so-called PLS components as axes. A PLS component represents 
the variance of a phenomenon.
The following is a rough description of the nature of PLS components (and principal 
components, PC): Figure 3-1 shows a three-dimensional space with a swarm of data points 
(Esbensen et al., 1994:19-22). An “intuitive” perception would be that a central axis, called 
PC1, could be drawn as indicated in Figure 3-1 a), and that this line would describe the biggest 
variance of the data swarm. In Unscrambler, the PLS components are found by identifying 
the line that minimizes the sum of squared distances from to points to the line. The variations 
in X are analysed by using the variance in Y as a guide.  (Esbensen et al., 1994:21-22). PC1 is 
positioned along the direction of maximum variance, and thus represents the most important 
phenomenon. PC2, as shown in Figure 3-1 b) describes the second largest variance. PC3 
describes the third largest variance, and so on.
10
 The Unscrambler is provided by CAMO ASA, Web site at: http://www.camo.no
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Figure 3-1: The figure shows a swarm of data points in a three- dimensional space. a) shows the first principal 
component and b) shows both the first and the second principal component.
3.4.3 Interpretation of the Unscrambler Plots
The plots in Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4, in chapter 7, are called “X- and Y-loading” plots. 
Entering the X- and Y-loadings in the same plot makes possible a study of both the 
relationship between X-variables and the relationship between X- and Y-variables. In this 
case that means the relationship between voter characteristics (the X-variables) and party 
preference (Y-variables). 
Variables that are close to each other in the plot will have a high positive correlation. The 
same counts for variables in the same quadrant lying close to a straight line through the origin 
(centre). Variables lying in diagonally opposed quadrants will have a tendency to be 
negatively correlated. The same applies for variables lying on or close to a PLS component, 
on each side of the origin. A variable with a large value (far away from the origin) contribute 
much to the PLS components. Variables lying close to the centre are poorly explained by the 
plotted PLS components. Each variable can contribute to more than one PLS component. 
Interpretation of the “phenomena” described by the PLS components is, in this study, a 
key to identify possible (potential) cleavages related to any of the X-variables. The 
interpretation of the loading plot profits from beforehand knowledge about the population, 
which is based on information from a variety of other sources. 
A “score plot” is presented in Figure 7-6 in chapter 7. This plot is complementary to the 
loading plot, and gives valuable information about the objects and the variables together 
(Esbensen et al., 30-31). The score plot shows the location of each individual respondent in 
the same two-dimensional space defined by the PLS-components (as in the loading plot). 










4. THE TRANSFORMATION OF CLASS SOCIETIES INTO A NATION-STATE
4.1 Introduction
Nation-building and democratization is related to economic modernization and the impact of 
ideas of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the Latvian area, it 
meant the transformation of traditional, feudal societies into modern, industrial societies 
characterized by demographic and social mobility, urbanization and industrialization within a 
time span of less than hundred years, from about 1817 with the so-called liberation of the 
serfs, until the beginning of  the 20th century. The traditional structures were at the same time 
kept in place in the Western provinces of Russia, including Courland and Livonia, and created 
extreme social tensions and conflicts. The contrasts of the traditional society remained while 
new contrasts, created by modernization, grew. Social status was inseparable from cultural 
features, profoundly language, in the old society. With modernization, the doubled-faced 
structure got mobilized along “National” and “Class” lines that partially re-inforced eachother 
as social status, cultural identity and language were largely the same. Latvian found 
themselves socially and culturally dominated by the Baltic Germans, a consciousness that 
grew out of the so-called “national awakening” in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A 
national-liberal11 and a radical-revolutionary “national” opposition emerged, but were 
mutually opposed along the class cleavage (Lindemuth, 1976:77) . 
4.1.1 Modernization in the Baltic Provinces
The beginning of modernization in Livonia and Courland can be related to the abolishment of 
serfdom in 1817-19 which marked the beginning of the “emancipation” of the Latvian-
speaking peasantry, which was no real emancipation as the landowners took possession of all 
the peasant land. The reform preconditioned demographic mobility, followed by social 
mobility (education and economic improvement), social improvement for a few members of 
the peasant population, and increasing migration into the cities. Decades later, peasants were 
allowed to by land, and a new strata of independent Latvian farmers came into being 
(Kahk/Tarvel, 1997:53, 85). Two directions of political mobilization happened: One, the 
making of  the peasant culture and language as expression of a separate nation (Gert von 
Pistohlkors, 1993).  Upward social mobility usually meant germanization as German language 
and culture were expressions of higher social status. German was confined to the landowning 
11
 Liberal and National-Liberal are difficult concepts in the Latvian context. It should be understood as an idea 
that is anti-privilege, anti-revolutionary and demanding  political and social reforms that will improve the social, 
economic and cultural position of Latvians in a society dominated by an elite of German-speaking Balts.
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nobility and the educated and commercial classes (Kirby, 1995:54-55). Members of a new 
generation of Latvian intellectuals became the nucleus of a native intelligentsia whose 
national idea would be adopted by an emerging urban Latvian middle strata as a political 
ideology against the class privileges enjoyed by the Baltic German elite. The era is usually 
referred to as the first “national awakening.”12
Second, the corporate privileges and monopolies which secured the local dominance 
of the Baltic German aristocracy, merchants and artisans were kept in place until the 1880s. 
With russification in the late nineteenth century, the decline of the Baltic German local 
autonomy and privileged status began, as revolutionary ideas inspired a new generation of 
students and intellectuals. The revolutionary movement directed their antagonisms against 
Russian absolutism, the Baltic Germans and the Latvian bourgeoisie, including the new class 
of independent Latvian landowners (farmers). The 1890s saw the politization of a new class 
conflict in the cities and in the countryside. 
4.2 A Double-Faced Stratification System
A medieval stratification system based on rigid class segmentation remained in place while 
industrialization and social mobility led to a parallel social structure. The old stratification 
system was created and controlled by the Baltic German aristocracy and put limitations upon 
the new. According to Tönu Parming, the double-faced stratification system contributes to 
explain the complexity of social conflict in the Baltic area (Parming, 1982:1). The privileges 
and monopolies controlled by the aristocratic institutions and reserved for members of the 
German knighthoods (Ritterschaften) put restrictions on the social and economic progress of 
the middle classes. In the countryside, the most important limitation was land, which was 
owned almost entirely by the nobility before the revolution. The re-interpretation of the old 
class-based antagonistic relationship as a class-nation conflict in the late nineteenth century, 
changed the scope of confrontation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Baltic 
Germans constituted 7 per cent of the population in the Latvian territories. The majority, 
35.000 (out of 60.000), inhabited Courland (8,4 per cent) (Dribins, 2000). By 1897, the Baltic 
German proportion was down to 6.2 per cent, and decreasing. Michael Haltzel (1981:151) 
describes the demographic map of Courland and Livonia:
12
 The circulation of the first Latvian-edited and –written newspaper from 1856, the weekly Majas Viesis
(“house guest”) – signalled the start of a general Latvian national awakening, according to Zigurds L. Zile 
(1982). See p. 74 in Ezergailis and von Pistohlkors: The Russian Baltic Provinces between the 1905/1917 
Revolutions.  
36
By 1897 the rural Baltic Germans – that is the nobility, the relatively few 
burgher manor owners, country pastors, doctors and foresters – were isolated 
islands in a sea of non-Germans. In that year the rural population of Kurland, 
for every German there were 32.9 Latvians, 1.7 Russians, and 1.5 Jews. In
Livland the ratio on the land was 27.0 Latvians, 29.3 Estonians and 1.05 Jews 
for every German.
The 1905 revolution in Latvia was a revolt firstly by Latvian peasants against the Baltic 
German landowners (Parming, 1982:1-2, Blodnieks, 1960). The native population and thereby 
most of the total population “[…] was overwhelmingly rural, and the pressing issue for this 
native groups was social justice through land reform, and full abolishment of the feudal 
privileges of the old aristocracy of Baltic German land owners,” according to Parming 
(1982:2).13 Moreover, it was not just a class confrontation, but also a confrontation along 
national/ethnic lines, as the manor owners were German Balts and the rural workers were 
almost all Latvian (Parming, 1982:2). Agnis Balodis says the 1905 revolution in the Baltic 
area had not alone primarily social causes, as in Russia proper, but contained also “strong 
national and political causes” (Blodis, 1990:141). A general strike among 50.000-60.000 Riga 
workers in January 1905, organized by the Latvian Social Democrats and the Jewish Bund, 
“help(ed) sustain a rising campaign of political unrest in the countryside of Kurland and 
southern Livonia throughout the summer” (Kirby, 1995:201). The civil war in the Latvia 
territories 1918-1920, in the wake of the “empire-crushing” First World War and the Russian 
revolution in 1917, was a war along the dimensions of class and nation/ territorial control, 
between revolutionaries who would keep the imperial territory under a socialist regime, the 
Baltic German nobility supported by German forces not yet demobilized, whose aim was to 
make the territory a Germany dutchy; and finally Latvians mobilized in favour of a 
democratic nation-state.14 The national cause was promoted by intellectuals who in many 
cases earned their first political experience as revolutionary agitators and activists at the 
beginning of the century. Adolfs Blodnieks, himself a young Latvian revolutionary who 
became an ardent supporter and advocate of Latvian national aspirations, and later founder of 
a smallholders’ party and prime minister of Latvia, describes the demands put forward by the 
Latvian Social Democracy in the underground press before 1905: “We were asking for a wide 
13
 Adolf Blodnieks writes: “The historic significance of the 1905 revolution was the fact that the Latvian people 
did assert themselves as an independent factor that after 700 years of subjugation to aliens was still capable to 
fight for their national and political freedom and better social conditions.” […] “The revolution of 1905 was a 
Latvian revolution, and with respect to this it must be said that the German press of that time was right when 
speaking of a “Latvian republic”.” (Blodnieks 1960:66) 
14
 The idea of an independent nation matured in certain Latvian circles during the First World War and was not 
adopted as a goal by national-liberals before the summer of 1917. 
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political and economic autonomy for all provinces. We demanded also that the local language 
should be taught in the schools” (Blodnieks, 1960:19). 
4.2.1  Industrialization and Urbanization
While the old stratification more or less prevailed in the countryside, the cities grew into 
centres of a much more diverse ethnic and social mix. The German urban elites (“burghers”) 
remained in power but not as a numerically dominant segment. 63 per cent of Riga inhabitants 
were German-speakers by 1800 (Handrack, 1932), a number that fell to 22.4 per cent by 1897. 
Around 1800, the number of inhabitants in Riga, the administrative, intellectual and merchant 
centre and capital of southern Livonia, was estimated at 29.500. Between 1863 and 1914 the 
population increased from 77.500 to 517.500. The urban population growth turned the ethnic 
structure upside-down. By 1897, a hundred thousand Latvians lived in Riga and had become 
the single largest nationality (42 per cent of the population) compared to 24.000 thirty years 
earlier (24 per cent) (von Pistohlkors, 1993). A non-German middle strata emerged, as well as 
an industrial working class. The Latvian territory was among the empire’s most industrialized 
regions by the turn of the century. 
In 1863, only 14.8 per cent of the population in Courland and southern Livonia lived 
in towns. By 1897, the proportion had increased to 29.4 per cent, and to 40,3 per cent at the 
start of the First World War (Zile, 1982:74). Most city dwellers (70 per cent) lived in the three 
biggest cities: Riga, Liepaja (Libau) and Daugavpils (Dünaburg, Dvinsk) (Blodis, 1990:139).
Andrew Ezergailis (1983) points to the political radicalization among Latvians about a 
decade later: “If any sector of the Russian empire’s population can be designated as a 
vanguard of Bolshevism, it seems the Latvians would qualify” (Ezergailis, 1983:12). 
Differently from Parming’s description of the 1905 revolution, Ezergailis asserts that in 1917 
“there was not much anti-baronial, anti-German opinion.” According to Ezergailis, the anger 
among the socialists was directed against the “grey barons”, i.e. Latvian independent farmers 
and bourgeoisie. (Ezergailis, 1983:16, 283-286) The Latvian intelligentsia at the time was 
split. Also, in 1917, the Social Democratic Party split along Bolshevik/Menshevik lines, the 
Mensheviks were influenced by the Austro-Marxists’ idea of a democratic federation of 
autonomous states (Ezergailis, 1983:70). After the defeat of the German forces and the Red 
Army in 1920, the Bolshevik (Communist) party was prohibited, while the “Menshevik” 
Social Democratic party became the dominant opposition party in the 1920s.
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4.2.2 Between Great Powers
There is an “international dimension” which has always been a crucial factor in the history of 
the Baltics. The Latvian territory was inhabited by ethnically and linguistically different tribes 
whose names are reflected in the names of the districts that constitutes modern Latvia: 
Livland (Vidzeme), Courland (Kurzeme), Zemgale and Latgale.15 The tribes were gradually 
defeated during the conquests and colonization by the crusaders and merchants of the German 
Order (the Baltic branch of the German Order was the Livonian Order) and catholic 
bishoprics from the twelfth century. Today’s Latvians speak a language that belongs to the 
Baltic family, a branch on the Indo-European language tree shared with Lithuanian. The first 
independent (germanized) Livonian state existed until 1561 (von Pistohlkors, 1994:166). 
Most of the non-German and non-Latvian nationalities in independent Latvia reflected 
the region’s strategically and economically vital position situated between the imperial 
powers of Sweden, Russia and Poland. Russian, Jewish, Polish and Lithuanian settlements 
began in earnest during the rule of one or another great power (Jewish immigration during the 
“Polish era”). The western region (Courland) became a dutchy protected by Poland (-
Lithuania) until the third partition of Poland in 1795 when Courland was made a Russian 
province. The north-western region (Livonia/Livland) came under Poland in 1561 with its 
local autonomy guaranteed similarly to Courland. Livonia (minus Latgale) came under 
Sweden 1629 and Russia in 1710-21. 
Latvia has, wholly or partly, been occupied five times since the proclamation of 
independence in November 1918: By Bolshevik forces in 1919 who established the first 
Latvian Soviet Republic (the Iskolat republic), later by German forces who remained after the 
German capitulation in 1918 and assisted the Baltic German aristocrats in their annexation 
attempt; by Soviet forces in 1940-41, by Nazi-German forces in 1941, and returning Soviet 
forces in 1944 (until 1991/9416).   
4.2.3 Latgale: A Dominantly Catholic and Multiethnic Region
Whereas most of the territory inhabited by a Latvian-speaking peasant population experienced 
a relatively similar history dominated by a Lutheran (after the reformation) German ruling 
elite, the south-eastern part of the old Livonian state (Latgale) is in 1561 placed under direct 
rule of catholic Poland. The territory that was conquered by Russia between 1710/21 and 
15
 A few hundred descendants of the Liv tribe resides on the coast of Kurzeme by the Bay of Riga. Their 
language is Finno-Ugric.
16
 The remaining Red Army troops left Latvia in 1994.
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1795 is made into three provinces – Estonia to the north, Livonia and Courland, whereas 
Latgale is incorporated in the Russian province of Vitebsk at the partition of Poland in 1772. 
At the unification with the rest of the independent Latvian territory in 1918-20, 
Latgale differed socio-structurally and culturally from the other Latvian provinces by a more 
complex ethnic composition and a dominant catholic religious culture. The district was far 
less industrialized than the rest of Latvia, economic development was slower, and farming
units were smaller. The Germans in Latgale had become “Polonized” and the local ruling 
strata consisted of Polish and Russian gentry. The emancipation of serfs happened only 1861, 
at a time when the “national awakening” was already underway among Latvian-speaking 
intellectuals in Livland and Courland. The language spoken by Latgalian Latvians was – and 
is - distinctly different from the Latvian spoken in Courland and Livland. A separate Latgalian 
“awakening” led by members of the catholic clergy started at a time when the revolutionary 
movement was beginning to organize in the two other provinces. The separate historical and 
cultural experience of Latgale inspired a national separatist movement in the first decades of 
the twentieth century (von Hehn, 1966:6).
4.3 Ethnic- and Social Structure in the Interwar Period and Present17
By 1920, the Latvians constituted around three fourth of the total population (Handrack, 
1932:28; von Rauch, 1995:82; Garleff, 1978:81), the national minorities constituted 26.6 per 
cent in 1925, and the Latvian majority was 75.5 per cent by 1930. Latvians totally dominated 
Kurzeme (Courland, Western Latvia) and Vidzeme (Southern Livland) – 93.8 per cent of the 
Vidzeme population was Latvian, and 85.5 per cent of the population in Courland in the 
1920s18 (Handrack, 1932:28) but not as much Latgale (56.9 per cent). There were also a high 
concentration of  minority nationalities in Riga, which traditionally had been dominated by 
Baltic Germans. The Latvian proportion of the Riga population in the 1920s was 60 per cent. 
The German presence in Latvia largely came to and end in 1939-41. Only around 400 
individuals identify as Baltic Germans in Latvia today (Dribins, 2000a). 
The largest minority nationality in the 1920s was Russian (7.8 per cent – 10.6 per cent 
in 1935, according to von Rauch; 12.5 per cent according to Handrack who also include 
Byelorussians). The presence of the Russian minority nationality was related to the 
annexation by imperial Russia (Volkovs, 200019). The largest number of Russians lived in 
17
 The literature refer somewhat different numbers with respect to “ethnic” distribution.
18
 Hans Handrack does not make clear which year (1920, 1925 or 1930).
19
 Volkovs, 2000: www.li.lv/old/n_minorities/russians.htm
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Latgale (30 per cent) and secondly in Riga. Over half of the Russians were peasants, a third 
belonged to the urban middle strata and a small segment belonged to the Latgalian 
aristocracy. A significant religious minority in Latgale were Old Believers, schismatic 
congregations that opposed reforms in the 1650s, left  the Russian Orthodox church and 
became persecuted. Many fled, and some settled the Baltic provinces.
The Russians did not develop a concept of a local identity separate from that of the 
people of Russia, according to Volkovs. The perception of a “Great Russian” identity was 
related to the position of the Russians as a core nation of a multinational empire. The result 
was an absence of a local national-cultural self-consciousness. Another, or an additional 
explanation to the lack of coherence among the Russian minority was social differentiation, 
especially between farmers and a small elite of officials and merchants (Garleff, 1978:82).
Jews were permitted by the Russian government to register in Riga in 1841 (Dribins, 
2000b). Most Jewish immigrants came from Germany. A separate Jewish immigration came 
from Poland, Russia and other eastern countries to Latgale. Many Jews moved to Riga after 
independence to find employment or worked in the industry. The ethnic differentiation in 
Latvia by 1920, 1935 and 1989 is shown in Table 4-1:
Table 4-1: Ethnic differentiation in Latvia by 1920, 1935 and 1989*
Nationality**    1920 (numbers)     %   1935 
(numbers)
     %    1989
(numbers)
   % 2000     
%
Latvian 1, 35 mill   75.6 1,47 mill    75.5 1,39 mill    52   57.7
Russian   124,746    7.8   206,499    10.6   905,515    34   29.6
Byelorussians     75,630    4.7     26,867      1.4   119,702     4.5     4.1
Ukranian -- -- -- -- -- (Other)     2.7
Jews     58,133    5.2     93,479      5.0     22,897     0.9 (Other)
Germans --    3.6     62,144      3.7          400 -- (Other)
Poles     52,244    2.8     48.949      3.1      60,388     2.3     2.5
Lithuanians --    1.6     22,900      1.4      34,630     1.3     1.4
Estonians --    0.6       7,000      0.4        3,312     0.1 (Other)
Other -- -- -- -- -- --     2.0
Totally 1,60 mill 1,95 mill. 2.67 mill.
  *The survey of 1920 is incomplete (due to the war situation). 
**Identified by first language; Jews by confession. 
    The numbers are compiled from a number of different sources, including Hans Handrack (1932), John 
Fitzmaurice (1992), Agnis Balodis (1990), Georg von Rauch (1995), Wilfried Schlau (Boris Meissner, 1991) and 
The Latvian Institute.
4.3.1 The Impact of Religion
The religious map of Latvia reflects the variety of nationalities and cultural backgrounds 
among inhabitants. The first influence may have been Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the 
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ninth century (Plakans, 1997: 130-131). Western Christianity arrived with the German 
crusaders three centuries later, about a century after the schism that in 1054 divided the 
Byzantine church into Greek (Orthodox) and Latin (Roman Catholic) churches. The 
institutions of the “Western” church were well established in the medieval Livonian state, and 
all the Baltic people had been (nominally) Christianized, according to Plakans. The Western 
church in the Baltic region adopted Lutheranism following the reformation, except for Eastern 
Livonia that became part of  Poland - Latgalians remained catholic (Garleff, 1978:83).
The control of the Lutheran church over the peasant (Latvian) population met 
challenges from two different quarters in the eighteenth and nineteenth century: the pietistic 
Herrnhut movement (Moravian Brethren), that originated in Germany, and attracted an 
estimated 5,000 Latvian peasants away from the Lutheran church between 1730 and 1800 
(Plakans, 1997:115-116, 131). The Herrnhut movement left a strong pietistic tradition in 
Latvian religiosity, according to Plakans (1997), and the movement was important to the 
Latvian peasant as it inspired literacy and improved self-consciousness. Some regard the 
Herrnhut congregations as the first Latvian “national” movement.” (Plakans, 1997:116).20
A different challenge was presented by the Russian Orthodox conversion movement in 
the 1840s, when thousands of peasant families accepted to become Orthodox Christians, due 
to rumours that they would be granted land in Russia. A few decades later, new attempts to 
make the Baltic peasants turn to Orthodoxy was carried out as part of a broader Russification 
policy (von Pistohlkors, 1993:187). German Lutheranism and Russian Orthodoxy were 
“competing religions” in the Baltic regions ruled by Russia and dominated by a German elite 
(Haltzel, 1981:161). The majority of Latvians  remained Lutheran at the turn of the twentieth 
century, and only 10 per cent of the population in the Baltic provinces (Estland, Livland and 
Courland) were Orthodox; one quarter of them were Russian (Haltzel, 1981:162).
By 1920,  57.2 per cent of the population were Lutheran, Catholics 22.6 per cent, 
Orthodox 14 per cent, Jews 5.2 and other faiths about 2 per cent (Plakans, 1997:131). 
4.3.2 Ethnic Cultural  Autonomy
The local elites were traditionally German Balts who took care of local government, while the 
Russians belonged to the “ruling race” (von Rauch, 1995:135). Following 1918, the two 
national groups had to come to terms with being cultural minorities within a new, democratic 
20For more details there is a paper posted on the Internet by Anna Munson (2001): “The Moravian 
Brethren in the Baltic And Their Influence on the Rise of Cultural Nationalism”, Washington University, at 
http://depts.washington.edu/baltic/papers/moravian.html
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nation-state. The Baltic Germans mobilized their political potential by collaboration within a 
single election alliance, while the Russians, and the Jews, remained politically fragmented. 
The Latvian constitution guaranteed the minorities equality before the law, as well as the right 
to political participation. The Baltic Germans managed in 1919 to secure school autonomy 
that was made into a general minority school autonomy law, but the minorities did not 
achieve an extensive cultural autonomy as in neighbouring Estonia (Garleff, 1976:82-83, 85, 
89). The staunchest opposition came from the nationalistic, urban-based “democrats” and 
Latgalian representatives, while the right21 and the left supported the proposition (Garleff, 
1976:88).  The debate on the protection of  minorities’ schools included the question of 
language of instruction. Other important cultural issues were the struggle about the ownership 
to (Baltic German) Lutheran churches, the buildings of the local feudal Ritterschaften 
(Knights’) institutions and other buildings. The school autonomy law came increasingly under 
attack in the late 1920s and early 1930s, as the ideological climate became increasingly 
polarized and acute, but the law remained in place throughout the democratic years. 
 The new Latvian nationalism grew within a context of economic crisis, political crisis 
and external pressure from the Soviet Union and developments in Germany. The political 
climate in the 1930s was marked by social, ethnic, political and ideological polarization. A 
consequence was the formation of a nationalist government in Latvia in 1931 and attempts to 
remove the school autonomy law (von Rauch, 1995:144, Garleff, 1978:94).
4.3.3 Ethnic Socio-economic Differentiation
Agriculture was the dominant economic sector in the inter-war years, and industry was based 
upon agricultural resources. Latvians dominated agriculture, the army and civil services 
compared to their share of the population, and much less represented in the free professions 
and trade. Russians and Byelorussians were employed mainly in agriculture. Baltic Germans 
were heavily found in the free professions and trade, as were Jews. Poles dominated in 
industry and transport relative to their share of the population. 
21
 “Right” here means conservatives. The Latvian nationalists made up the “centre” of the political spectrum. 
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%    60.99    12.61   6.13     3.52   1.24      1.54     2.92
Latvians
   80.2    65.9  37.47    71.99  81.14    83.4   53.66   75.6
Russians* 15.34      8.10    4.85      8.87    8.21      5.43     9.4   12.3
Jews      0.08    11.0 40.71      4.01    2.79      0.42 13.11     4.5
Germans      0.98        7.98 12.24      4.65    3.03      6.0 18.95     3.3
Poles      1.85 4.19   1.97 6.32    3.43      2.85     2.66     2.5
*Russians and Byelorussians.
4.4 Occupations, Annexation and a New Demographic Structure
The Russian proportion of the population increased 3.5 times between 1935 and 1989, mainly 
a result of the Soviet industrialization and migration policies. The social differentiation among 
Russians changed as well. Russians made up a significant proportion employed in the large 
agricultural sector before 1934, but following the Soviet occupation more than a third of the 
Russians were employed in the industry and only 7 per cent in agriculture (Volkovs, 2000).23
The Soviet occupation and annexation in June 1940, the occupation by the Nazi army 
in July 1941, and re-occupation by the Soviet Union in 1944 for the next four decades 
drastically changed the ethnic and social structure. There were three waves of deportations of 
mostly Latvians. Totally, 150,000 people were lost in deportations, executions and guerrilla 
warfare (1940-50) (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1993:42, 47, 99, 129) and also significant 
numbers emigrated to the West (Plakans, 1997:64). Migration from Russia and other Soviet 
republics was initiated to increase the industrial workforce after the deportations, and served 
also to neutralize the ‘national’ element in non-Russian republics. Migration to Latvia was 
forced during the Stalin regime. Later people came voluntary, often motivated by the 
relatively “better” economic and social conditions in the western republics (Misiunas and 
Taagepera, 1993:108,111-112,194). Another aspect to the changed ethnic differentiation was 
the devastating consequences of the Holocaust, near-extermination of the Jews in systematic 
massacres following the Nazi invasion in July 1941.24  Over 90 per cent of the Latvian Jewish 
22Free professions comprises intellectual work, science, journalism and self-employment, for example artisans.
23
 The corresponding Latvian figures were 25 and 22 per cent.
24
 One detailed description is written by Ezergailis (1996). Local participation in the massacres of Jews remains a 
sensitive and disputed issue. Different authors states different numbers of Jews in Latvia in 1939. According to 
Ezergailis, there were 86,422 by 1939 and by 1943 their numbers were 12,964 (table p. 58). According to Rein 
Taagepera and Romuald Misiunas (1993) 93,000 Jews lived in Latvia by 1939. Thousands of Jews were killed or 
deported by the Soviet regime before the German invasion. Of about 70,000 left in 1941 at the Soviet retreat, 
only 4,000 survived.
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population was killed by the Nazis and local henchmen. Today, the Jewish community 
consists of 14,000-15,000 individuals, some of them are Soviet immigrants.
In the late 1980s, the Latvians made up only 52 per cent of the population. While the 
number of Russians in Latvia increased by nearly 50 per cent before 1979, residents who 
considered Russian their mother tongue increased by nearly 80 per cent. Among them were 
Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews and other who moved to the Latvian SSR (Volkovs, 
2000). By 1989, Russian speakers outnumbered ethnic Latvians in Latvia’s six biggest cities, 
including Riga. In Latvia’s second biggest city, south-eastern Daugavpils, only 15 per cent of 
the city’s inhabitants were ethnic Latvians. Riga was made the headquarter of the regional 
Soviet military district and home of a large number of Soviet military personnel. By 1991, 
about one third of Riga’s population were ethnic Latvians.
4.4.1 Bolshevization and Russification
An important aspect to the “internationalization” or “Sovietization” of the Latvian population, 
was russification. The Soviet communists, like the tsars who adopted the slavophile agenda in 
the late nineteenth century, made Russian the common and official language of their 
multinational empire, with Russians as its core nation, to the effect that “Russian” became 
synonymous with the communist regime and “occupier”. The goal of the Soviet nationality 
policy was to create “a single nation with a single language” – Russian - which was “the 
language of the socialist culture” as expressed by the Latvian Communist General Secretary 
August Voss in 1960 (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1993:174). The displacement of the Latvian 
as the dominant language increased the awareness among Latvians of their subordinate status 
in their homeland, according to Jubulis (2001:51). The politics of economic and social 
‘bolshevization’ (heavy industrialization and planned economy) and cultural ‘russification’ 
became a target of the national, liberal, pro-democratic, environmental and human rights’ 
movements in the late 1980s. 
A simplistic description of the social structure resulting from sovietization is one of 
manual unskilled workers, skilled workers, intellectuals, party and state bureaucrats, and 
collective farmers, with private lots. The emphasis was on labour- and resource intensive 
industrial production. The pollution and indiscriminate use of energy and other resources led 
to the first political mobilization in Latvia against the plans of a hydroelectric plant at the 
Daugava river (Misiunas and Taagepera, 1993:304, Lieven, 1994:293). Lacking a sanctioned 
political arena of opposition, public demonstrations became the channel of frustration and 
anger against environment damages, human rights abuse as well as national manifestations. 
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Confrontations in 1988-1990 were between defenders of the Soviet Union and communism, 
and a growing majority of people who wanted national independence or, at least, changes.25
There were all nationalities in both camps, but a solid majority of Russians among the pro-
communists and a solid majority of Latvians among the supporters of independence. 
4.5 New Nation-Building Conflicts
Two major non-economic conflict issues have become dominant since 1991, concerning 
citizenship, and language. Whereas citizenship was not an issue in 1920, language and 
education was, as part of the cultural autonomy struggle. 
4.5.1 Language and Education
A law adopted in 1989 made Latvian the official language. The revised law which took effect 
in May 1992 states:  
Latvia shall be the only ethnic territory in the world which is inhabited by the Latvian 
nation. One of the main prerequisites for the existence of the Latvian nation and for 
the preservation and development of the Latvian nation shall be the Latvian language.
Latvian held a secondary status during the Soviet regime. Education was conducted in both 
Latvian and Russian in separate schools. In schools with mixed language instructions, 
Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers attended separate classes. Latvians and non-Russian 
minorities became bilingual whereas few Russian-speakers learned the local language, 
Latvian. This has led to a new conflict related to the policy of national integration and defence 
of Latvian as the national language. Language as mother tongue and second language shows 
that the Latvian society was a bi-lingual society (Latvian and Russian) by 1989 (Kolstø, 
1999:158)26. 97.4 per cent of Latvians regarded Latvian as their mother tongue, whereas only 
1.1 per cent of Russians in Latvia regarded Latvian their mother tongue. 2.6 per cent of 
Latvians regarded Russian as their mother tongue, and 98.8 per cent of Latvian Russians 
regarded Russian their mother tongue. 21.1 per cent of Latvian Russians spoke Latvian 
fluently, while 65.7 per cent of Latvians spoke Russian fluently.
In 1999, The Latvian government adopted in a national integration program that defines the 
nation state on the basis of shared basic values and the use of the Latvian language as the 
main indicator. The government recognized that Latvia historically has “never been an 
25
 There may be structural, cultural and political differences between Soviet migrants and non-Latvians with a 
background spanning over several generations in Latvia, but to my knowledge no such surveys have been 
published in English.
26
 Kolstø’s sources are public statistics (USSR census). 
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ethnically homogenous society” and acknowledge the right of ethnic non-Latvians to preserve 
their ethnic identity (Jubulis, 2001:228-129). Liberal-centrist Latvian parties recognize Latvia 
as a multicultural state, in which bilingualism and multilingualism exists with Latvian as the 
common denominator and state language. The acceptance of multiculturalism is partly 
motivated by a recognition that other non-Russian minorities in Latvia suffered equally and 
even more under the Soviet Russification policies, and have become “Russian speakers” 
(Jubulis, 2001:132). 
Pål Kolstø (1999) regards the official categorization of ethnic groups as artificial:  
“Linguistically, the great majority of non-Latvians functions as one group. A great majority of 
the minorities commands Russian far better than their supposed mother tongue, in many cases 
they do not know their ethnic language at all” (Kolstø, 1999:158). Few members of the non-
Russian minority population regarded Latvian as their mother tongue in 1991. A larger 
proportion regarded their nationality’s language as their mother tongue. 
Statistics presented by Kolstø may also be looked at differently: Despite the Soviet 
Union’s russification policies; the promotion of Russian as a superior language, with 
socioeconomic advantages related to using Russian; the Latvian society remained largely 
multi-linguistic in 1989. Even among Byelorussians and Ukrainians whose own traditional 
language is close to Russian, 64.8 per cent and 49.4 per cent, respectively, regard Russian 
their first language. Among Jews, nearly one in four actually regard Hebrew their mother 
tongue (22.5 per cent). The language issue has a potential for mobilizing a Russian-speaking 
opposition and pushing a bilingual agenda – depending, perhaps, on the naturalization process 
and to which extent permanent residents opt for citizenship. 
4.5.2 Citizenship
The first major conflict issue following independence was the decision on citizenship. With 
the restoration of independence, the Supreme Council (formerly the Supreme Soviet) re-
adopted the 1922 Constitution27 and restored citizenship to all inhabitants who could verify 
having had citizenship before June 17, 1940, or being direct descendants of pre-war citizens. 
A significant number of the population, around 40 per cent, remained Soviet citizens until the 
USSR ceased to exist in December 1991. A majority were Russians and other non-Latvians 
(see Chapter Five). A majority of citizens were ethnic Latvians, about 75 per cent. A decision 
on the legal status of USSR citizens was left to be decided by the first post-Soviet national 
27
 In 1991 the Supreme Council readopted the Constitution, but leaving out some sections. On 6 July, 1993, the 
newly elected Parliament (5th Saeima) fully re-instated the Constitution in the Saeima’s first meeting.
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assembly, the 5th Saeima, elected in June 1993. The Naturalization28 Law adopted by the 
Saeima introduced a quota system that strictly limited the number of  applicants. The system 
got substituted in 1994 by a different system consisting of so called “age windows” which 
opened up to new age groups each year. The restrictions got altogether abolished in 1998, 
after severe criticism from international bodies like the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the European Union. The decision to abolish technical restrictions 
was made on the basis of a referendum. Automatic citizenship were granted to children born 
by parents who were residents by 4 May 1990, if the parents wished. By 1999, the citizenship 
issue and the Naturalization Law were fading as a political issue, while the language issue 
emerged as an offshoot and directly related to the “independence” cleavage.
4.6 Non-Latvian Cities, Latvian Countryside
The Latvian proportion of the population decreases with urbanization. Russians and other 
non-Latvians numerically dominate the urban areas, while Latvians dominate the countryside 
and smaller urban centres (Aasland, 1996). The numerically stronger positions of Russian-
speakers in the cities have been politically “neutralized” through the citizenship policy, but 
this may change. 
73 per cent of the total population were citizens by 1994. 98 per cent of ethnic 
Latvians were citizens, only 40 per cent of Russians and 31 per cent of other minorities were 
citizens. The largest proportion of Russian non-citizens is in Riga (29 per cent, and 23 per 
cent of other minorities). The proportion of Russian Latvian citizens is bigger in other large 
cities (40 per cent) and even more in towns (more than 50 per cent) and in rural areas (nearly 
70 per cent). This information seems to reveal a different pattern of settlement between Soviet 
Russian migrants and Latvian Russians with a longer history in Latvia. The newcomers tend 
to live in the cities, and profoundly Riga.
4.6.1 Effects of the Economic and Social Transition
Whereas social and economic differences and unemployment did not, officially, exist in the 
Soviet society, post-Soviet Latvia experiences a rapid economic transition involving the 
development of a civic society, privatization of properties and companies, market economy, a 
reorientation of trade and EU membership within close range. The costs of the transition are 
unemployment and social problems related to poverty. A new social differentiation is 
28
 Naturalization: The procedure for being granted citizenship.
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developing: A well-to-do elite29, a relatively large well-off urban middle strata and a large 
poorer strata. The new Latvian economy emerged within a Soviet economy already in 
recession. With independence, Latvia lost its (Soviet) markets for the offset of goods as well 
as supplies of raw materials, facing “chaos” on the post-Soviet market (Nørgaard, 1994:125). 
The result was a steep fall in GDP (Latvia 1992: 44 per cent) and production, rising 
unemployment and decreasing standards of living. The NORBALT Living Conditions project 
(1996) identified illiterate people, people without education or lower education, and 
pensioners as the most vulnerable groups in the transitional society (Aasland, 1996:210-212). 
The report found that living conditions were worse in Latgale than in other regions, and 
women were worse off than men. According to Aasland; ethnic affiliation and citizenship 
status appeared irrelevant as and explanation to vulnerability (Aasland, 1996:212). This 
finding indicate that a political mobilization along a socioeconomic “class” dimension may 
cut across the Nation-Building ethnic-cultural dimension. 
A question is whether there is emerging, or would emerge, a urban-rural economic  
dimension, between a relatively well-off urban population and a rural population experiencing 
poverty, or even an “Eastern” versus “Western” dimension with eastern Latgale and partly 
southern Zemgale as less economically developed areas in contrast to the more affluent north-
western Vidzeme and western Kurzeme. 
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The bases of  the first Latvian political parties were institutions like the bourgeois Riga 
Latvian Association (1868) and the social democratic Latvian Union (1902). Political parties 
developed in basically four phases up to 1922: (1) 1902-1905 when Latvian Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party (1904) and other social democratic parties were organized, (2)
between 1905 and 1907 when the majority of  non-socialist (liberal, democratic and 
conservative) parties were formed, (3) in the course of the early 1900s, when farming 
organizations won greater independence and founded the rural Farmers’ Union party in 1917, 
and (4) the formation of a large number of  new parties, including ethnic and regional, after
1918. Many Latvian parties emerged from refugee- and relief organizations established in 
exile during the First World War  (See Henriksson, 1983: 83ff; Pulkis, 1982:115-116; 
Lindemuth, 1969/1976; Ronis, 1990; Wittram, 1954: 250). An additional fifth phase
following independence include the formation of smallholders’ parties in the wake of the 
Land Reform in 1922; a reform that created a new social segment of small rural landowners, 
many formerly belonging to the rural proletariat, whose political affiliation had recently been 
with the revolutionary movement. There was a process of social differentiation among rural 
Latvians in the latter half of the Nineteenth century (Loit, 1985:68-69) with a new strata of 
landowners and a lower class of landless peasant workers. According to Loit, the landless 
population stood at 60-70 per cent in the 1890s (Loit, 1985:69). In the 1920s, the new 
smallholders did not find common ground with the old “class enemy”, the farmers. Nor did 
they associate with the social democrats, and the new smallholders’ parties would mostly 
collaborate with the liberals and democrats – the Latvian nationalistic “centre” (von Hehn, 
1966:11,13). 
New parties were formed and disappeared with rather high frequency during the 
democratic years in the 1920s and 30s, but the basic structure of oppositions was in place by 
1925: Social Democrats versus non-socialist radical parties (the liberal and democratic 
“centre”) and conservatives (including German and confessional), farmers’ parties and new 
smallholders’ parties, minorities’ parties and Latgalian.   
Most post-Soviet parties emerged from the struggle for independence, the movements formed 
in 1987/1988 and the Supreme Council factions 1990-1993. Three parties got re-established 
as successors of pre-war parties, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, the Farmers’ 
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Union and the Democratic Centre Party. Each party was the dominant one of the ideological 
‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’, respectively, in the democratic period between the wars.  This 
chapter focuses on the development of parties, the main differences, origins and ideological 
“identity”. I will start with the most recent development of oppositions and parties.
5.2 Parties and Political Conflicts in the 1990s
The main line of confrontation in the last Soviet Latvian election in 1990; the only free and 
competitive election to the Latvian Supreme Soviet; was between defenders of the Soviet 
empire and people who would re-establish Latvia’s independence (1988-91). The former were 
primarily hardliners within the Latvian Communist party, organized within the Supreme 
Council in the “Equal Rights” faction and in the Interfront movement. Pro-independence 
forces gathered in the Latvian Peoples’ Front (Latvijas Tautas Fronte – LTF), the smaller 
Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvijas Nacionala Neatkariba Kustiba – LNNK) 
and the environment protection club (Vides Aizsardzîbas Klubs - VAK). LTF represented the 
pro-independence forces in the Supreme Soviet elections in March 1990. 
5.2.1 The Citizenship Issue
The Supreme Council (Soviet) made a decision 4 May 1990 on the transition to independence, 
which was de facto declared on 23 August 1991. The most immediate question was how to 
define the country’s citizenry before elections to the independent national assembly, the fifth 
Saeima, in June 1993. The Law on Citizenship adopted 15 October 1991 re-established 
approximately the pre-war proportion of ethnic Latvians and minorities (75:25) among the 
citizenry. 
The decision opened up a conflict which would often be described as an “ethnic” 
conflict between Latvians and Russians.30 While there was a strong “ethnic” (national-
cultural) component, the conflict was rather about the political status of Soviet migrants and 
related to the Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940 (Lieven, 1994:222). 38 per cent of Russians 
living in Latvia (278,087 persons) received automatic citizenship as citizens of the Latvian 
republic before 1940, or as direct descendants of citizens.  90 per cent of the Roma population 
and 62 per cent of the Poles in Latvia received automatic citizenship. Between 30,000 and 
30
“The Latvians are divided between at least three different confessions. But the reason why we do not have big 
conflicts like in Moldova or Ngorno-Karabakh is a good tradition of national co-existence. We have not had very 
serious ethnic conflicts. Now we are beginning to see some signs of such conflicts. The new russophobia is a 
reaction against the (communist, bs) regime. The Russians and the system get mixed up”. The statement was 
made by professor Ilga Apine during a lecture (“The peculiarities of Latvian ethnic structure”) in Riga, 1993.  
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40,000 “ethnic” Latvians who were not citizens of the pre-war republic did not receive 
automatic citizenship. (Jubulis, 2001:25). The ‘First Republic’ was formally revived by the 
readoption of the 1922 Constitution, and by returning pre-war citizenships. The opposite 
position, held mainly by Russians, other non-Latvians and some Latvians, most related to the 
Latvian Communist Party, was the ‘Zero Option’ which was to grant citizenship to all 
inhabitants as of 4 May 1990. This position implied the establishment of a “Second Republic” 
and seen by many Latvians as accepting the earlier Soviet claim that the incorporation of 
Latvia in the USSR was voluntary and legal. 
Following the definition of the citizenry, the debate concerned the law on 
naturalization. The “nationalists” (LNNK, Fatherland, 11th November Union and other 
groups) feared that the inclusion of all Soviet migrants would continue to erode the basis of 
the Latvian nation as the proportion of Latvians was down to 52 per cent in 1989 (see 4.6.1, 
4.6.2 and 4.7). The “pragmatics”, between the two extremes, worried that denying several 
hundred thousand residents citizenship rights would increase tensions domestically and 
discredit Latvia’s image internationally. By 1992 the parties of the Soviet-elected Supreme 
Council was divided into roughly three groups along the ‘Citizenship’ issue dimension 
(Lieven, 1994). 
A difference between the “nationalists” and “moderates” (or “pragmatists”) – an 
important political subdivision – originated in the different goals and strategies chosen by the 
Latvian National Independence Movement (founded in June 1988) and the Latvian Popular 
Front (October 1988) (Fitzmaurice, 1992:124): The Popular Front would work within the 
Supreme Soviet (Council) and negotiate the terms for independence. The LNNK, including 
the radical part of the Popular Front, in principle rejected the Supreme Soviet’s legitimacy. 
Only a representative body elected by Latvia’s legitimate citizens could speak and decide on 
behalf of the people. In reality, both LNNK and LTF placed their bets on two horses; leaning 
officially to different strategies while also supporting the other. The Popular Front sponsored 
the Citizens’ Committees, that were to elect the Citizens’ Congress; a shadow Parliament; 
while running candidates for the Supreme Council elections. LNNK put its own candidates on 
the Popular Front ticket for the Supreme Soviet elections. Several people were members of 
both movements (Fitzmaurice, 1992).
The Popular Front movement at first aimed at national autonomy within the USSR 
(see 7.3.1. Latvian Liberalism and “The Federative Idea”). The second LTF Congress in 1989 
adopted independence as the goal, and the Zero-Option. After independence, the LTF 
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organization adopted the modified “First Republic” position, saying Soviet migrants must live 
in the country for minimum 10 years (later 16) to apply for citizenship.31
5.3 Supreme Council Factions
A group of reformists, mostly Latvians and led by Ivars Kezbers,32 left the Communist Party 
at its 25th Congress. The “pinks”, as the reformed communists were nicknamed, formed an 
independent party which in September was named the Latvian Democratic Labour Party 
(Latvijas Demokratiska Darba Partija – LDDP) and headed by Jurijs Bojars.33 LDDP merged 
with the Social Democratic Labour Party in 1999. 
Alfred Rubiks was First Secretary of the Latvian Communist party during the violent 
attacks against the pro-independence Latvian SSR government in January 1991 and during the 
failed coup d’etat later that year. He headed the Salvation Front, an anti-independence 
organization, which tried to take control of the Latvian state apparatus in January. Rubiks was 
sentenced to eight years in prison for treachery against the state of Latvia,34 but returned to the 
Socialist Party as their leader in 2002. The Socialist Party (founded in 1994) emerged from 
the “Equal Rights” movement and faction; the former Communist Party. 
The Popular Front captured 131 of 201 mandates in the Supreme Council elections in 
March 1990 (Butenschön, 1992: 161). The block included pro-reform liberals, reformed 
communists, members of the Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party, the Farmers’ Union, 
LNNK and the Green Party. The “Equal Rights” faction (59) included members of Interfront, 
the Agrarian Union and the Communist Party. Between the blocks was a mixed group of 11 
“independent” deputies whose political affiliation was with the Communist Party as well as 
the reformed communists and LNNK  (Butenschön, 1992:161.162)35. 
A crucial decision by the democratically elected Supreme Council was the resolution 
“On the renewal of Republic of Latvia’s citizens’ rights and fundamental principles of 
naturalization” 15 October 1991. Residents who did not qualify for automatic citizenship 
could not participate in Saeima elections. Privatization and withdrawal of Soviet troops were 
31
 Lieven (1994) claims that the LTF politicians who argued in favour of the Zero Option did so “with rare 
exception”(….)”simply out of fear of a local Russian revolt, invasion by Moscow or isolation from a critical 
West.” pp. 276-277. 
32
 Ivars Kezbers later became a deputy of DP “Saimnieks” (1995-96).
33
 Current (2003) chairman of the Latvians Social Democratic Labour Party.
34
 Rubiks served six years. Vigdis Nygaard  writes in a footnote in her thesis that it became clear that OMON 
forces which attacked Riga in January 1991 acted on orders from Rubiks and not the minister of interior in 
Moscow, Boriss Pugo. (Nygaard, 1993:64)
35
 Handbook: Latvijas Republikas Augstaka Padome 1991 and other written information collected at the 
Saiema’s information office in 1992
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equally urgent domestic issues, and privatization depended partly on the resolution of the 
citizenship issue. Privatization issues did not divide the factions along traditional positions 
with respect to state or private ownership. Among liberals and conservatives, who held 
majority, there was no question about privatizing, but differences over procedures and forms 
of privatization slowed down the process. 
5.3.1  Political-Ideological Designations
A complicated question with regard to Latvian politics is the use of, and usefulness of, 
ideological designations. I will return to the issue in Chapter Seven. Here, I will address the 
issue briefly and preliminary, as I have already made use of ideological designations. 
A problem with the conservative designation in relation to Latvian political parties 
concern the Latvian parties’ oppositional nature of origin, whether as a bourgeois or socialist 
opposition to Russian and German rule and dominance, or opposition to the Soviet regime and 
communism, with the aim to restore independence. With regard to Latvian liberals; their main 
concern have traditionally been national autonomy, and the term ‘liberal’ has actually hardly 
been used (Ezergailis, 1971), neither in the early twentieth century nor in the 1980s and 
1990s. ‘Liberal’ parties are (traditionally) parties whose political programmes underline 
individuals’ freedoms and responsibilities, respect and tolerance of diversity, and advocate 
reforms in the economic and social sphere.36  ‘Conservative’ designates parties that share 
conservative values; that is; an inclination to preserve and protect existing values and 
traditions inherited from ancestors, and resistance to change that can threaten these values37. 
Liberal political thoughts grew in Baltic German circles in the late 19th century along with 
modernization in the Baltic provinces. Under pressure from imperial reforms from “above” 
and demands for political and social rights from “below”,  Baltic German liberal bourgeoisie 
settled for institutional and political reforms in order to modernize and prevail. The 
traditional, conservative elite resisted change which could threat their privileges.  
Around 1990, the local hardline Soviet communists were in principle in a 
“conservative” position, going against change and reforms. While reforms were put forward 
from “above” (Perestroika and Glasnost), further reforms were demanded from “below”. The 
conservative forces were those who sought to upheld and preserve the Bolshevik revolution; 
but ideologically they were the very opposite of what is regarded “conservative” in a common  
36




political terms. The successors of the hardline communists today remain marxist and 
constitute an ideological opposition to the ‘national’ conservative and liberal parties. 
Conservative and liberal programmes today contain few if any real differences with 
regard to important issues. However, a “non-negotiable” attitude with respect to the  
reinvigoration of the First republic and rejection of  a “mass incorporation” of Soviet migrants 
as Latvian citizens have become the most important defining elements to the conception here 
of “conservative” in the present-day Latvian context (see 5.4.1.). A second element that 
distinguishes between ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ is the priority given to economic issues, 
business and development above national-cultural issues (liberal), or national-cultural issues 
above economic issues (conservative). A third element that I consider relevant but not 
necessary when identifying conservative Latvian parties, is the incorporation of  religion or 
religious ethics in the party programme. Last but not least; in the course of the 1990s, several 
parties have adopted liberal or conservative designations in their programmes and identifies 
themselves as belonging to one or another ideological families – and have become members 
of European “party families”.  I will elaborate and discuss ideological designations in Chapter 
Seven. 
5.4 The Popular Front Faction Disintegrates
New issues following independence created tensions within the LTF faction. In late 1991, 31 
deputies formed a right wing faction called “Constitution” (“Satversme”), led by Janis 
Vaivads. “Constitution” was more “resolute in questions concerning citizenship and restoring 
property rights” (The Baltic Observer, 5/1992). A second splintergroup, “Country” (“Lauku” 
– 20 deputies) was formed in 1992 by LTF deputies and members of the Farmers’ Union who 
considered farming interests neglected by the existing factions.  In addition, a left-leaning 
group called “Centre” (“Centrs”) broke away from LTF in early 1992, in response to the 
radicalization of LTF politics on the citizenship issue. The ‘Centre’ was too small to form a 
faction and joined the group of independent deputies. From July 1992 the independents also 
included the remaining members of the “Equal Rights” faction after 15 “Equal Rights” 
deputies got expelled from the Supreme Council. Another split happened between the Popular 
Front organization and the LTF and ”Constitution” factions which refused to follow the party 
line imposed by the organization. Popular Front’s 5th congress declared that neither of the two 
factions anymore represented LTF (Osipovs, 1993). In fact, the role of the LTF had been 
played out. In the 1993 elections, the Popular Front that had played such an important role at a 
crucial time became decimated at the polls with only 2,6 per cent of the votes. The LNNK 
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movement transformed successfully into a national conservative party in 1994. A reason why 
the Popular Front movement failed may be a fall in popularity during two years in 
government. According to Anatol Lieven, the population experienced a severe decline in 
living standards (Lieven, 1984:297). Besides, the most popular figures joined other parties, 
not least Latvia’s Way. In 1996, the remaining LTF was renamed the Christian Peoples’ 
Party, which merged in 2002 with the conservative Christian Democratic Union into Latvia’s 
First Party (Latvijas Pirma Partija, LPP).
5.4.1 Popular Front’s “Offspring” 
The primary “heir” of the LTF faction was Latvia’s Way.  Jubulis (1991) consider the party as 
the successor of the LTF also in terms of policies. More than half of LC’s 36 deputies in the 
5th Saeima came from the original LTF faction.38 Most ‘Constitution’ faction deputies 
belonged to LNNK, some to the Green Party which emerged from the Environmental Club. 
The left wing of the LTF faction grew into the Democratic Centre Party headed by Aivars 
Kreituss39 and Concord for Latvia headed by Janis Jurkans, an LTF foreign minister. 
Jurkans claims his Concord Party (1995: Tautas Saskana Partija – TSP) is the real 
descendant of the original LTF, which included all national groups and supported the zero 
option settlement of the citizenship issue. 
Most of the parties of the post-Soviet Saeima are linked to the Popular Front. 
Exceptions are the factions and parties ascending from the anti-independence wing of the 
Supreme Council, “Equal Rights” and the Socialist Party, and their counterpart, For 
Fatherland and Freedom (Tevzemei un Brivibai –TB), which is linked to the Citizens’ 
Congress. 
5.4.2 Contrasts Between Nationalist Parties: Defining the ‘Nation’
The fifth Saeima adopted the Law on citizenship and naturalization in 1994. Mark A. Jubulis 
(2001:7) distinguishes two policy directions among the nationalists with respect to citizenship 
and naturalization in the fifth Saeima by employing concepts of ‘ethnic’ and ‘cultural’ 
nationalism. The concepts correspond to concepts of ‘principled’ and ‘pragmatic’ (see 5.2.2). 
The disagreement between the pro-independence parties remains important. ‘Ethnic’ nation 
refers to a static concept of nation based on blood relationship, whereas ‘Cultural’ nation 
38
 17 SC representatives, and additionally three LTF government ministers, according to information collected at 
the Saeima Information Office following the elections in June 1993. See also Hermann Smith-Sivertsen (2001).
39
 Economics minister in the LTF government. He joined “Landlord” in 1995 but left the party in 1996 and 
organized the Latvian Labour Party (Latvijas Darba Partija – LDP) together with his wife, Ilga Kreituse. The 
LDP joined the Christian Democrats and the Green Party to form a new faction in July 1998 (seventh Saeima).
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means the citizenry making up the ‘nation’ may have different ethnic identities but is part of 
the ‘nation’ by learning the state language and accepting the norms of the nation-state. The 
most important difference is the will to include ‘non-ethnic nationals’ by way of 
naturalization, which is a choice ethnic minorities may accept or reject. In the case of 
rejection, it means a rejection of citizenship. The introduction of naturalization “windows” 
(which opened up for one and one age group at a time) in 1995 was intended to limit the 
number of individuals for naturalization, to preserve the about 75 per cent ethnic Latvian 
majority among the citizenry.40 The system failed, simply because the number of 
naturalization applicants did not even fill the yearly quota. Instead, the big proportion of non-
citizens became a hurdle for Latvia’s integration into EU and NATO. Naturalization became 
an option for all residential non-citizens in 1998. TB/LNNK forced a referendum to stop the 
liberalization, but lost. 
5.4.3 New Nation-Building Conflicts: Language and Education 
According to TB/LNNK, the automatic citizenship for non-citizens’ children “would not be 
contingent on passing a state language examination” and therefore fail to check Latvian 
language proficiency among new citizens (The Baltic Times, Vol. 3 #113, 1998). Latvia’s 
Way, Democratic Party “Saimnieks” and other supporters of liberalization argued that 
naturalization procedures were wrong means for securing proficiency in Latvian - which they 
said must be the task of the education system. Since the adoption of a new education law in 
1995. The law stipulated autumn 2004 as the time when all public schools in Latvia, including 
minority schools, should use Latvian as the primary language of instruction, and education 
and language has emerged as a battlefield between Latvian-speakers and Russian-speakers.41
40
 690,461 non-citizens were registered as of January 1994.
41
 Based on concepts borrowed from Hermann Smith-Sivertsen (1998) Heidi Bottolfs argue that an ethnic 
cleavage has emerged through three stages, from materialising as an independence cleavage (1989-91), via the 
citizenship debate (inclusion-exclusion debate) until 1998 and shifting to issues of a more clearly ethnic 
character “such as language, education and social integration.”
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5.5 Development of Parties 1990-2003
The development of party representation in parliament from 1990 to 2003 is illustrated in 
Figure 5-1 to Figure 5-3. (The 1990-1993 facts are based on documents and other information 
collected at the Saeima and the Saeima Information Office in 1992-93.)
Figure 5-1: Figure showing the development of  factions and party representation in the parlament1990 – 1993. 
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Figure 5-2: Figure showing the development of factions and  party representation in the parlament1993 – 1998.
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Figure 5-3 Figure showing the development of factions and party representation in the parlament1998 – 2003. 
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5.6 The Saeima 1993-2002 
A new party has won each of the first four Saeima elections. A common feature, at least 
regarding Latvia’s Way, The People’s Party and New Era, is a primary concern with 
economic policies and reform, European integration and NATO membership. The main 
differences seem to be a greater priority to economic integration in the European Common 
Market by Latvia’s Way. Another difference between Latvia’s Way and the latest three 
winners is organizational, as the latter parties were/are all centred around the party leader 
(Ziedonis Cevers, Andris Skele, Einars Repse) whereas Latvia’s Way was founded by exiles, 
state officials, politicians and local businessmen who joined behind a program for the 
transformation of Latvia’s economy, called “Latvia 2000”. The People’s Party have 
apparently become independent of its founder and former leader, Skele, who left politics in 
2002. 42 The following section describes existing and formerly relevant parties and factions 
according to characteristics that join them along different branches of a “party family tree”.
5.6.1 The Centre
Three parties are related to the left wing of the Popular Front faction: 1) The Democratic 
Centre Party (DCP – 1992-1995), emerged from the Supreme Council ‘Centre’, also called 
‘independent’ group, and sent five deputies to the 5th Saeima (Bara, 1992). DCP claimed to be 
a successor of the pre-war party, but did not renew the Democratic Centre’s statutes. The 
relationship was rather symbolic (Purs, 1993, 2002:70). DCP called for a full restoration of 
the 1918 republic and 10 years’ settlement as requirement for naturalization, and a 
reorientation of the economy towards Western markets. DCP supported the use of minorities’ 
languages in non-Latvian schools, and integration of the non-Latvian nationalities. DCP 
merged with the left-of-centre Democratic Party “Landlord” in 1995.43
Democratic Party “Landlord” (“Saimnieks” – DPS) won the 1995 elections and 
participated in three liberal-conservative governments between 1995 and 1998. Party leader 
Ziedonis Cevers was a minister of interior in the Popular Front government, and formerly 
leader of the Communist Youth, Komsomol. “Landlord” was formed on the basis of Cevers’ 
private foundation “Drosiba” (Security). Among “Landlord”’s deputies were former Popular 
Front members Ilmars Bisers (an LTF deputy prime minister in 1991), Juris Celmins and 
Alfreds Cepanis (independent). The party was organised by business people and so-called 
42
 Janis Ikstens (http://www.politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/11.htm): ” (The People’s Party Manifesto and Action 
Programme) can be described as the joining of economic liberalism with conservative social policies, which, at times, turns into 
authoritarian populism.”
43
 DCP leader Aivars Kreituss joined “Landlord” but left in 1996 and formed Latvia’s Labour Party (Latvijas 
Darba Partija – LDP) together with his wife and colleague politician Ilga Kreituse.
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technocrats, but the programme focused on social issues. “Landlord” was wiped out in the 
1998 election. Political scientist Nils Muiznieks sees the defeat in light of the success of the 
social democrats (The Baltic Times vol. 2 #50, 1997) 
Another left-of-centre party is Concord for Latvia – Revival of the Economy (Saskana 
Latvijai – Atdzimsanas Tautsaimnieciba – SLAT, 1993, in 1995 renamed the People’s 
Concord Party, Tautas Saskana Partija (TSP) which moved more to the left). 44 SLAT was 
formed by Janis Jurkans who left DCP early in 199345 (Lieven, 1994:300). SLAT is related to 
the Popular Front’s SC independent group, and the reformed communists, LDDP.46 Party 
leader Janis Jurkans served as foreign minister for two years in the LTF government. The 
party was closely related to local business (Lieven, 1994:300), however, its main concern was 
that of  social harmony, ethnic concord and “civil conciliation”.47 SLAT supported the Zero 
Option and was in favour of agricultural subsidies and economic protectionism. Its support for 
EU membership and a “Western” political orientation complicated the collaboration from 
1998 with the pro-Russian Socialists Party. SLAT’s business-oriented faction left in 1994 to 
form the Political Association of Economists (PAE).  SLAT then focused on “reconciliation, 
solidarity and improvement of relations with Russia”48 and was renamed the People’s 
Concord Party (TSP). Several deputies left TSP and joined the “Landlord” faction in 1996 
after a proposal to merge with the latter was voted down. SLAT found its main electoral basis 
in Latgale and Riga in the 1993 election (36.7 per cent of the party’s support was in Latgale; 
31.1 per cent in Riga49). Renamed TSP, the party entered an alliance with the extreme left 
Socialist Party and the Russian List in 1998 in an attempt to maximize election outcome, but 
the alliance (faction) broke up in early 2003. 
44
 Janis Ikstens uses the “social-liberalist” as an ideological designation for TSP’s centre-left position 
(politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/16.htm). 
45
 Participants were The Latvian Support Foundation (Janis Jurkans), The Latvian Youth For Progress Union 
(Andris Ameriks), The Farmers Union (Vilnis Edvins Bresis, LTF/independent/LDDP), The Fishermen’s Union 
(M. Pese), The Economy League (Janis Lucans, LTF) (Purs, 1995)
46
 Four candidates on Concord for Latvia’s list in the 1993 elections were members of the SC independent group, 
one was member of the LTF faction. Totally four were members of the Latvian Democratic Labour Party.
47
 From the 1993 party programme, translated into English from Russian by students at the English faculty, 
University of Latvia.
48 Ikstens at “politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/16.htm”
49
 Latvijas Republikas 5. Saeimas Velesanas. Results.
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5.6.2 The Left
The ‘left’ is made up by a “Latvian” and Western-oriented Social Democrats (LSDSP) and 
two Russian-oriented parties: The Peoples’ Concord Party (TSP – presented above) and the 
Latvian Socialist Party (LSP).  
5.6.2.1 The “Russian” Left
The Political Organization “For Human Rights in a United Latvia” (Politisko Organizaciju 
“Par Cilveka Tiesibam Vienota Latvija” - PCTVL) is originally an alliance between the anti-
independence wing of the Supreme Council (Interfront, the Communist Party/Equal 
Rights/Latvia’s Socialist Party and the Russian List), and pro-Russian forces among the 
supporters of independence, TSP. LSP (since 1994) and Equal Rights (since 1991) have been 
advocates of the  migrant population and citizens among the Russian minority. The TSP 
(1998) and PCTVL (2002) alliance was an attempt to unite the spokesmen of  the diaspora; 
the national minorities, and maximize the election outcome. The PCTVL alliance mobilized a 
majority of non-Latvian voters in 2002 and captured one in four Saeima seats (25).
LSP’s and TSP’s electorate differs in many respects. The 1993 election survey 
indicate that young people voted for SLAT (TSP) but not for Equal Rights (LSP); people with 
higher education preferred SLAT, while people with lower education preferred Equal Rights; 
voters in the higher income category preferred SLAT, while Equal Rights attracted lower
income groups. 
The nationality variable has been the most profound for identifying the basis of 
support for both SLAT/TSP and Equal Rights/LSP.  The Baltic Data House’s post-election 
poll after the 6th Saeima election in 199550 shows that the support for The Socialist Party was 
practically all Russian (20.5 per cent of all Russian votes, zero of non-Russian minorities’ 
votes), whereas 9.2 per cent of all non-Russian minorities voted for TSP (21.3 per cent of the 
Russian voters). A significant number of non-Russian minorities voted for the TSP/LSP 
alliance in 1998 and 2002, but around two thirds of the non-Russian minorities’ votes were 
distributed among the other Saeima parties - except for TB and LNNK. 
LSP and TSP disagree on important issues like language (TSP supports Latvian as the 
only state language, LSP says Russian should be the second state language) and EU 
membership (which TSP supports, not LSP). Both parties are against Latvian NATO 
membership. The break-up of the PCTVL alliance early in 2003 suggests that important 
50
 The first year “other” nationalities were measured separately from Russians, and the last year so far the Equal 
Rights/LSP ran a ticket separately from TSP)
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differences remained important. The PCTVL faction was re-established in the autumn of 2003 
in addition to the TSP and LSP factions.51 By September 2003, the “Russian Left” comprised 
the TSP (15 deputies), LSP (5), and PCTVL (5) factions. 
Latvia’s Socialist Party (Latvijas Socialistiska Partija – LSP) originates is in the 
hardline communist movement “Equal Rights”.52 The party aims at re-establishing Latvia 
according to Marxist principles and to make Latvia a “unitary multi-national state”. 
In 1993, the opinions among Russians in Latvia fell into mainly four positions, 
according to Boris Tsilevich:53 1) “Latvia is our common state and, traditionally, a multiethnic 
society,” which is the position of Concord for Latvia (SLAT/TSP). 2) Another, large segment 
favoured the Soviet and communist ideologies, and to re-establish the USSR, an attitude 
Tsilevich asserted was relatively widespread among Russian residents. These “Soviet 
internationalists” were also against Russian independence. This is the position of the “Equal 
Rights” Movement (and the Latvian Socialist Party). 3) A third segment are imperialists and 
supporters of “Great Russia”. This is the position of the Russian List. 4) Tsilevich suggested 
about 5 per cent of Russians in Latvia felt guilty towards the Latvian nation and were willing 
to accept “being deprived of certain rights” or “move to Russia”. This category found no 
political expression. 
5.6.2.2 The “Latvian” Left (Social Democrats)
Latvia’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Latvijas Social Demokratiska Stradnieku Partija -
LSDSP) was founded in 1904 and revived in Latvia 1989. The party existed as an exile 
organization during communism.54 LSDSP sent four deputies to the Supreme Council. 
Another party of the Latvian left was the Latvian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP – renamed 
the Latvian Social Democratic Party, LSDP), based on the pro-independence faction of the 
Latvian Communist Party. LSDSP and LDDP forged a loose alliance before the 1995 
elections and again before the municipal election in 1997 when they captured both Riga and 
Daugavpils55. After success also in the 7th Saeima election, the two parties merged in May 
1999. The new party kept the LSDSP name, with LDDP’s leader Juris Bojars as party leader. 
51 http://www.saeima.lv/deputati_eng/1deputati_frakcijas.html (The Saeima Internet homepage)
52
 The Communist Party got prohibited in 1991.
53
 Member of SLAT/TSP, later Member of Parliament in Latvia and Riga City Council, in an interview with me 
on 29 May 1993. 
54
 “Since 1945, the Latvian Social Democratic Party has been working in exile. In 1949, the party elected a 
foreign committee, with its seat in Stockholm. The party issued a monthly newsletter, Briviba (Freedom). 
Source: Briviba. http://www.briviba.lv/LSDSP%2050%20gadi/English.htm
55
 The Social Democratic Alliance won 13 of 15 deputies in Daugavpils, and 11 of 60 seats in the Riga 
municipality.
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The leadership of the former LSDSP left.56 In 2002, a faction left the new LSDSP to form the 
Social Democratic Union (Socialdemokratiska Savieniba - SDS). Bojars has uses the term 
“patriotic left” about the social democrats as different from the “Russian” left which he calls 
“pro-Soviet forces” (TBT, vol. 2 #50, 1997). LSDSP was in favour of Latvian EU and NATO 
memberships, but has shared the socialists’ criticism of the governments’ pursuit of free 
market reforms (TBT, vol. 3 #108, 1998; TBT vol. 2 #50, 1997). LSDSP is against 
privatization of vital state utilities like energy and transportation sectors, but support 
privatization of smaller enterprises. The success in the local elections in 1997 and national 
elections in 1998 followed a series of protests organized by Bojars’ LSDP (1996) who 
mobilized mainly factory workers and pensioners against the government’s economic 
policies. The new LSDSP failed to pass the five per cent threshold in the 2002 election and 
was not represented in the 8th Saeima.
5.6.3 The Right
Parties at the right; national-conservative, conservative and liberal parties; have repeatedly 
formed governments. The right consist of liberals with a pragmatic-moderate attitude to issues 
like naturalization (centre-right) and conservatives that are less inclined to compromise on 
national issues (conservatives), or not at all (national-conservatives).
5.6.3.1  Liberal and Conservative Parties
Latvia’s Way (Latvijas Cels - LC) was a great winner in the 1993 election, but less than half 
of its mandates were returned in 1995. According to Janis Ikstens, LC’s failure in 1995 was a 
consequence of its unbridled will to let loose the forces of market economy without paying 
respect to painful social consequences. The party was eliminated from the Saeima in the 2002 
election. Latvia’s Way has been the most important in the Saeima for nearly ten years and was 
the only party that has participated in all governments since 1993.
Latvia’s Way was founded by members of a club of businessmen and bureaucrats, 
Club 21, and the World Federation of Free Latvians, in 1993.57 LC members were mostly 
former Soviet reformist nomenklatura who embraced Perestroika and liberalization. The party 
presented an ambitious programme for Latvia’s economic transition from communism into a 
56
 LSDSP leader Jânis Dinevics remained an LTF deputy in 1992 after the disintegration of the LTF majority. 
Juris Bojars belonged to the group of  (left) independent deputies.
57
 The Farmers’ Union, LTF and LNNK was involved in the exploratory talks. The Farmers’ Union would 
eventually chose to defend farming interests, the Popular Front decided to go it alone, while the activities of the 
German Joachim Siegerist of LNNK would rule out further collaboration with LNNK, according to Andris 
Kadegis, board member of Latvia’s Way in 1993.
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free market, “Latvia 2000”, which projected Latvia in a classical role as a bridge between East 
and West.58 Latvia’s Way and TB/LNNK have become adversaries on the right with respect 
to national-cultural and –economic priorities. The referendum on amendments to the Law on 
Naturalization in October 1998 was initiated by TB/LNNK, while Latvia’s Way advised 
voters not to vote against the amendments. 
TB/LNNK define its national conservative ideology according to the principle of the 
Latvian nation state as a “legal succession of the Republic of Latvia proclaimed on the 18th of 
November 1918 and the Constitution of 1922” (Party Programme). TB’s slogan before the 
1993 election was “De-occupation, De-bolshevization, De-colonization”, as maintained in the 
current (2003) programme: “…(to) enhance the overcoming of the heritage of occupation, 
colonization and totalitarian regime…”. TB/LNNK supports economic reforms but worries 
that unrestricted economic liberalism will increase social contrasts and lead to unrest and 
social disturbances “that is a natural ground for leftist ideas”. Paulis Apinis attribute the 
decline in support for the national-conservative parties to their exclusive focus on nationalistic 
issues, which left economic and other issues to the other parties.59
Between TB/LNNK and Latvia’s Way is the conservative People’s Party (TP) which 
won the 1998 election with promises of balanced budgets, low inflation, continuing economic 
reforms, pursuit of EU and NATO membership – and fighting corruption. TP defines itself as 
a conservative party in traditional sense, expressed by its emphasis on the protection of 
community, the family institution and the nation as basic elements of society - in contrast to 
liberal ideology’s emphasis on the individual. TP’s concept of the nation-state include 
minorities: “…the existence of diverse ethnic cultures and identities is an advantage for 
Latvia’s society and for the Latvian nation,” the programme states. 
TB/LNNK also defines the nation-state as a multicultural state, but more reluctantly:
“The stability of the Latvian state is guaranteed by equality between all Latvian citizens, by 
the right of minorities, that carry on (“continues”) the traditions accepted in Latvia before the 
World War II.”60 The latter statement is ambiguous, because the time before the war consisted 
of two different regimes in Latvia - a democratic regime that guaranteed national minorities’ 
cultural rights, and an authoritarian which did not. 
Among the liberal/conservative parties is the confessional Latvia’s First Party
(Latvijas Pirma Partija – LPP), resulting from a merger in 2002 of the Christian Democratic 
58
 The new party gathered people with a certain public standing. Notably, Ivars Godmanis was not invited after 
three years as the head of LTF governments through a very difficult period. He joined the LC later.  
59
 1.kas.de/publikationen/2000/ai/03_apinis.pdf (published by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung)
60
 TB/LNNK’s programme, English version, p. 3
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Union (established in 1993), the Christian People’s Party (established in 1996 - formerly the 
Popular Front organization) and the New Christian Party (Jauna Kristogo Partija – JKP).61
The LPP describes itself as a centre-based political party which “acknowledges individual 
freedom and personal responsibility, supports socially responsible free market and 
entrepreneurship”, and based on christian values. Party leader Eriks Jekabsons (2004) is a 
priest and former kickboxer. The party was part of the Repse government (2002), along with 
the Centrist Party Farmers’ Union (Centriska Partija Zemnieku Savinieba – CPZS). The 
Farmers’ Union forged an election alliance with the Green Party (Latvijas Zala Partija – LZP) 
before the 2002 elections called the Green and Farmers’ Union (Latvijas Zala un Zemnieku 
Savinieba – ZZS). Both parties have a conservative heritage: CPZS in its rural pre-war roots 
(Latvia’s Farmers’ Union) and the LZP in the pro-national independence movement in the 
mid-80s, VAK. The environment movement started its public protests against Moscow’s 
plans to build a power station along the Daugava river and a Riga metro. But environment 
issues have hardly been politically mobilizing after the restoration of independence. 
The Farmers’ Union was not represented in the 7th Saeima, but captured 12 mandates 
with the Green Party in 2002. The new ‘centrist’ orientation is intended to broaden the party’s 
electoral basis to all of the countryside and not simply farming interests.62 The Farmers’ 
Union has backed Latvian EU membership as well as the liberal and conservative 
governments’ reform policies. CPZS is against privatization of the large hydroelectric power 
stations and the railway, and wants state-owned forests to remain state ownership. CPZS 
wants Latvian to be the language of instruction in all public secondary schools, but is also 
supporting the protection and development of the smaller minorities’ culture and language. 
“We are against the post-Soviet endeavours to make all small national minorities into a unity 
of Russian-speaking inhabitants,” says party leader Aivars Berkis.63
The Farmers’ Union is related to the “Country” faction of the Supreme Council.64
Agricultural interests have been of roughly two kinds; the independent farmers and 
smallholders (national-liberal) and the former collective workers and officials (leftist). The 
Latvian Unity Party (LVP), represented in the 6th Saeima, was a left-wing agricultural party 
(European Forum, 1999). Party Leader Albert Kauls was a director of a Soviet model farm in 
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 The Christian Democratic Union (KDS) still exists as a party organization: http://www.kds.lv/
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 “We consider rural area and small town development as the cornerstone of the nation’s development” (party 
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 E-mail 27.5. 2003.
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 Aivars Berkis was a member of the “Country” SC faction along with four other LZS members. 
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Latvia. The party was founded before the 1993 Saeima elections.65 All Unity’s sixth Saeima 
deputies defected to other parties. By the end of February 1997 the faction ceased to exist.66
The 2002 election brought forward a new election winner, New Era (Jaunais Laiks). 
Party leader Einars Repse was a leading member of the LNNK movement and a LTF 
deputy.67 He left politics to serve as the central bank director and earned a reputation 
internationally when he successfully re-introduced the national currency, the Lat, in 1993.68
New Era’s government coalition was formed in November 2002 by the First Party, Green and 
Farmers Union and TB/LNNK. The People’s Party, third in the 2002 election, was excluded 
although TP together with New Era and Latvia’s First Party belongs to the group of European 
People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament. 
The coalition agreed to continue economic reforms and lead Latvia into the EU. Repse 
resigned in February 2004. Since then, two liberal/conservative coalition governments have 
been in charge.
5.7 The Early Formation of Political Opposition in Latvia
The October Manifesto in 1905 legalized political parties for the first time in Russia. The 
Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries were already organized, and different political 
groups existed among the Latvian bourgeoisie. The differences between the Latvian bourgeois 
parties were rather of a “formal and tactical kind” (Lindemuth, 1969:75ff). There were 
German liberals and Russian constitutional-democratic groups (Ronis, 1990). 
5.7.1 Latvian Bourgeois Parties
Members of the Latvian bourgeoisie established a cultural society, the Riga Latvian 
Association (RLA), in 1868. It became “a hotbed for political debate”.69 The Association was 
a by-product of the socioeconomic transformations and rural-urban migration experienced by 
the Latvians in the nineteenth century (Plakans, 1997:133, 1981:225). Parties formed within 
the organization, and each party published, or was supported by, a newspaper or publication, 
65
 The Monthly Survey of Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics, October 1995, p.50-51. Tallinn Panor-Press Sakala 
Center.
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 See for example the Saeima’s list of  factions in the 6th Saeima published at 
http://www.saeima.lv/Lapas/s6_frakc_a.html and European Forum (http://www.europeanforum.bot-
consult.se/cup/latvia/parties.htm)
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 Repse was one of two LTF/LNNK members who belonged to the big group of independent deputies in the 
Supreme Council after the disintegration of the LTF majority. Source: Latvijas Republikas Tautas Deputati 
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 The RLA had 230 members after a few years ,and “some 1,000” by the end of the century (Plakans 1997:134)
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usually related to one or more leading figures. Personal contrasts and rivalry prevented the 
formation of a larger, united Latvian bourgeois party (Lindemuth, 1976:77).
Opinion among the Latvian bourgeoisie fell into three main positions. Their political 
programmes differed basically in terms of  extent of reforms demanded. The democrats 
presented the most far-reaching and radical demands, the conservative least radical.70 A 
common goal was constitutional reform and free elections. 
Three Latvian bourgeois parties was formed in 1905: The Latvian People’s Party, a 
conservative party headed by a monarchist, Friedrichs Veinbergs; the Latvian Constitutional 
Democratic Party, a liberal party headed by F. Grosvalds, and the Latvian Democratic Party
(radical) headed by Arveds Bergs.71  Two democratic parties formed in 1906 on the ruins of 
Bergs’ party, one based on LDP’s newspaper The Baltic Messenger (Baltijas Vestnesis), the 
other called The Progressives, with its newspaper the New Daily Paper (Jauna Dienas Lapa) 
(Lindemuth, 1969, 1976, Ronis, 1990). 
The Latvian Democratic Party (radical) called for the unification of Latvian-speaking 
areas, cultural autonomy, extensive land reform, a social security system and eight hours’ 
workday. The People’s Party (conservative) called for unification of the Germanized Latvian-
speaking areas, and a limited land reform. The conservative party was apparently primarily 
concerned with Latvian-cultural issues such as education and language, rather than social 
reforms, which were the concern of the radical parties. The Latvian Constitutional-
Democratic Party was soon replaced by the conservative Latvian Reform Party. Both parties 
represented the interests of the wealthiest layer among the urban Latvian bourgeoisie (Ronis, 
1990:153). 
5.7.2 Russian and German Reform Parties
Liberal oppositions among Baltic Germans and Russians called for various political and social 
reforms. Russian liberals wanted the integration of all nationalities into Great Russia but were 
against the use of force. They believed economic liberalization would entail social 
improvement and voluntary integration into the Great Russian nation and break the power of 
the German nobility (Misiunas, 1985:86,88). The liberals were distinctly different from 
Russian conservatives (monarchists) on the right and socialist-revolutionaries on the left. In 
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 The first (illegal) conservative party, the National Party, was founded by Friedrichs Veinbergs already in 1883, 
according to Margarethe Lindemuth.   
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 Bergs served as interior minister in the provisional government 1918-21, as member of the Constituent 
assembly and the Saeima. In 1921 he founded the National Centre Party and became a leading figure on the 
nationalist right (Plakans, 1997).
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Latvia, three Russian parties called for a democratic constitution - the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (Liberali Konstitucionala Partija) – or a constitutional monarchy – the Monarchist 
Constitutional Party (Monarhistu Konstitucionala Partija). A third was the Russian 
Constitutional Democratic Party, a branch of the “Kadets”, the leading liberal party in Russia, 
whose aim was a constitutional monarchy and limited land reforms. Liberal Germans formed 
the Baltic Constitutional Party (Baltijas Konstitucionala Partija).72
5.7.3 The Revolutionary Movement and the Social Democratic Party
The mobilization of the urban working class and landless peasants was led by radicalized 
students of the “New Current” movement (“Jauna Strava”) in the 1890s.73 Social democratic 
organizations merged in 1904 into the Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party. Participation 
among rural workers was very high, about 60 per cent by the end of 1905. The class contrasts 
in rural Vidzeme (Livland) and Kurzeme (Courland and Zemgale) were acute (Pulkis, 
1982:115-116).
LSDPS collaborated with the Jewish Bund (Algemayne Bund fun Yidishe Arbeter in 
Rusland Poyln un Lite – General Association of Jewish Workers in Russia, Poland and 
Lithuania) and the Russian Social Democrats. In 1906, LSDSP became a branch of the 
Russian party and was re-named the Latvian Social Democracy. The Latvian Social 
Democrats split along Bolshevik and Menshevik lines in 1917. Latvian Mensheviks (inspired 
by the Austro-marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer) wanted an independent Latvian state, 
whereas the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a Soviet republic (1919). 
Other social democratic groups emerged from a literary society established in 1902, 
the Riga Latvian Society, and the newspaper Dienas Lapa (“Today”). 
5.7.4 The Farmers
The Social Democrats recruited the rural proletariat – the agricultural workers (Pulkis, 1982). 
No bourgeois agricultural party existed before the 1917 revolution. The Farmers’ Union 
(LZS) grew out of  farming cooperatives and organizations, and the publication “Lidums” 
(“Clearing”) (Ronis, 1990:155; Plakans, 1997:17, 88). After the 1917 revolution, LZS was the 
main counterpart to the social democrats in the countryside (Ezergailis, 1974; Ziemelis, 
1982:257). The Bolsheviks became the number one challenge to Latvian liberals (Ezergailis, 
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 Among the leaders were the poet Rainis, lawyer Peteris Stucka and journalist J. Jakobsons. Stucka would 
become the leading figure of the Latvian communist party.
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1983:15-17).74 The main political contrast among Latvians by 1917-18 reflected the conflict 
that emerged in the 1890’s between the national-liberal, culturally-oriented members of the 
Riga Latvian Union; the Latvian urban bourgeoisie; and the socially-oriented radicals of the 
“New Current” (see 5.7.1. and 5.7.4.). In the elections to an All-Russian Constituent 
Assembly in 1917, Latvian anti-Bolshevik nationalism was expressed also in the rural regions 
by the party of  Latvian independent farmers, the Farmers’ Union, the only significant 
challenger to the Bolsheviks in the countryside .75 The most pressing questions were the social 
situation and the distribution of land, and the national question. The Farmers’ Union 
comprised “a broad political spectrum, from agrarian socialists to advocates of free 
enterprise” (Ezergailis, 1983:34, 69-70).
5.7.5 Civil War: A Three-Party Struggle
The five years 1915 to approximately 1920 were extremely complex and chaotic, with a world 
war, revolution and civil war. Three main forces struggled for regional power: the Bolsheviks, 
the broad alliance between native conservatives, liberals and Menshevik Socialists who 
strived for a democratic nation state, supported by the Entente powers; and thirdly, the Baltic 
Germans who relied on military support from German invasion troops remaining in the region 
to establish a German protectorate or dutchy, at the expense of both Bolshevism and 
democratic solutions (Pistohlkors, 1993:197). Totally 700,000 Latvians fled Courland, Riga 
and Livland to Russia (Pistohlkors, 1993:195). Latvians were allowed to organize refugee aid 
within the Central Committee for Latvian Refugees in St. Petersburg (Petrograd) in 1915. The 
Committee became a “national centre” (von Rauch, 1995:26,37) and instigated the 
establishment of a democratic Latvian assembly, the Provisional National Council, in 
November 1917 in Valga at the new border between Livland and Estonia (Germanis, 
1971:62-63) .76 According to Wittram (1954:251), it was a “national-democratic bourgeois 
assembly”. The Bolsheviks refused to participate, the Social Revolutionaries arrived late and 
the Mensheviks sent an observer (Germanis, 1971:63). A goal was to convoke a Latvian 
constituent assembly and create an independent state comprising the regions inhabited by 
Latvians (Kurzeme, Zemgale, Vidzeme and Latgale) (Blodnieks, 1960:143-144, Wittram, 
1954:251). Blodnieks (1960:143) quotes a description of the Provisional National Council by 
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an American historian, M. W. Graham, as “the principal agency for the constructive 
expression of Latvian nationalism”. There was a hope to work with Kerenski’s Liberal 
Constitutional government to transform the Russian empire into a federation of autonomous 
republics, a scope that began to change in the autumn of 1917 and was definitely gone with 
the Bolshevik coup and the declaration in 1918 of a Soviet (“Iskolat”) republic in the areas 
not yet occupied by German troops. A clandestine Latvian pro-independence organization 
formed  in Riga under German occupation in spring 1918; The Democratic Block, which 
rejected the “German-friendly politics of the bourgeois groups” (Wittram, 1954:253).77 The 
Democratic Bloc was an alliance between bourgeois and Menshevik leaders. Bolsheviks and 
the most conservative (“reactionary”) Latvian People’s Party was excluded (Germanis, 
1971:44-45). The People’s Council was set up by bourgeois and social democrats in 
November 1918 and declared Latvia an independent republic.78
The Farmers’ Union worked within the Provisional National Council as well as the 
Democratic Bloc in Riga  (Ezergailis, 1983:74), just the way pro-independence people and 
parties would work within the Popular Front as well as LNNK seven decades later.79
Ezergailis describes how national and social issues went hand-in-hand in their political 
program, aiming at Latvian autonomy, social reforms, equal rights for women, improving the 
life of workers, “restoration of Kurzeme” from German occupation, and appealing to all 
Riflemen “who desire undivided Latvia” (Ezergailis, 1983:77). A decisive task for the non-
Bolshevik Latvian intelligentsia after the revolution was to gather support among the 
population for an autonomous Latvian state, and to limit the Bolshevik influence among 
Latvian soldiers (Riflemen – “Strelki”) and peasants (Ezergailis, 1983:73; Blodnieks, 
1960:105-116). Yet, the Bolsheviks won a crushing victory in Riga as well as Livland 
(Ezergailis, 1983, Germanis, 1971:48). Riga was however about to be occupied by German 
forces (Ezergailis, 1983:75-76). 
Latvians participated both in the Imperial Army (and formed for the first time a 
separate battalion), in the Red Army after the Revolution, and fought with German troops 
against the Bolsheviks in the Baltic (-German) Defence Forces. As the liberal Russian 
government was overthrown, the German troops advanced in the Baltic. A year later, when 
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Germany collapsed, the Bolsheviks advanced. The Baltic lands should serve as a bridgehead 
for the socialist revolution into Europe (von Rauch, 1995:51). The ambition failed. In the late 
summer of 1920, a peace treaty was signed that recognised Latvia’s borders along
ethnological lines, including Latgale (von Rauch, 1995:74-75).   
5.8 Independent Latvia: New Conflicts, New Oppositions
Early Latvian conservative parties played little role in the new nation-state, as the German 
party did. ‘Conservative’ in post-revolution Latvia was associated mainly with the Baltic 
nobility and monarchists. A Latvian conservative party, Friedrich Veinbergs’ Latvian 
People’s Party, was excluded from the Constituent Assembly in 1920 along with the 
Bolsheviks, as both opposed national independence (Blodis, 1990:163).80 The Baltic Germans 
eventually chose to work within the new democratic institutions and chose collaboration in 
the pursuit of cultural autonomy rights as a minority. A School autonomy law was granted by 
the provisional government in 1919, but no extensive cultural autonomy (Garleff, 1991:92-93, 
von Pistohlkors, 1993:202). 
Several German parties were founded between 1917 and 1920. The parties coordinated 
their activities within the Committee of Baltic German Parties (1922), also called the Baltic 
German Party of Latvia. The German achieved representation proportionally larger than the 
minority’s population size, while other nationalities were deeply divided (von Hehn, 
1966:13). 
The largest national minority, the Russians, showed least social and political cohesion. The 
divide was deep especially between the large groups of farmers and a small “upper class” of 
civil servants and merchants. There were six parties among the Russians, seven in 1928 
(Garleff, 1978:82), supported by two thirds of the Russian voters (Balodis, 1990:199). 
There were several parties also among the Jews. Garleff  makes the distinction mainly 
between Zionists and non-Zionists, but the social-democratic Bund (Jewish Workers’ League) 
should count as well, along the socio-structural cleavage. The Jewish voters were divided 
additionally by different cultural identities – Kurzeme Jews identified mainly with the 
German culture, other Jews associated with the Russian and East-/Central-European culture. 
There were a Hebrew-speaking Zionist culture and the Yiddish-speakers – all reflecting 
different waves of Jewish immigration from the West (Germany) and East (Russia, the Pale of 
80Veinbergs defended, as long as it was realistic to do so, the rights of the tsarist government in the Baltic. After 
the revolution he switched his support for the tsar with the idea that the Baltic provinces should become a duchy 
or protectorate affiliated with Germany. (Plakans, 1997:157-158).
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Settlement etc.). There were religious Jews (and religious differences) and secular Jews, 
nationalists (Zionists) and socialists. The Jews lived mainly in the cities, but also in the 
countryside. Steimanis (2002:62) points to the entrepreneurial character of the Jewish 
population: 41 per cent of all industrial, commercial and craftsmen’s enterprises in the 
country belonged to Jews, who made up 5 per cent of the population (1924).81 In contrast, 38 
per cent of all industrial enterprises belonged to Latvians who made up 75 per cent of the 
population. Jews and Germans, two small nationalities, dominated in the field of  enterprise. 
According to Steimanis, this dominance was used by anti-semites to rouse hate against Jews 
“in right-wing circles”. 
5.8.1 Latgale  
The constitution and the election law emphasized the representative aspect of democracy, at 
the expense of the efficiency of governing. There was no election threshold that would 
prevent parties with support only in concentrated areas to enter the 100-seat legislature. The 
inclusion of Latgale added a regional dimension to the fabric of political contrasts. Some saw 
the Latgalians as a “separate nation” (von Hehn, 1966:7). 
As election districts  more or less corresponded to administrative and historical 
borders, Latgale’s distinct historical and cultural differentness could translate into the sphere 
of politics. Both Latgalian Latvian and minorities’ parties contributed strongly to party system 
fragmentation. The district’s contribution was clerical and multiethnic, and there was a 
tendency to establish separate Latgalian parties even when similar parties existed on the 
national level, such as peasants’ parties. The Latgalian peasant parties were predominantly 
catholic.
The Latvian Social Democrats was the only nation-wide party able to capture a 
mandate in Latgale. A Latvian Catholic Party which won votes in the other four election 
districts did not get any in the one region where Catholicism dominated (Zalts, 1926:54-55). 
The largest Latgalian party was the Party of Christian Peasants and Catholics, which gained 
foothold also in Zemgale and Kurzeme (von Rauch, 1995:95; von Hehn, 1966:13). 
5.8.2 A Sketch of the Political Blocks
The main features of the pre-war Latvian party system existed within the Constituent 
Assembly elected in 1920: two larger parties; agrarian (the Farmers’ Union) and socialist (The 
Social Democrats). In addition were cultural/ethnic and confessional parties, radical bourgeois 
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parties and a small conservative block (von Hehn, 1966:9). The Constituent assembly had 150 
seats. Citizens from 21 years had the right to vote, 24 parties participated in the election in 
April 1920 and the turnout was high – 84,9 per cent (Blodis, 1990:189-190). 
In 1917, the Bolsheviks was supported by up to 70 per cent of the voters. In April 
1920, the Social Democrat Mensheviks came first with 39 per cent (57 seats), but the 
bourgeois parties won 76 seats. The Farmers’ Union was the largest non-socialist party with 
17.8 per cent of the votes (von Hehn, 1966:9). Georg von Rauch describe the party system as 
consisting of a dominant agrarian party, opposed by a social democratic party, and a “middle 
ground” occupied by one or more National Liberal parties, which represented the views of the 
indigenous intellectuals.” (von Rauch, 1995:91). In addition there were a not insignificant 
representation of Latgalians (15.4 per cent) and minorities (10.3 per cent).
Table 5-1: Each blocks numbers of representatives in the four first Saeimas, the numbers of parties in each 
block, in brackets. Source: Alfred Bilmanis (1928), Albert Zalts (1926) a.o.82
Mandates (number of parties in brackets)








Socialists 38 (3) 37 (4) 36 (6) 28 (3)
Farmers 25 (5) 28 (6) 29 (4) 34 (4)
Centre block (radical bourgeois) 12 (3) 10 (5) 9 (5) 13 (5)
Conservatives  9 (3) 9 (5) 8 (4) 8 (3)
Minorities  15 (8) 16 (8) 18 (8) 17 (8)
Total 99 (22) 100 (28) 100 (27) 100 (23)
The central role of the Farmers’ Union seems to reflect the importance of agriculture in 
Latvian economy. Most of the industry processed raw materials from the countryside; timber, 
food products or textiles. The Social Democrats remained the largest single Saeima party, but 
the non-socialists held majority. A challenge to governing came from within; the 
fragmentation of the national-liberal centre “block”, Latgalian and minorities’ parties which 
often had only one or two mandates (von Hehn, 1966:10-11, von Rauch, 1995:146-147). 
5.9 The Agrarian Reform and New Peasant Parties
A new social “class” of smallholders was created in the countryside with the Land Reform. 
The Land Reform became a catalyst for a re-politization of the old class conflict in the 
countryside, between large farmers and landless peasants who became owners of small plots 
of land following the Reform. A faction led by Otto Nonacs left the Farmers Union during the 
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Constituent Assembly because of disagreement over the Land Reform Act. Nonacs “defended 
the interests of the peasants and would not accept any compromises with the estate owners” 
(Zalts, 1926:16). The New Farmers’ Union, as Nonacs’ party was named, appealed to the new 
strata of smallholders. 83 The smallholders were recruited primarily among the rural workers 
(“Unbemittelten Ständen aus den Kreisen der Arbeiterschaft”) (Zalts, 1926:16). Some of these 
often radicalized rural workers turned away from the Social Democrats; but not towards the 
Farmers’ Union – the party of their former “class enemy” -  but to the new smallholders’ 
parties such as Nonacs’ New Farmers’ Union. Another party appealing to the new rural 
segment was Alfreds Blodnieks’ New Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Party (1924). Blodnieks 
was former pro-independence Social Democrat. The smallholders’ parties would not form a 
rural block with the Farmers’ Union; Blodnieks’ New Settlers’ and Smallholders’ party was 
closer to the political “centre”, which became more and more powerful by holding the balance 
between the two dominant parties (von Hehn, 1966:13).
5.10 The “Centre” – Radical Bourgeois, National-Democratic, National-Liberal?
The concept ‘radical bourgeois’ comprises the parties usually called the ‘centre’ of Latvian 
pre-war war politics. They were the most significant bloc balancing the dominant Farmers’ 
Union and the social democratic opposition.  To find a defining political concept for the 
“middle ground” is difficult for at least two reasons: The parties of the political centre had no 
common ideological superstructure. The term liberal, democratic and other terms are used to 
distinguish the parties that based their support mainly on the urban Latvian bourgeoisie and 
intelligentsia from other blocs: 
During the 1917 there was no party that adopted it (liberal, B.S.) as a party 
designation, while words such as democratic, progressive, and radical were 
used in many combinations. Yet it seems that we can speak about liberalism in 
1917 Latvia, if for no other reason than only because a category is needed to 
delineate the opinion that was non-Marxist, non-Social Democratic, and non-
Bolshevik.” (Ezergailis, 1971:1)
Ezergailis says that Latvian liberalism as of 1917 “had several peculiarities and therefore in 
its analysis one must avoid the conceptualizations used in analyzing Anglo-Saxon politics or 
French politics of the nineteenth century which are predicated on the existence of a right to 
left political spectrum.” (Ezergailis, 1971). In Latvia, he goes on, “there was no right wing to 
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 The number of smallholdings differs in the literature. Fitzmaurice (1992:100) says the reform created 220.000 
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speak of. There were only competing views of progress, change and social transformation 
(….) Somewhere, at some times the right wing may outweigh the left, but this fine 
counterbalancing did not occur in Latvia.” Liberal opposition were expressed in the 19th
century by members of the Latvian bourgeoisie, a new socio-cultural strata, as the few 
Latvians who earlier had achieved social advancement became germanized. The new Latvian 
liberal bourgeoisie owed their “ideology” to the formulation of a national identity which 
began in the 1840s. According to Margarethe Lindemuth, there were three “directions”, or 
organized groups, among the Latvian bourgeoisie: Conservatives, liberals and democrats 
(Lindemuth, 1969:75, 1976:23ff). The political programmes of theses groups showed rather 
little difference; the differences were rather “of formal and tactical than fundamental nature” 
and antagonisms were often personal (Lindemuth, 1976:25). Their three most important goals 
were a united, autonomous Latvia within Russia, local rule by Latvians and an agrarian 
reform that would reshape ownership to land and power-structures in the countryside.    
Ezergailis define the liberals as “those individuals and groups who believed in 
constitutional government, land reforms, Latvian autonomy, free press, speech and assembly, 
and open, frequent and un-coerced elections” (Ezergailis, 1971). After independence, when 
constitutional government, land reform, freedom of press, speech and assembly, and a 
democratic system with free elections were achieved, there was no clear ideological platform 
for the groups and parties which the literature describe as the political ‘centre’, except for 
defending narrow interests as well as the main achievement: national independence, being 
“masters in their own house.” 
The ‘centre’ comprised most of the groups Ezergailis categorised as ‘liberal’ in 1917, 
based on narrow, mainly urban financial and economic interests, and intellectuals (von Hehn 
1966:10-11). The single most important party was the Democratic Centre after the merger in 
1922 of the Democratic Party, the Radical Democratic Party and the People’s Party (von 
Rauch, 1995:94, von Hehn, 1966:12).84 The Democratic Centre was fiercely against the idea 
of  class struggle and endeavoured to unite the Latvians as a nation (von Hehn, 1966:13, von 
Rauch, 1995:94). In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Democratic Centre turned into a party 
of  strong Latvian nationalism and anti-minority policies. Ilga Apine sees the anti-minority 
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policies of the 1930s as carrying “the features of ethnocracy.”85 Nationalism, with “anti-class 
struggle” as a feature, appears to have been an ideological common ground of the “centre”.86
Jürgen von Hehn attributes the Democratic Centre’s relatively strong influence - in spite of its 
size (the party captured six seats in the last pre-war Saeima) - to the support from the largest 
daily, “Jaunakas Zinas” (“The Latest News”). He describes DCP as “a bearer of strong 
Latvian nationalism”. Another exponent of Latvian national chauvinism was the Progressive 
Union led by Margers Skujenieks, a former Social Democrat. In 1931, Skujenieks formed a 
government with the Democratic Centre Party and other Latvian non-socialist factions, with 
the aim of creating a “homogenous Latvian culture” (“lettischen Einheitskultur”) (von Hehn, 
1966:17). 
‘Liberal’ had a different meaning to a Latvian, German or Russian in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Ezergailis (1971) writes that the group (among 
Latvians) who could be compared to the Russian Octobrists was “pitifully small”. The 
Octobrists was the Russian moderate right opposition to the tsarist government. Russian 
liberals were opposed to autocracy but also to the German dominance in the Baltic provinces. 
German liberalism in the Baltics at the time “stood squarely in the mainstream liberalist 










Does divisions at the party level correspond to certain contrasts among the voters? This 
chapter concern party preferences with respect to a number of background variables employed 
in election surveys in 1993 (fifth Saeima), 1995 (sixth Saeima), 1998 (seventh Saeima) and 
2002 (eight Saeima).87 A feature of the first four post-Soviet elections is the victory of a new
party at each election (see chapter five): In 1993: Latvia’s Way, 1995: Democratic Party 
“Landlord” (“Saimnieks”), 1998: The People’s Party, 2002: New Era. A possible explanation 
may be a confidence in the competence of the candidates and a willingness to try a new crew, 
or/and possibly disappointment with the last election winner and the government(s). To find 
out, we will look at the voters’ (respondents’) motivation for party preference, and the priority 
given by voters with respect to issues of concern.
6.1.1 Voter Motivation
A 1993 election survey showed that 28,4 per cent of the voters who supported Latvia’s Way 
(LC), said they preferred LC (to the other parties). 10,1 per cent said they participated in the 
election to express their opinion (and voted for LC), whereas more than half of the 
respondents (55,8) said they participated to fulfil their duty as a citizen (Lasopec, 1993). 
In 1998, totally 24,1 per cent of all respondents said they voted “for the electoral list I 
believe represents the best candidates, ideas and programme” (BDN, 1998).88 30,4 per cent of 
the respondents gave that response, said they voted for the election winner, the People’s Party 
(TP), whereas 7,8 per cent of the People’s Party’s voters said they “don’t have much 
confidence in those I voted for, but I voted for them because I was dissatisfied with the 
incumbent politicians”. 13,8 per cent of TP’s voters said they “voted for the list with the most 
professional and competent candidates” (person-focused). A third (33,5 per cent) of the TP 
voters responded “I voted for the electoral list that I believe represents the best candidates, 
ideas and programme.” Roughly one-fifth (21,1 per cent) of those who voted tactically for a 
list “with real chances to enter the 7th Saeima” voted for The People’s Party. The findings do 
not leave any clear conclusion, but the tendency is towards confidence in a new crew. 
87
 1993 survey was carried out in July that year by Latvia Social Research Center (Lasopec). The 1995, 1998 and 
2002 carried out in October both years by the Baltic Data House (BDN - Baltijas Datu Nams).
88
 The response alternatives (1998) was formulated by Hermann Smith-Sivertsen who had the survey made by 
the Baltic Data House for his doctorate thesis at the University of Oslo.
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Other indications are stronger in the 2002 election. As much as 62,7 per cent of respondents 
who said they “voted for them (the list) because I was dissatisfied with incumbent 
politicians”, voted for New Era (BDN, 2002). Nearly one-third (29,6 per cent) of the 
respondents who voted for New Era gave that answer. Only 11,7 per cent of the respondents 
who voted for JL, said they “voted for the electoral list that I believe represents the best 
candidates, ideas and programme”. 22,1 per cent of the respondents who gave that answer, 
voted for JL. It means that nearly 80 per cent of the voters who voted by confidence (130) 
voted for another party than the election winner. 18,2 per cent of the respondents who voted 
for New Era said they “voted for the list that contained my favourite candidate”, who was 
probably Einars Repse, the former national bank director. The “dissatisfaction” component 
seems to have played a significant part in New Eras victory. 
Anton Steen (1997) points to what he calls “the elite network state” where stable 
connections among elites and personal relations play a more important role than that of formal 
institutions. This structure fills a vacuum left by the old regime institutions. The “instability” 
with regard to voting patterns and even among Saeima factions during the parliamentary 
terms may be at least partly related to an apparent “elite orientation” that may jeopardize  the 
responsiveness of the democratic system. “Elite control through interconnecting informal 
structures and a high degree of consensus […] may be disruptive to democratic stability in 
the long run” (Steen, 1997:362).  
6.2 Socio-Structural and Cultural Factors
The most clear divide structuring the post-Soviet Latvian political landscape is between 
“Latvian” and “pro-Russian” parties, but the tendency has declined (Smith-Sivertsen, 
1989:98,102). The surveys leave a clear indication that “nationality” is a significant factor 
behind party preference. We must also discuss the possible presence of regional and urban-
rural contrasts with respect to party preference. Moreover, economic and social issues have 
become more important since 1995, as the socioeconomic differentiation has progressed.89
People in the countryside experiences a socio-structural transition which may be just as hard 
as the one experienced by urban dwellers, and an economic gap has re-developed between the 
south-eastern and western regions, profoundly between Kurzeme and Latgale. A study shows 
there is co-relation between lower education, lower income and higher risk of unemployment 
89
 A Latvian journalist explained (1997) that even people who may not be actually worse off then they were, 
would experience their situation worse by comparing their situation to that of better-off people, and by the look 
of all the new goods offered in stores which were not there in the 1980s. The new situation has created different 
economic and material opportunities, and the possibility to compare one’s situation to others.  
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(Aasland, 1996). We will look at socio-structural variables as education, income and 
unemployment for whether they indicate contrasts related to party preference (6.2.4). 
6.2.1 The Russian-Latvian Contrast
There is a profound difference between ethnic Latvians and Russians with respect to party 
preference. 92.9 per cent of those who said they voted for Tevzemei un Brivibai (For 
Fatherland and Freedom) and 93.8 of those voting for the LNNK (Latvian National 
Independence Movement) in the 1993 elections were “ethnic” Latvian.90  78.9 per cent of 
those who voted for the Equal Rights’ list were non-Latvian. Non-Latvian voters also 
preferred Saskana Latvijai/Tautas Saskana Partija (SLAT/TSP). 53.4 per cent of SLAT’s 
voters had a non-Latvian background. The higher percentage of Latvian voters for Saskana, 
compared to Equal Rights, may be explained by Equal Rights’ relation to the former 
Communist Party and the anti-independence movement. SLAT’s origin in the pro-
independence movement seems to leave a certain legitimacy among Latvian voters.
Many Latvians have repeatedly voted for the parties that have defended a restrictive 
citizenship and nationalist agenda - For Fatherland and Freedom, LNNK, the Farmers’ Union 
and the Christian Democratic Party. However, national or nationality issues were not stated 
by many respondents as the decisive factor behind party choice (See 6.6.). The weight of the 
nationalist issues appears to be far less important than economic, social and other, which may 
explain the relatively moderate support for the parties with a predominantly nationalist 
agenda. A question is whether national issues or the “ethnic variable” is more mobilizing for 
non-Latvian voters in support of the so-called “pro-Russian” parties, than for Latvian voters 
in support of so-called “Latvian” parties. The “Motivation of Choice” survey 2002 does not 
confirm that ethnic-political identity is the primary motivating factor among people who 
voted for PCTVL. Only 2.8 per cent of PCTVL’s voters say they “voted in support of the 
ethnic group I belong to” (BDN, 2002). Among the respondents who voted for the national-
conservative party TB/LNNK 2,5 per cent reported ‘support for ethnic group’ as the 
motivation behind their vote in 2002.91  This result does not exclude ethnic-national identity 
as one of more factors, if not the most important, or not consciously. Nor do we know if 
“ethnic group” is perceived as difficult to state as the decisive factor. If we look at the 
nationality variable, however, it shows that TB/LNNK - unlike any other Latvian party - has 
90
 The 1993 survey used only the Latvian/non-Latvian dichotomy. The 1995, 1998 and 2002 surveys divided 
between Latvian, Russian and “other” ethnic background
91
 The survey subgroup is very small, only 39 respondents. The 2.5 per cent motivated by ethnic identity 
corresponds to one respondent.
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almost exclusively Latvian support, and none of the “other nationality” respondents voted for 
TB/LNNK. Similarly, very few Latvians vote for Equal Rights and the Socialist Party. Less 
than one per cent of Latvian respondents said they voted for Equal Rights in 1993, and only 
1.1 per cent for the Socialist Party in 1995. 7.1 per cent of the Latvian respondents said they 
voted for SLAT in 1993, but only 1.5 per cent in 1995 (when the “economists” had quit). 2.7 
and 3.6 per cent of Latvian respondents said they voted for the united list of TSP and LSP 
(1998) and PCTVL (2002). The proportion of Latvian votes has decreased  (1998: 19.4 per 
cent, 2002: 15.7 per cent) as a consequence of the increased total support for the TSP/PCTVL, 
possibly also from new, naturalized voters.    
The election survey indicates that ethnic identity is a significant variable in the 2002 
election as it was in 1993, 1995 and 1998, although it is not stated as a primary motivation. 
The naturalization of more and more residents, who are mostly Russian or of another non-
Latvian origin, will show if the nationality contrasts are becoming a permanent post-Soviet 
cleavage.92 The majority of Russian-speaking citizens, before 1998, have a family history in 
Latvia. Many may feel integrated as Latvian Russians, but may also feel alienated by 
contemporary nation-building policies. There may be distinct political differences between 
”rooted” Latvian Russians or Slavs, and Soviet migrants, a topic that call for more research. 
6.2.2 Urban – Rural Contrasts?
Like in most Western countries, the agricultural economy has lost its formerly dominant 
position and currently makes up only about a third of the Latvian GDP. Industry, trade and 
services; mostly urban sectors, constitute the bulk of the national economy. A third of the 
population is living in the capital, Riga, which is a political, cultural, financial and economic 
centre. Is there any pattern in the distribution of urban and rural votes that reflects the new 
urban/rural differentiation? Are Riga voters different from other voters? 
The surveys employ a variety of categories under the “Size of populated place” 
question (which is called “Place of residence” here). The 2002 survey employs five categories 
(Riga, 6 bigger cities, District centre, Other city and Village/Countryside). The 1998 survey 
employs three (Riga, Other city and Town/Village/Countryside). The 1995 survey employs 
six categories (Riga, 6 bigger cities, District centre, Other city, Village and Countryside). The 
1993 survey employs three values similar to the 1998 survey, but Rural area instead of 
Village/Countryside. The 1995 survey does not explain what is meant by “District centre” (as 
92
 Heidi Bottolfs suggest that ethnic contrasts may grow into a permanent cleavage as more non-Latvians become 
citizens and the political questions become more purely cultural - issues like official language and language in 
schools and so on  (Bottolfs, 2000:83-86).
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different from village, town or other city). I will look primarily at the latter values in each 
survey as ‘rural’ (rural area, village, countryside). Let us look at which parties the rural voters 
preferred, shown in Table 6-1. (See also Appendix C):
Table 6-1: The table shows which parties the rural voters preferred in 2002.
Rural Respondents 2002 (n=296) % of the Rural Voters Rural % of the Party’s Votes
New Era (JL) 27.1 31.6
The People’s Party (TP) 19.4 41.2
Green and Farmers’ Union (ZZS) 17.6 57.7
Latvia’s First Party (LPP) 13.0 49.1
LNNK/For Fatherland and Freedom   5.7 44.9
Other   2.0
New Era (election winner) captured a large number of votes all-over, including the 
countryside. TP, ZZS and LNNK/TB also seem to have a significant basis of support in the 
rural areas. LNNK/TB used to have a more “urban” electoral profile. The party was reduced 
by more than half from 1998 to 2002, and most of the decrease seems to have been among the 
urban electorate. Two of the parties above did not exist during previous elections. However, 
one of the parties that became part of Latvia’s First Party (LLP), the Christian Democratic 
Union, participated in the fifth Saeima and was in a coalition in the sixth Saeima with the 
Farmers’ Union and Latgale Democratic Party. For the previous elections (1998, 1995 and 
1993) the rural distribution is shown in Table 6-2 - Table 6-4.
Table 6-2: The table shows which parties the rural voters preferred in1998 .
Rural Respondents 1998 (n=331) % of the Rural Voters Rural % of the Party’s Votes
The People’s Party (TP) 29.3 43.9
Latvia’s Way (LC) 19.9 45.8
Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) 15.1 41.7
LNNK/For Fatherland and Freedom 13.3 31.0
The New Party (JP)   5.7 29.7
Other 12.1
The bulk of The New Party transformed into a christian party which is part of the LPP (2002),  
a member of the group of conservative European parties, along with The People’s Party and 
New Era.93) TP gathered nearly half of its support in rural areas in 1998. LC experienced an 
increase in the party’s proportion of rural support (the total support for LC increased slightly 
from 1995 to 1998), and, interestingly, the Social Democratic Alliance actually had a larger 




Table 6-3: The table shows which parties the rural voters preferred in1995 .
Rural Respondents 1995 % of the Rural 
Voters
Rural % of the Party’s 
Votes
Democratic Party “Landlord” (DPS) 17.8 (Countryside)
12.3 (Village)  
28.0
  3.7
Latvia’s Unity Party (LVP) 16.8 (Countryside)
  4.9 (Village)
66.6
  3.7








Christian Democrats, Farmers’ Union and Latgale Democrats 
(KDS, LZS, LDP)




*Joachim Siegerist’s party, which dissolved during the sixth Saeima.
The 1995 election winner “Landlord” collected a good share of the rural votes, but was not a 
profoundly “rural” party. In 1993 and after, the rural vote was distributed among a number of 
parties. The data shows first of all that there is no distinct “agricultural” party preference, but 
the People’s Party, the Farmers Union/ZZS, the KDS/LPP and partly Latvia’s Way have or 
did have a significant basis in the countryside. A large share of the rural vote is taken by the 
election winner irrespective of any “rural profile”, except in 1995, when a good share of the 
rural vote was distributed among three new parties.
Table 6-4: The table shows which parties the rural voters preferred in1993.
Rural Respondents 1993 % of the Rural Voters Rural % of the Party’s Votes
Latvia’s Way (LC) 41.9 41.7
Farmers’ Union (LZS) 14.3 48.4
Concord for Latvia (SLAT)   9.0 26.0
Christian Democratic Union (KDS)   7.1 38.5
When looking at Riga voters, a slightly different picture can be observed. (See Table 6-5 -  
Table 6-8). 
The Farmers’ Union/ZZS, Latvia’s First Party/Christian Democrats, the People’s Party 
and also “Landlord” do (or did) not have any firm basis in Riga. The relatively strong support 
in Riga for TB, LNNK and SLAT/TSP/PCTVL seems to reflect the ethnic composition, as 
more Russian and other non-Latvian citizens live there (compared to the countryside which is 
predominantly Latvian). The Latvian national-conservatives did well in Riga until 2002 when 
the support fell sharply. The support for “Russian” parties (notably PCTVL) rose dramatically 
from 1998 to 2002,94  while New Era won significant support among Latvian voters (35.0 per 





constituency).95 The Social Democrats and Latvia’s Way did not pass the election threshold in 
2002, while the Riga support for TP was weak (7.8 per cent).
Table 6-5: The table shows which parties the Riga voters preferred in 2002.
Riga Respondents 2002 % of the Riga Voters % of the Party’s Votes
New Era (JL) 38.6 35.5
PCTVL 30.7 47.5
TB/LNNK 2.5 15.4
Table 6-6: The table shows which parties the Riga voters preferred in 1998.
Riga Respondents 1998 % of the Riga Voters % of the Party’s Votes
TB/LNNK 22.1 31.7
The People’s Party (TP) 21.1 19.5
The Social Democrats (SDA) 17.2 29.2
The Peoples Concord Party (TSP, incl. Socialists) 14.2 29.6
Table 6-7: The table shows which parties the Riga voters preferred in 1995.
Riga Respondents 1995 % of the Riga Voters % of the Party’s Votes
For Fatherland and Freedom (TB) 20.0 40.5
DP “Landlord” (DPS) 19.5 25.0
LNNK/Green Party (LZP) 13.6 46.4
People’s Concord Party   6.9 37.8
Latvia’s Socialist Party (LSP)   6.8 44.9
Table 6-8: The table shows which parties the Riga voters preferred in 1993.
Riga Respondents 1993 % of the Riga Voters % of the Party’s Votes
Latvia’s Way (LC) 29.7 --
Concord for Latvia (SLAT) 17.1 --
LNNK 12.0 --
Equal Rights   5.7 --
The distribution of votes in ‘Other Cities’/’6 Bigger Cities’/’District Centre’ and ‘Other 
Town’ is shown in appendix 3. In 2002, PCTVL and New Era captured a major portion of the 
votes in ‘6 Bigger Cities’, New Era and the People’s Party in ‘District Centre’, New Era and 
the People’s Party in ‘Other Town’. It appears that there is a “continuum of change” with 
respect to party preference with ‘Rural Voters’ at the one end and ‘Riga’ at the other. A 
further discussion of an urban/rural contrast will follow in chapter seven.
6.2.3 Regional Contrasts?
What has happened to the regional contrast? The district-based election results of 2002 shows 
one immediate difference between Latgale, Riga and the other three districts, Vidzeme, 
Kurzeme and Zemgale: PCTVL won the election in Latgale (nine of 17 mandates, 36.8 of the 
votes) and Riga (ten of 28 mandates, 30.5 per cent of the votes) but barely passed the five per 
cent threshold in Kurzeme and did only slightly better in Vidzeme and Zemgale. A party 
95
 N (nationality)=640/77.6 per cent of all respondents).
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called Latgale’s Light (Latgales Gaisma) won almost one-tenth of the votes in Latgale but 
none in any other district.96 (With a 5 per cent threshold nationwide the chance for local 
parties or lists to gain representation in the Saeima is very small). The surveys show a 
relatively strong support for New Era and the People’s Party in Vidzeme and Kurzeme, and 
for New Era and Latvia’s First Party in Zemgale. The findings seem to confirm differences 
between regions that have a higher non-Latvian population (Riga and Latgale) and the 
overwhelmingly “Latvian” rural regions. Except for the support for LZZ in Latgale, the 
parties with a strong rural component (LPP and TP) have a weaker basis in the districts that 
has a higher ethnic mix, Latgale and Riga. In the districts with a very dominant Latvian 
citizenry, the distribution of votes between different “Latvian” parties seems to increase.   
6.2.4 Socio-structural Differences
The income variable in the 2002 survey reveals that New Era, the Popular Party, Latvia’s 
Way (which is not represented in the 8th Saeima), and earlier TB (TB/LNNK), are preferred 
by high income voters, but the high income respondents are few and the explanatory strength 
related to the highest income groups is low. The People’s Party has its highest proportion of 
votes among the richer and poorer groups in 2002. It is difficult to explain this “U” curve 
without more data. It may be coincidental. The proportion of low-income voters who 
supported TP was 18.4 per cent in 2002, down from 23.8 per cent in the previous Saeima 
election. The proportion of TP voters in the “middle” income groups fell even more.
LC scored well among the group of respondents with the highest income (income 
above 400 Lats a month) but few,97 and the party lost much of the support among all the other 
income segments. The support for New Era shows and increasing tendency in the higher 
income groups. It is yet to see whether New Era will consolidate its position and which basis 
will remain sources of support in the 2006 election. 
The 1998 survey shows that nearly 23 per cent of the respondents with incomplete primary 
education voted for Latvia’s Way, corresponding to 16 per cent of the party’s support. 45 per 
cent of the people who voted for LC had completed only secondary school, while 13 per cent 
have completed university. Nor does the People’s Party appear as an “academic’s” party but 
attracted votes from all educational levels, except “Primary education incomplete”. 53 per 
96
 60 per cent of the respondents who said they voted for Latgale’s Light, were Russian (five of sixteen 
respondents), two were of Latvian nationality and one of other nationality.  
97
 In the survey a total of four persons, one of whom voted for LC, one voted for TP and two voted for New Era. 
The category is too small to have explanatory value.
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cent of the voters in the 1998 elections had completed secondary education.98 Nearly 13 per 
cent had been or were university students (incomplete), and 10 per cent had a university 
degree.99  The national conservative party, TB/LNNK caught votes among all educational 
categories including university level100 and post-graduate level.101 The score among ‘Primary 
incomplete’ and ‘Secondary incomplete’ is very small. The common TB/LNNK voter has 
completed secondary education, which is the largest subgroup. TB/LNNK’s “share” of this 
group is less than 10 per cent. The ‘Secondary completed’ group constituted more than 60 per 
cent of the People’s Concord’s electorate, less than 8 per cent of the total subgroup. Education 
alone does not seem to represent a significant factor with respect to party preference in 1998. 
In 1993, Equal Rights found a relatively higher support among the voters aged 25 to 
34 years (52.6 of its electorate), and more than half of the Socialist Party’s voters in 1995 
were aged 25-49. If we look at occupation (1995), 6.6 per cent of the unemployed 
respondents said they voted for the Socialist Party (19.5 per cent of the party’s voters), 4.8 per 
cent of the respondents who identified as “workers” voted for the Socialist Party (36.8 of the 
party’s voters), whereas 3.9 per cent of respondents who identified as “retired” voted for the 
Socialist Party (27.5 per cent of the party’s voters). Only 6.1 per cent of the Socialist Party 
voters in the survey identified as “self-employed” (3.8 per cent of all respondents identified as 
“self-employed”), 5.8 per cent of the LSP voters identified as “specialists” (2 per cent of the 
category), among “Managers” there were none, among students there were none, while 4.2 
per cent of the party’s voters identified as “Housewife” (3.4 per cent of the category voted for 
LSP). We may include education, which consist of three categories in the 1995 survey 
(Primary School, Secondary School and Higher Education). 20.6 per cent of the Socialist 
Party’s voters had primary education (3.9 per cent of the respondents with primary education 
voted for the LSP), 69.3 per cent of LSP’s voters had secondary education (4.4 per cent of the 
category) and 10 per cent had higher education (1.8 per cent of the total category). The data 
suggest that the LSP finds its core electorate among (non-Latvian) young unskilled workers, 
unemployed and retired people, most of them with secondary or primary school education. In 
1993, 68.4 per cent of the respondent who voted for Equal Rights had secondary education 
98
 Completed secondary education was the largest education subgroup with  792 respondents. Nearly 15 per cent 
of the respondents with secondary education voted for TP, whereas 8.2 voted for LC.  TP was the single largest 
receiver of votes from this subgroup, however, the largest proportion – more than one in four – did not have the 
right to vote. 
99
 These are small subgroups, respectively 28 of 101 and 22 of 169 respondents.
100
 12 per cent of respondents with university education voted for TB/LNNK, a total of 21 individuals, which  
constituted 15 per cent of the TB/LNNK voters in the 1998 survey. 
101
 One-fourth of the respondents with higher education than university degree (‘post-university completed’) 
voted for TB/LNNK, however the subgroup is very small, with only four respondents. 
87
only (3.5 per cent of the total category), 21.1 per cent of the Equal Rights voters had primary 
education only (3.6 of the total category) and only 10.5 per cent of the party’s voters had 
higher education (1.7 per cent of the total). Over 90 per cent of the Equal Rights voters 
reported an income of less than 50 lats a month. Occupation was not included in the survey. 
On the basis of the two surveys together, it is possible to assume that the Equal 
Rights/Socialist Party’s voters may be primarily disadvantaged groups among mainly non-
Latvian voters. However, the Socialist Party cannot be considered the party of the 
economically and socially disadvantaged since several other parties have collected more votes 
than LSP among these groups. In 1993, Latvia’s Way received 41.6 per cent of the votes 
among respondents whose monthly income per family member was less than 15 lats, and 35.6 
per cent of the votes among respondents who earned 15 to 25 lats. In 1995, People’s 
Movement “For Latvia” (of Joachim Ziegerist) received 20.8 per cent of the votes among 
respondents who earned less than 10 lats per month, whereas “Landlord” got 16.7 per cent of 
the votes among the respondents who earned 11 to 25 lats per month. The Christian 
Democrats similarly found nearly all its voters in less than 50 lats category in the 1993 
election, according to the survey.
Joining the People’s Concord list (TSP) before the 1998 election, LSP entered an 
alliance that reached a larger spectrum of voters in terms of income and education. In 1998, 
TSP got 9.2 per cent of the votes among respondents who earned more than 81 lats per month 
(the highest income category in the survey) and 9.6 per cent in the income category of 51 to 
80 lats. In 2002, PCTVL got 22.6 per cent of the votes in the ‘101 to 250 lats per month’ 
category, and 2.5 per cent of the votes in the category ‘Above 250 lats’ which was the highest 
income category in the survey. The 1998 survey shows, however, that ‘workers’, 
‘unemployed’ and ‘retirees’ were the dominant answers in the occupation category among the 
TSP (with LSP) electorate, as in 1995 (when 60 per cent of the party’s voters were 
‘unemployed’ or ‘retired’). In 1998, 12.4 per cent of TSP’s voters had completed University 
education (7.1 per cent of the total category).
We should look briefly at the same variables for Social Democratic voters. LSDSP 
collected relatively equal shares of votes in every income category (8.2 per cent to 9.4 per 
cent.) In the highest income category (81 lats or more), LSDSP got 9.3 per cent of the votes. It 
is the smallest segment of the party’s support and a small income category (N=109, total 
N=860). The occupational profile of LSDSP’s voter is somewhat similar to that of LSP. 41.5 
per cent of LSDSP’s voters were ‘Employees’ (8.3 per cent of the ‘Employee’ category), 34.7 
of the party’s voters identified as retired (8.5 per cent of the ‘Retired’ category), whereas 13.1 
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per cent of the party’s voters identified as ‘Responsible for home/Not employed’) and 13.3 
per cent (3.4 per cent of the category) were on maternity leave. 10.2 per cent of the LSDSP’s 
voters were unemployed/between jobs (6.5 per cent of the total category). 55.8 per cent of 
LSDSP’s voters had completed secondary education (8.5 per cent of the category), and 8.3 per 
cent had completed University (5.9 per cent of the total category). 87.5 per cent of the party’s 
voters were ‘Latvian’, 7.5 per cent ‘Russian’ and 5 per cent ‘Other Nationality’ (12.5 per cent 
non-Latvian voters), which support the assumption that LSDSP and LSP appeals to different 
electorates along the nationality variable. Signs of an emerging socio-structural cleavage are 
weak, however there is a noticeable indication that social variables like income and education 
have a say, and may cut across the nationality variable (Smith-Sivertsen, 1998:92-93).  
According to Smith-Sivertsen, empirical research at the mass level can provide different 
impressions than at the elite level, as the “masses” would be more severly affected by the 
socioeconomic difficulties that have been part of the economic restructuring of the Latvian 
society. Heidi Bottolfs (2000:77-78) asserts that the masses are far more concerned with 
economic and social issues than reflected in the elite which ”seems to prefer ethnic issues 
before economic issues (…)  rendering an impression of overemphasis on ethnic issues on 
part of the elite at the cost of a more advanced discussion about economic issues.” Bottolfs 
asserts that an elite-driven policy-making process has politicised the ethnic dimension out of 
proportion, and the true cleavage of Latvian contemporary politics (2000) is that between the 
rulers and the ruled. Does any evidence support this observation?
Elections since 1993 suggests that the majority of the voters indeed are more 
concerned about economic, social issues, crime and corruption, than ethnic issues. Most 
Latvian voters, according to election surveys, prefer parties that appear to present a solution to 
the problems they are most concerned about. In 1993, the number one concern among voters 
was increasing crime (96.7 per cent) and secondly, the concern about decreasing living 
standard (95.9). On third place was a demand for higher pensions, and on fourth, concern for 
rising unemployment. In comparison, 63.9 of the voters were concerned with returning 
property to its former owners, and 69.2 per cent found it important to remove the former 
nomenclature from power. The Popular Front and most of the successive parties – with 
Latvia’s Way as number one included many members of the former nomenclature (Pabriks 
and Purs, 2002:68, Lieven, 1994:301),  but it was far from damaging. 
On the political level, there has not been any significant  disagreement about the broad 
lines and direction of economic policy, which may rather be ascribed to realpolitik rather than 
a real state of agreement. People may largely have agreed to economic change away from the 
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command economy, and although they react with disappointment upon the negative effects of 
transition, there is not a single party that manages to significantly mobilize the disadvantaged 
and disappointed. Latvia’s northern neighbour Estonia pursued a much more rapid and even 
more liberal economic policy, but economic issues were “conspicuously missing” from the 
political debate in the period after independence, according to Hans Petter Svege and Christer 
D. Daatland (Svege and Daatland, 2000:67):
There was a general agreement that the command economy left over from 
Soviet times had to be replaced by market economy, although there was little 
discussion on what this would entail. 
In the 1993 post-election poll by Latvia Social Reasearch Centre, 84.2 of the voters thought 
the development of a social security system was important.102 In 1995, 74 per cent of Latvians 
and 83 per cent of Russians in Latvia described their household’s economic situation as 
unsatisfactory (Rose, 1995).103 In 1996, the same proportion of Latvians and about the same 
proportion of non-Latvian (82 per cent) gave this answer (Rose, 1997:14). Significantly, in 
1996, 57 per cent of Latvian respondents and 69 per cent of the non-Latvian respondents gave 
a positive evaluation of the socialist economic system and a “non-positive” evaluation of the 
current economic system (Rose, 1997:11).104
A possible indication of support for Bottolf’s suggestion, may be the voters’ 
punishment at each election of the incumbent government parties and preference for 
newcomers.  The existence of an “elite cleavage” between the population and the political 
elite may not be ruled out. After all, Latvia has historically been a highly stratified society, 
and the people has not been used to chose who to be govern by. The function of 
responsiveness vis à vis an electorate may have a weak foundation.
102
 Respondents who answered ”very important” and ”rather important”.
103
 Answers ”not very satisfactory” and ”very unsatisfactory”.  
104
 ”Reaction to economic change”.
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7. ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction: Different Political Climate, Different Political Processes
“The most striking – and most ominous – impression is the prevalence and 
intensity of hatred: ideological, ethnic, social. The monarchists despised the 
liberals and socialists. The radicals hated the “bourgeoisie”. The peasants 
loathed those who had left the commune to set in private farms, (…) Latvians 
were ready to pounce on their German landlords. All these passions were held 
in check only by the forces of the army, the gendarmerie and police – who 
themselves were under constant assault from the left. Since political 
institutions and processes capable of peacefully resolving these conflicts had 
failed to emerge, the chances were that sooner or later resort would again be 
had to violence.” (Pipes, 1997:194)
(…) Latvia in 1917 was a socialist country which, considering the 
circumstances, also meant that it was a Marxist country. (Ezergailis, 1971)
The above sentences describe the political climate and moods in various parts of Imperial 
Russia shortly before the Revolution. It was the climate in which the new Latvian democratic 
state and multiparty system was founded. Cultural, religious, territorial, social and ideological 
conflicts all pulled in different directions. Modernization in Latvia had intensified the existing 
class conflicts and created new social conflicts upon the old. The proclamation of the nation-
state mobilized even new cultural contrasts. 
The level of conflict in Latvia in the 1980s and 1990s cannot compare. The re-
democratization of Latvia was marked by pragmatic steps and acts. The democratic and 
national opposition proceeded by peaceful means, avoiding to give the Soviet authorities a 
pretext to resort to force. The authorities did attempt to regain control by military force in 
January, 1991, when the Western world’s attention was at Kuwait and Iraq, but failed. 
The most important contrasts in the 1980s were cultural and ideological rather than 
social. In 1920, the most urgent issue was social (the Land Reform) and aimed at defusing 
tensions resulting from centuries of social inequality. In practical policy it meant measures of 
economic and social levelling. In the 1990s, a political priority has been to create the 
conditions necessary for a development towards greater social and economic differentiation; 
as part of the development of a civil society independently from the state and government. 
This development will probably be accompanied by new types of conflicts, and the 
development of a more complex conflict structure. In this chapter, the pre-war and post-Soviet 
party systems will be compared with respect to continuation and change in terms of individual 
parties, the structure of political opposition and possible cleavages. 
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The questions asked initially were: 1) which conflicts and cleavages were decisive for the 
formation of political opposition in Latvia in the 1920s and 1930s? 2) To what extent does 
conflicts and cleavages mobilized before 1934 express themselves in the formation of new 
oppositions in post-Soviet Latvian politics? To answer these questions I will discuss the 
structure of oppositions on the basis of a sub-divided two-dimensional figure which employs a 
traditional left to right-axis (‘Economic-ideological’) and a cultural axis which is called the 
‘Nation-building’ axis. I have found that the concepts of ‘Class’ and ‘Nation’ describe the 
most fundamental conflict dimensions in pre-war Latvia. 3) Thirdly, how to interpret changes
in new party system structure compared to the 1920s and 30s? Can changes in the structure of 
political opposition be explained by changes in the voter population and new socio-structural 
contrasts since the 1940s? 
7.2 The Structure of Oppositions in the 1920s and 1930s
The party system that existed between the wars (1920-1934) was dominated by the Social 
Democrats (left), the Farmers’ Union (centre-right) and radical bourgeois/liberal parties 
(centre) which were based on urban electoral groups. The ‘centre’ was added a rural 
component when joined by new smallholders’ parties. The influence of the centre parties was 
not due to size or coherence, but due to the fragmentation which made any government 
dependent on the support of the centre (von Rauch 1995:95). The ‘Left’, ‘Farmers’ and 
‘Centre’ represented class contrasts in the cities and in the countryside, and a (re-)emerging 
contrast within the countryside and between the countryside and the cities as the new 
smallholders’ abandoned the left, and the Social Democrats increasingly depended on the 
urban working class votes. Table 2-1 sketches the main divisions in the Saeima 1922-1931:105
105
 The table is based on information given by several sources: Albert Zalts (1926), Alfreds Bilmanis (1928:24-
28, 1934:76ff), Jürgen von Hehn (1966), Georg von Rauch (1995:91ff), Josifs Steimanis (2002:77-94) a.o. 
The differentiation between Smallholders and Farmers is made by me on the basis that the traditional contrast 
between the farming class established in the nineteenth century and the rural proletariat remained politically 
salient after the implementation of the 1922 Land Reform Act. I also prefer to use the designation “Radical 
Bourgeois” about the parties that based their support upon the urban Latvian petty-bourgeoisie, dominant among 
them were the “educated class” of intellectuals. Their dominant common feature appears to be “national 
protectionism”.
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Polish Party  
MINORITIES
The position of the smallholders’ parties within the party system is difficult to define. They 




ideologically and politically they were closer to the national-radical bourgeois parties of the 
“centre”. The new peasant parties embody the amalgamation of social radicalism of the 
former rural working class, and the new nationalism. The dominant bourgeois party in the 
1920s, the Farmers’ Union, was a radical party from the outset but gradually modified its 
policies following independence (Zalts, 1926:11,13). A conservative rural party, The National 
Farmers’ Union, formed in 1923 following the Land Reform. The party was fiercely anti-
socialist, in favour of collaboration with the estate owners; the old nobility; and adhered to 
nationalism and christian culture as the foundation of the state. While it appears contradictory, 
the Latvian conservatives’ amalgamation of nationalism and supportive association with the 
Baltic German estate owners, the impression is that it should be seen firstly in terms of class: 
Nationalism as the antithesis of  socialist revolution (Plakans, 1997:119). With Socialists and 
Conservatives as the extreme counterparts, a third and dominant position is held by the 
moderate right and radical bourgeois parties. The main theme dividing the bourgeoisie into 
different camps was the question of whether or not collaborate with the former elite, the estate 
owners (Zalts 1926:14). One important issue that drew the line between the conservative and 
moderate right/radical bourgeoisie following independence was the Land Reform which 
allowed the confiscation of land from the estate owners for redistribution among soldiers and 
landless peasants. The conservative Latvian parties were against any revolutionary or radical 
measures against the formerly privileged class, while to the majority of  the non-socialist 
parties the Land Reform was a measure that was necessary to stem the “land hunger” and 
stem the radicalization of the poorer population (von Hehn, 1966:7).107 However, among the 
bourgeois supporters of the land reform there were disagreement. To some, the position held 
by the Farmers’ Union was seen as too lenient towards the estate owners, and in 1922 a shoot-
off; The New Farmers’ Union; was founded (Zalts, 1926:16-17).108 The new party announced: 
“The new peasantry is recruited mainly from the classes without means, from labour 
circles.”109 The new peasant party would represent the interests of a new rural strata created 
by the Land Reform, while the core electorate of  Farmers’ Union were the Latvian farming 
strata emerging after the imperial land reform in the mid-nineteenth century (“Altbauern”). 
The New Settlers’ and Smallholders’ Party, founded by Alfreds Blodnieks in 1925, targeted 
the same social segment. Apparently, the peasant strata was a relatively large and attractive 
electoral source to tap into. The reform created nearly 100,000 new smallholdings (Blodnieks, 
107
 Landlessness became a problem in the second half of the nineteenth century because of population growth 
and the limited access to land because of the estate structure (Plakans 1997:93)
108
 The party was headed by Otto Nonacs, previously a leading member of the Farmers’ Union.
109
 My translation from German in Zalts, 1926:16.
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1960:196). 144,000 persons who were landless or considered deserving, mainly war veterans, 
received land (Plakans 1997:16). The creation of a new peasant strata based on the Social 
Democrats’ rural basis, reduced the Social Democratic support in the countryside. The party 
more and more depended on its urban electorate. The Social Democratic party was also 
challenged by internal splits. Towards the end of the 1920s, a marxist wing left to form a new 
communist party, The Left Trade Unions. The Bolshevik party in Latvia was prohibited. 
There were more or less parallel sets of parties of the minorities and Latgale (Smith-
Sivertsen 1998:90). Except for the Poles and the Germans, the minorities can hardly be seen 
as a single segment; the number of parties expressed a high degree of differentiation and 
disunity between and among the various nationalities. The German and the Polish parties 
basically defended the interests of the former social elites respectively in the “germanized” 
Latvian territories and “Polish” Latvia (Latgale). It was the old class conflict transformed into 
political defence of their cultural identity, and social and economic interests.    
7.2.1 Different Ideological Positions of the “Deposed Regime” Parties
An immediate problem arises when trying to compare the structure of political oppositions of 
the 1920s and 1990s because of the fundamentally different ideological positions of the two 
“deposed regime” parties - the Baltic German and the former Communist Party (Latvian 
Socialist Party) which is dominated by Russians. The Baltic Germans politically transformed 
their identity from high social status to that of a national minority in 1917-22. The conflict 
between the Baltic Germans and Latvians prevailed along the territorial-cultural dimension. 
Today, the picture is somewhat more complex, because the main representative of  “the 
deposed regime” is in opposition both along the ideological left-to-right dimension (socialism, 
state ownership versus capitalism, private property rights and the free market) and along the 
national-cultural dimension as a representative of ‘Russian’ (“minority”) interests. In 
principle, the Communist Party nomenklatura was a privileged social class which may be seen 
in principle as a structural parallel to the privileged Baltic German elite – none were interested 
in changing the system. Despite the ideologically different positions, the privileged classes of 
both the “deposed regimes” were  fundamentally conservative, and both were replaced by 
mass democracy and national-liberal governments. In the purely political-ideological context, 
the Baltic German “party” (Committee of Baltic German Parties) was rightist (liberals and 
conservatives) while the current Socialist Party is leftist (marxist) in terms of its past and 
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present political program and ideological orientation.110 A possible approach to the 
comparative analysis of apparently very different party systems, therefore, is to discuss the 
fundamental conflicts involved. 
A point of departure is the events between 1917 and 1920 which defined the 
fundamental conflicts of the time: a deep social and economic (class) conflict turned into 
revolution, and a territorial-cultural struggle about the future of the Eastern Baltic territories 
as the First World War and the revolution turned into a civil war between Bolsheviks, the 
local German nobility supported by the German Army, and Latvian “patriots”. The political 
forces that eventually participated in the build-up of the Latvian nation-state within the 
Constituent Assembly and Saeima all stood behind the nation-state or at least accepted the 
formation of the independent republic, which logically was a premise for participation. The 
territorial-cultural conflict surfaced again and mobilized the independence cleavage in the 
1980s. The socio-economic conflict finds some expression too, but not in a decisive way. 
Rather, the economic conflict became part of the independence cleavage due to the 
ideological nature of the Communist regime. Differentiation became a more important issue 
than levelling class contrasts.  
As mentioned earlier, a parallel notion to the political concept of “discontinuous 
democracy” is “discontinuous nation-building process”, which is central to an analysis of 
political contrasts in Latvia. The process of developing and defining a national identity started 
before the mid-Nineteenth century with the so-called New Latvians and the National 
Awakening, while the process of nation-building began at the time of the formation of the 
independent republic. The process involved integration of a culturally, religiously and 
linguistically diverse population. There was not much of a common “national” history, nor a 
common “national” culture. Language (of the “indigenous” population) defined the borders of 
the territory. The new nation-state inherited a partly medieval class-based social stratification, 
with extreme social contrasts. The main political opponent of the Baltic German Saeima 
faction was the Latvian Social Democrats, which was the biggest party and still adhered to 
marxist principles (v. Hehn 1966:12). The LSDSP remained in opposition most of the time 
also vis á vis the Latvian bourgeois parties. After the radical Land Reform, the largest non-
socialist party, the Farmers’ Union, entered a moderate, pragmatic liberal-conservative 
political course and was losing support by 1931 due to ideological polarization and a strong 
anti-minority climate (Zalts 1926:13-14, v. Hehn 1966:17 ). 
110
 LSP’s programme (in English) as of 2002 states: “SPL supports creation of a socially protected society on the 
basis of the Marxism theory.” (SPL=Socialist Party of Latvia)
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The school autonomy law came under attack in the late 1920s by the fourth political 
force, the ‘centre’ parties. The Democratic Centre and the Progressive Union were leading 
forces behind the new anti-minority policies within the Latvian Saeima in the beginning of the 
1930s (v. Hehn 1966:16-17) . The growing extremism of the early 1930s grew out of the three 
“fronts” that were involved in the civil war and reflected the hegemonic rivalry between 
Bolshevik (then Soviet) Russia and Germany in the Baltic area, and the new Latvian radical 
nationalists. The moderate nationalism, represented by the Farmers’ Union before 1931, was 
losing, as were conservatives like the National Union. Since the late 1980s a similar 
distinction has existed between moderate and radical nationalists, expressed profoundly by the 
adherents of ‘ethnic nation’ and ‘civic nation’ where the former has opposed the large-scale 
integration of Soviet migrants and the latter has chosen a more pragmatic approach to the new 
nation-building. An emphasis has been on Latvian integration into European and Western 
institutions for the sake of security and economic reorientation and development. The 
‘pragmatists’ promote the use of Latvian language in the public sphere and education as a 
means for integration of the culturally diverse population. The cleavage that divided the 
‘centre’ and the ‘moderate right/right’ has a parallel in the contrasts dividing the adherents of 
‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nation. It may be called the ‘exclusion’/’inclusion’ cleavage (see Smith-
Sivertsen, 1998:98-102).   
7.2.2 The structure of oppositions along basic dimensions 1920-1934
I will introduce a simplistic two-dimensional figure, Figure 7-1, that shows the basic 
ideological conflicts and oppositions. A similar figure will be presented later in the chapter for 
the structure of the post-Soviet party system. Georg von Rauch describes the pre-war party 
system in terms of a three-party structure, consisting of the Farmers’ Union (conservative), 
the Social Democrats and the National Liberals (Rauch, 1995:91). I will add the German party 
as the ‘old regime’ party and the most influential among those of the minorities, as well as 
representing the formerly dominant social strata. 
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Figure 7-1: Illustration of thepart system’s main  counterparts 1920- 1934. The arrows define the extreme 
oppositions. A dominant role was played by the Farmers’ Union.
A comparison of the figures follows the figure of the post-Soviet oppositions in Chapter 7.2.4.
As mentioned, in the inter-war period, the economic nation-building element 
concerned measures that would reduce the sharp social and economic contrasts; at present it 
means measures that will lead to a differentiated economy independent of the state. In both 







































































































































regime’ – in the 1920s it was the estate structure with few very large owners occupying most 
of the land; in the 1990s it was the state possessing most of the land – the purpose: to create 
an economically viable nation-state based on independent citizens. 
7.2.3 The structure of oppositions along basic dimensions 1993-2002 
The economic-ideological dimension of the following figure assumes that the space between 
the centre and the left pole comprise some degree of state involvement/control up to full state 
involvement/control. The space between the centre and the right pole comprises the position 
of some state involvement/control (centre) up to minimal state involvement/control.  The 
economic dimension includes a very important economic and ideological foreign policy issue 
too, that of EU membership (fulfilled in 2004).
The non-economic nation-building axis that cuts across the economic dimension 
concerns mainly socio-cultural issues including the definition of the state’s citizenry, and an 
important defence issue, NATO membership. The attitudes regarding the issues of EU and/or 
NATO membership is strongly related to the country’s historical position between East and  
West, and concern the question of whether Latvia should chose a profoundly Eastern or 
Western orientation in matters of culture, economy, trade and security. 
The punctuated line through the centre from the lower left end to the upper right end 
represents a post-Soviet transition contrast within agriculture, between independent farmers 
(upper-right) and representatives of Soviet-related collective farming (lower left). (The figure 
shows the main political contrasts on the party-system level only.) 
The subdivisions are meant to explain the main differences among parties that usually 
are considered “similar” along a one-dimensional left-to-right axis, and may contribute to 
identify differences especially among the so-called Latvian parties (liberal, conservative and 
national-conservative), but also among the socalled “Russian” parties. The first, single 
dimension used to describe the structure of opposition in Latvia in the 1990s derives from the 
conflict between pro-Soviet regime defenders (communists) and pro-independence democrats 
and nationalists in the 1980s (Smith-Sivertsen 1998:94).111 The conflict consisted of a number 
of issues – ideological (communists versus democrats), political (one-party versus a multi-
party system), economic (planned economy versus market economy) and social (state/public 
ownership versus private ownership). A ‘cultural’ component was added by the 
overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) Slavic and mostly Russian representation on the ‘left’, 
and overwhelmingly native Latvian on the ‘right’, which Smith-Sivertsen calls the ‘Ethnic 
111
 Smith-Sivertsen (1998: 94) uses the concept ‘Independence Cleavage’.
99
Cleavage’ (Smith-Sivertsen 1998:95-102). The core conflict of the single-dimensional 
structure of oppositions (in the fifth Saeima) was that of citizenship and naturalization. The 
Ethnic Cleavage reflects the presence of  Baltic German and other nationalities’ parties in the 
1920s and early 1930s, but in a different way. The Baltic German representation was coherent 
and dominant as a conservative and liberal element in the inter-war years, while today the 
Ethnic cleavage is dominantly Russian, reflecting the migration policies of the Soviet regime 
and a much larger Russian minority. The German and the Jewish components have practically 
disappeared in political terms, along the Ethnic Cleavage, and the opposition to ‘Latvian’ is 
‘Russian’ and ‘other national minorities’. A corresponding feature of the new Ethnic Cleavage 
to the former is the issue of a dominant minority (then Baltic German, now Russian) to come 
to terms with its new minority status in a society where the mentioned national minorities 
belonged to a more or less privileged cultural group. A significant difference compared with 
the inter-war years is the absence today of the huge political fragmentation among the 
minorities, which may be explained both by cultural sovietization as well as the election law 
threshold that discourages political particularisation. 
7.2.4 Towards a More Complex Structure of Oppositions 
Around 1995, the original left to right dimension was inadequate as the effects of the 
economic transformation had hit large numbers of the population negatively, regardless of 
their ethnic identity or being citizens or not. The victory of the left-liberal party “Saimnieks” 
in the national elections in 1995, the subsequent victory of the Social Democrats in local 
elections in 1997 and success in the national elections in 1998, made relevant another and 
more classic type of economic dimension with a left social opposition which was also pro-
Latvian and West-oriented (Smith-Sivertsen 1998:105-106). Although the Social Democrats 
lost in the eight Saeima elections in 2002, the existence of a profoundly socially oriented 
Latvian opposition is accommodated by a two-dimensional figure that includes another two-
dimensional sub-division. This is presented in Figure 7-2. The left to right (horizontal) 
dimension comprises economic principles and ideologies (Marxism and state ownership, 
public welfare at the left end; liberalism, privatization and minimal state role in affairs at the 
right end). A crosscutting dimension consists of many of the original conflict issues; 
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citizenship (zero option versus “First Republic”/naturalization), nation-state versus an 
‘international’112 state, linguistic issues (including education) and other cultural issues. 
Figure 7-2: The figure is a sub-divided two-dimensional model of the post-Soviet party system, showing the 
structure of opposition of the main parties. TB/LNNK=Fatherland and Freedom/The National Independence 
Movement, LZP=The Green Part, LCSZ=Latvias Center Party Farmers’ Union, LPP=First Party, 
112
 The reason why I use ‘international’ in stead of multinational is because the former relates to the former 
regime’s ideology, to which Russian was the primary expression of the international state, and the party/parties 



















































































































































































































































LC=Latvia’s Way,113 TP=The People’s Party, JL=New Era, LSDSP=Latvia’s Social Democratic Labour 
Party, LDDP=Latvia’s Democratic Labour Party, DCP=The Democratic Centre Party, DPS=Democratic 
Party “Saimnieks”114, TSP=People’s Concord Party, LVP=Unity Party, PCTVL=The Party for Equal Rights 
in a United Latvia, LSP=Latvia’s Socialist Party. The positioning of the parties are approximate and based 
primarily upon party programmes, Janis Ikstens’ articles “Political Parties” at www.politics.lv,  and responses 
to sets of (similar) questions via e-mail to the respective parties with regard to the major  issues (citizenship, 
naturalization, language, EU membership, NATO membership, state regulation and interference in the economy 
vs. free market). See also Nørgaard et al. 1999:84/1996:102.
The figures of the pre-war and post-Soviet structure of oppositions represent “mirror-images” 
along two main conflict dimensions. The descriptions of issues along the dimensions are 
slightly different, but represent similar types of issues. In the pre-war figure, the Baltic 
German opposition, which included liberals and conservatives, is in the opposite position of 
the current Equal Rights/Socialist Party and Concord for Latvia, in the lower right quadrant. 
TB/LNNK’s position vis á vis LSP/TSP reflects a mirror-image parallel contrast to 
LSDSP’s pre-war position vis á vis the German party (socialist versus conservative/liberal). 
The latter contrast expressed mainly the old class conflict, whereas TB/LNNK’s position vis á 
vis Equal Rights/the Socialist Party (and even TSP) is based on complex contrasts of ideology 
and  national-cultural issues  related to the deposed regime. The national-conservative 
TB/LNNK fills a space corresponding to that of the pre-war radical bourgeois “Centre” (and 
the Democratic Centre/Progressive Union) with an ‘ethnic’ nationalistic ideology. 
The slightly different position of the three main conservative-liberal parties, Latvia’s 
Way, New Era and the People’s Party concern the emphasis on liberal economic issues and 
EU integration by Latvia’s Way (until a shift in the late 1990’s when the party began paying 
attention to social issues) whereas the People’s Party’s programme emphasize traditional 
values and the role of the family more profoundly than economic issues, although the party’s 
economic position is liberalist. New Era, too, represents liberalist pro-market views. 
However, the issue focused by the party founder and leader, the former Central Bank director, 
Einars Repse, before the 2002 elections was the fight against corruption and the need for a 
bureaucratic “clean-up” (Auers, 2002). The party defines itself as conservative, and is a 
member of the European People’s Party (along with the party of Repse’s rival Andris Skele, 
the People’s Party) which comprises conservative and christian democratic parties in Europe.   
The role of Latvia’s Way in the 1990s bears similarities to that of the Farmers’ Union in 
the 1920s as the backbone of several governments. Latvia’s Way failed to pass the five per 
113
 Latvia’s Way modified its political programme in a social direction after 1995, calling for a “responsible 
market economy”-type of welfare system,  and may become more of a centrist party. (Ikstens  
http://www.politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/9.htm)
114
 Ikstens says “Saimnieks” used left-centrist slogans but in practical activities realized right-centrist policies 
(http://www.politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/5.htm).
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cent threshold in the 2002 election, the fourth national election since the restoration of 
independence (support for the Farmers’ Union was waning after the third national election in 
1928, due to the ideological polarization which brought the centre parties to power, headed by 
Margers Skujenieks of the Progressive Union in 1931 and by Adolfs Blodnieks of the New 
Settlers’ and Smallholders’ Party in 1933). An important difference between then and now is 
the absence of polarization. The role of Latvia’s Way has been taken over by other 
ideologically moderate parties of a conservative-liberal brand, the People’s Party and New 
Era. Despite several government shifts, the governments have all been of more or less same 
brand and colour – national conservative with a liberalist economic agenda. Thus, the 
elimination of Latvia’s Way in the 2002 election apparently did not happen because the voters 
preferred a different political course, as with the Farmers’ Union the late 1920s when the 
climate of insecurity and economic depression increased the support for national radicalism.  
The emerging, cross-cutting structure of the economic and cultural dimensions suggests 
a possibly integrating effect, but there is also a risk of polarization between parties of the 
“Russian-Left” and “National-Right”. The main reason why such polarization has not 
happened is the much stronger support for the parties closer to the centre (mainly along the 
nation-building dimension) who are willing to compromise on fundamental issues such as 
naturalization, protection of the minorities’ cultural rights - and agree on EU integration and 
Latvian as the single state language – this include the People’s Concord Party, which has a not 
insignificant Latvian electorate (47 per cent in 1993, 25 per cent in 1995). 
7.2.5 The National Right: Different Strategies of ‘National Survival’  
The most important contrast between the parties of the national ‘right’ since 1993 is the 
“strategy for national survival”. Two strategies with a shared aim (‘national survival’) reflect 
the differences between the Latvian Popular Front and the LNNK in the late 1980s, and is 
expressed in present liberal-conservative policies: One, the ‘strategy of integration’ that puts 
economic issues and international relations, primarily membership in EU and NATO, first, 
represented first and foremost by Latvia’s Way and New Era, and less decisively by the 
People’s Party (Jubulis, 2002:131).115 This strategy is meant to secure Latvia’s survival within 
a broader European context by making compromises with respect to the “ethnic purity” of the 
nation-state. Latvia’s Way and other ‘rightist’ parties have followed recommendations by 
European institutions, such as EU, the Organization of Cooperation and Security in Europe, 
and the Baltic Sea States Council.
115
 The People’s Party called for a referendum on EU membership issue. 
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Another strategy is represented by the national-conservative TB/LNNK who sees the 
question of ‘national survival’ from within the country. The party agrees on Latvian EU 
membership but not by trading the principles established vis-á-vis the history of Soviet 
occupation and its consequences.116 This party follows a ‘strategy of exclusion’ with respect 
to “state membership”, which makes the question of national survival first and foremost one 
of ethnic re-construction by excluding or at least severely restricting the possibility of 
naturalization for immigrants who arrived during the Soviet occupation. The ‘right’ is thus 
distinguished internally by two opposing strategies that share the ultimate goal of prevailing 
national independence, the national conservatives (TB/LNNK) versus national-liberals 
(profoundly Latvia’s Way) with an in-between group of conservative and conservative-liberal 
parties which may be seen as a buffer as well as a glue between the “exclusionists” and 
“integrationists”. 
7.2.6 The Left
In seventh Saeima (1998-2002) another pier was added to the Left with the entry of the Social 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), which became a “Latvian left” as opposed to both the 
“Russian/Non-Latvian” left, and the “Latvian right”. The distance between the “Latvian” and 
“Russian” left is underscored by the fact that the left parties did not join forces.117 Instead, 
LSDSP agreed to support Vilis Kristopans’ LC coalition government in 1998-99 to save it, 
even when the “anti-left” TB/LNNK refused to accept the Social Democrats as a formal 
member of the coalition. 118 Adding to a “pro-Russian” and “Latvian” left, the collapse in 
2003 of the PCTVL alliance suggest that that the left consists of three “piers” or branches; 
split not just between the “Latvian” and “Russian/minorities” interests but also along the 
‘independence cleavage’ (See Smith-Sivertsen, 1998:95,104-108, also Heidi Bottolfs, 
2000:96 and Pabriks/Purs, 2002:83-84). The “Soviet left” (the Latvian Socialist Party) and the 
“pro-Russian, anti-Soviet left” (TSP) harbour fundamentally different political goals and does 
not speak for the same non-Latvian electorate. TSP has collaborated with the national 
government on a number of decisions which enhances the interests of the minorities and the 
Latvian state alike, such as the liberalization of the law on naturalization (Jubulis 
2000:118,121). The People’s Concord Party went through a split in 1995. A group of 
116
 See for example Ikstens: http://www.politics.lv/en/psistema/4.1/8.htm
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“economists” primarily concerned with the issues of recovering the country’s economy left 
TSP to form a separate party. Their departure made the “ethnic” issues and the defence of 
non-citizens’ rights became more to the forefront, according to Ikstens. 119 With the departure 
of the liberally-oriented “economists”, the TSP economic policies have become more left-
leaning. However, the party’s pro-EU position testifies to a policy orientation that is not just a 
“pro-Russian” party.
7.2.7 Integration or Ethnic Polarization?
The strength between the national-liberals (“integrationalists”) and the national-conservatives 
(“exclusionists”) has been decisive for the domestic and international political direction 
chosen by Latvia, in particular when concerning the most controversial nation-building issues 
such as citizenship, naturalization, language and education. The direction has been decided by 
the moderate left and right parties, which included TSP before the alliance with the Equal 
Rights Movement and the Socialist Party. This policy have been adopted also by governments 
dominated by the People’s Party and New Era, apparently very much as a consequence of the 
all-over priority among moderate nationalists to get Latvia into the European Union. 
There is no evidence as yet of an increasing polarization along the cultural axis 
between Latvians and non-Latvians (or Russians). The future development may depend on a 
successful integration of the current non-citizens in the political nation. The national-cultural 
policy pursued by the moderate (pro-integration) parties is aimed at integrating the non-
Latvians by naturalization and Latvian language instruction, and slowly convert the society 
from a dominantly “Soviet-Russian” to a dominantly “Latvian” by linguistic definition rather 
than ethnic definition (see Smith-Sivertsen 2002:61-63, Jubulis 2001:113-114, 122-123). 
Latvian then would become a second or even third language among citizens who do not speak 
Latvian as their first language, and a common language of all Latvian citizens. 
The mobilization of the Russian and non-Latvian vote together by TSP/LSP was 
motivated by the wish to increase the leverage of the Russian vote. Politically, the alliance 
was a step in a confrontational direction, as the PCTVL largely adopted LSP’s position of 
opposition and protest rather than the pragmatic approach of cooperation. TSP, Equal 
Rights/LSP and PCTVL constitute the main opposition along the new cultural nation-
building dimension. The dimension remains profoundly salient in Latgale with the largest 
proportion of ethnic non-Latvians (and larger support for Equal Rights/LSP and SLAT/TSP) 
and Riga, where Latvians are a minority among a Russian-speaking majority which is a 
119
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minority among Latvian citizens. The ‘regional’ cleavage remains, but in a changed version 
due to Soviet russification policies and possibly the geographical position of Latgale. While 
between the two world wars, the Latgalian distinctiveness was distinguished by the district’s 
ethnic-cultural pluralism and religion (Catholicism), today this regional cleavage is 
distinguished by the relatively dominant ‘Russian’ or ‘non-Latvian’ features. The catholic 
element has not been politically mobilized (yet). The salience of the Independence and Ethnic 
(cultural) cleavage makes Latgale politically more like the Riga district, although 
economically and socially the two districts are far apart. Latgale struggles with economic 
disadvantages, while Riga the capital is way ahead. The regional contrast, and possibly 
cleavage, may become more pronounced if the economic cleavage gain more salience. So far, 
the national-cultural contrast, with a relatively high concentration of non-Latvian voters, has 
been dominant, although the support for “pro-Russian” parties may also be an expression of  
‘economic’ contrasts rather than purely cultural contrasts.  
The dramatic weakening of the Latvian national-conservative party after 1998 may be 
the result of the decision to remove the naturalization windows and speed up the 
naturalization process, depriving the TB/LNNK of the party’s primary mobilizing issue. The 
education law, including the decision to gradually introduce Latvian as the language of 
instruction in non-Latvian schools, has been pushed by Latvia’s Way and other 
integrationalist parties. It appears that the pre-war political separatism of Latgale belongs to 
history, at least at the Saeima level. One Latgalian party, Latgales Gaisma (“Light of 
Latgale”) received only 1,6 per cent of the votes nationwide in 2002. However, Latgale’s 
Gaisma received nearly 10 percent of the votes in the Latgale district and is a political player 
on the municipal level. Thus, there is a slight tendency of localism, prevented nation-wide by 
the five per cent election threshold.  
7.3 Party Continuity 
Latvia’s former democratic experience was a 14-15 year long period if counted from the time 
of the Constituent Assembly (1920) until the suspension of the constitution (1934). By 2004, 
approximately the same amount of time has passed since the democratic election of the last 
Supreme Soviet (1990), which reinstated the 1922 Constitution, and a little less since the fifth 
Saeima elections in 1993. The development of political parties in the inter-war years stretched 
back two-three decades, whereas the formation of parties in post-Soviet Latvia started only in 
the very last stage of the USSR’s existence. Most parties were founded after the restoration of 
independence, in 1992 and 1993. One might have expected that a revival of earlier parties 
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would follow, if at least for the sake of symbolic relationship with the first democratic era and 
the possibility of reaping political benefit from a legitimacy attached to parties of the first 
decade of independence. However, only three parties were re-established or adopted the 
names of pre-war parties in 1989-1992, the Social Democrats (LSDSP), the Farmers Union 
(LZS/CPZS); and the Democratic Centre Party (DCP). 
The Social Democrats (LSDSP) and Farmers Union (LZS) were the two most 
significant parties in the 1920s. They represented the main fronts in the countryside at the 
time of the Russian revolution, between Latvian landowners and landless peasants. The 
Democratic Centre Party (Partija Demokratiskais Centrs) was founded in 1922 with the 
merger of three radical liberal (urban-based) parties, and again in 1992 by leading members of 
the Latvian Popular Front, and merged in 1995 with “Landlord”. Pabriks and Purs, (2002:70) 
regard the DCP as “re-established”,120 while Ikstens call it “an unconvincing retraction to 
history”. Ikstens states that the organization never stressed the succession.121 DCP’s party 
statutes from the founding Congress in Riga 1992 (English version) does not suggest any 
relationship to the previous Democratic Centre. Its political programme was in many respects 
similar to that of Latvia’s Way as DCP adopted a programme that expressed what would 
become the “integrationalist” line vis-á-vis non-citizens and non-Latvians – rather contrary to 
the anti-minority policies and radical nationalism advocated by the pre-war party. 
The Farmers’ Union and the Social Democrats (LSDSP) are the only inter-war parties 
that can be regarded as ‘continuous parties’. LSDSP existed in exile in Sweden (Balodis 
1990:365), whereas LZS was re-established on the basis (party statutes) of its predecessor. 
In 1993, the Farmers’ Union entered a government with Latvia’s Way, but it fell apart 
in July 1994 due to differences primarily over agricultural issues.122 Since then, the party has 
been represented in the Saeima only in election alliances with other parties (the Christian 
Democratic Party in 1995 and the Green Party in 2002). The difficult position of the Farmers’ 
Union at present may be explained by the fact that agriculture is not any more the dominant 
economic sector; as well as demographic change. Only 35 per cent of the population lived in 
cities and towns before the Second World War; by 1994 the number was 69 per cent (Aasland 
1996:27). Less than a third of the population lives in the countryside. 80 per cent of 
agricultural land was owned by private farmers by 1996, showing the rapid transformation 
120
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that happened in the rural economy, as 92 per cent of agricultural land belonged to collective 
and state farms only five years earlier (Smith-Sivertsen 1998:102-103). Another reason why 
the Farmer’s Union has not managed to become the farmers’ party may also have to do with 
the character of measures necessary to transform the countryside and the fact that the 
Farmers’ Union did not stand out as any different than other Latvian conservative-liberal 
parties. Both Latvia’s Way and the People’s Party have had a significant voter segment in the 
countryside. According to Ikstens, the Farmers Union presented a programme that was similar 
to other “national bloc” parties, and it did not suggest solutions to or discuss important 
problems facing the rural economy. “Although the Latvian Farmers’ Union’s words supported 
farming, its actions gave the impression, not of an agrarian party, but of a liberally oriented 
urban organization.”123  Since the defeat in the 1995 elections, the party started to work on its 
rural image, and returning with 12 seats in the eight Saeima together with the Green Party, it 
may find a position within the post-Soviet party system.
LSDSP (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) controlled much of the rural votes in the 
elections in 1917 due to the large number of landless rural workers. Following the pre-war 
Land Reform, the Social Democrats lost much of their basis in the countryside and became 
largely “urban”. LSDSP won 55.1 per cent of the urban votes in 1931 (Balodis, 1990:201). 
The current LSDSP was unsuccessful in the 1993 elections (0.66 per cent). The party nearly 
passed the five per cent threshold in 1995 with the “Labour an Justice” alliance,124 and then 
captured 14 seats (12.8 per cent of the votes) in 1998 with LSDP. In the 2002 election, the 
new Social Democratic Workers Party (a merger with LSDP) again fell under the threshold.
LSDSP’s experience is somewhat similar to that of the Farmers’ Union’s in 1995 and 
1998 and shows that the party has not managed so far to retake its pre-war position as a 
mobilizer of its traditional segment, the workers and the economically disadvantaged. The 
explanation may be a remaining scepticism among a majority of voters with respect to parties 
associated with socialism at this stage shortly after the downfall of communism. Many voters 
may also still assume a leftist orientation means an orientation towards Russia (Pabriks and 
Purs, 2002:83). Moreover, the “left” vote is split profoundly by the nationality variable. 
Besides, the social economy has changed not just away from a dominant agricultural sector, 
but also away from a dominant blue collar industrial sector. The new “worker” may not 
identify neither with the “worker” nor with the “social democratic” labels. It is a “post-
123
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modern”, post-industrial issue as well. The surveys indicate that economically disadvantaged 
citizens voted less for LSDSP in 1998 than for the People’s Party and Latvia’s Way. The 
same pattern is found in the second lowest income category. 
7.3.1 Latvian Liberalism and “the Federative Idea”
Liberal ideas found their way to the Baltic provinces from Western Europe in the nineteenth 
century. Andrew Ezergailis makes a point that the parties of the Latvian ‘centre’ appeared 
originally under other designations than “liberal”; as “progressive”, “democratic” or “radical”. 
Latvian liberalism was linked to a federative idea, formulated as “A free Latvia within a free 
Russia”, a slogan that referred to their concern for civil as well as national liberties, according 
to Ezergailis (1971:37). The idea of  independent statehood emerged as a goal only in 1917 
among the “liberalists”. (Ezergailis, 1971:33). Radical anti-privilege reform-liberalism and 
anti-German nationalism among the Latvian bourgeoisie and farmers served the same ends, as 
an oppositional ideology against the (“foreign”) privileged elite. The first Latvian national 
Awakening shares similarities with the simultaneous Nordic cultural “national romanticism”, 
cultivating and idealizing the conception of  (one’s own) nationality (‘volk’), its history and 
myths, cultural expressions and traditions which were ‘peasant’.  
The “liberalists” were individuals who were not social democrats nor demanding 
“exclusive class liberties”. It would include a majority of Latvian journalists, poets and 
leaders of agricultural, cooperative and refuge organizations, and most of the pre-
revolutionary politicians (Ezergailis 1971:33). Ezergailis cites passages from the Farmers 
Union and the National Democratic Party; the latter would in 1922 merge with other parties 
and transform into the Democratic Centre Party. Thus, the “liberalists” were not equivalent to 
the ‘centre’ block. The ‘centre’ was mainly the urban-based liberalists who played a 
secondary political role to the farmers and the Farmers’ Union.125
The parties of the ‘centre’ rejected the idea of  “class struggle” and were hostile to 
protection (‘privileges’) based on cultural identities. ‘Centre’ meant “not left nor right”, and 
possibly reflected the total rejection of class-type contrasts. In the course of the 1920s, this  
political idea of a single and unified national society provided ground for ethnic nationalism 
(von Hehn 1966:13). The reason why ethnic nationalism emerged as an ideology of the 
‘centre’ may have several explanations. One may have to do with “jealousy” towards the 
relatively dominant position in trade, industry and banking by members of two non-Latvian 
cultural groups; Baltic Germans and Jews. Another contributing factor may be the actual 
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political fragmentation among the Latvian urban middle strata; the bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals, a social strata that historically, has played a nation-building role, as well as a 
force for democratization. In Latvia, the elites supporting democratization and independence 
belonged to many different political shadings. The landowning farmers apparently played a 
more important political role after 1917 than the Latvian urban middle class. Another aspect 
pointed to by Ezergailis is the lack of a common ideological superstructure and inner cohesion 
among the ‘centre’ parties, and finally; the nationalistic liberal centre parties emerged from 
groups and circles that were in war exile in Russia and presented from the outset radical 
programmes that went further than the home-based parties, like the Farmers’ Union 
(Ezergailis 1971:39).  Today, the ‘centre’ designation usually refers to the space occupied by 
moderate parties that collect votes more or less equally among all nationalities, such as 
Latvia’s Way, DP “Landlord” (1995), the People’s Party and “New Era”  - and pursue a 
policy intended to avoid polarization. The real equivalent today of the political ‘centre’ of the 
1920s and 30s is the so called ‘nationalists” (radical or conservative nationalists), and 
identified by policies that are close to the “ethnic” brand of nation-building ideologies. 
An important question is whether the terms ‘liberal’ or ‘liberalists’ makes sense when 
analyzing today’s party system in a comparative, historical perspective. All “Latvian” Saeima 
parties adhere to the “federation-to-independence tradition” and supports independence, the 
nation-state, democratic civil rights and the democratic institutions. 
Corresponding to the two main “liberalist” groups of the 1920’s and 30’s; the radical 
bourgeois (radical national) ‘centre’ parties and the more moderate (national-liberal) Farmers 
Union; are the radical-nationalist For Fatherland & Freedom/LNNK and moderately 
nationalist Latvia’s Way (including later also the liberal-conservatives People’s Party and 
New Era); originating, respectively, in the radical and the pragmatic/moderate national 
independence movements of the 1980s. A significant change has occurred: The declining role 
of agriculture within the economy as well as demography. The party that have more or less 
filled the role of the pre-war Farmers’ Union; Latvia’s Way, has found not insignificant 
support among voters in the countryside. In 1993, 41.7 per cent of the respondents living in 
‘rural area’ voted for Latvia’s Way; in 1998, 20.6 of the rural votes were won by the People’s 
Party. The support for Latvia’s Way was declining, and only 14.8 per cent of the rural voters 
voted for LC; however; the rural votes (‘Town, Village, Countryside”) made up almost half of 
its total support, according to the post-election survey.126 Similarly, the rural voters 
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constituted 43.9 of the total support for the People’s Party, which was the 1998 election 
winner. In the 2002 election, 27.1 per cent of the rural voters (‘Village, Countryside’) cast 
their ballots for the New Era party, which became election winner. Among all the contesting 
parties, New Era collected the most rural votes, constituting one-third of New Era’s votes. 
The People’s Party came second, collection 19.4 of the rural votes, constituting 41.2 of the 
total number of votes won by TP. This suggests that the main problem the post-Soviet 
Farmers’ Union have faced is the fact that the role as a pragmatic and moderately nationalist 
“government backbone” which the pre-war party held for a decade, has been taken by parties 
that has succeeded in attracting support from the urban and the rural areas alike. The reason 
why rural voters prefer apparently “urban” liberal and liberal-conservative parties to a 
designated agricultural party, may be complex. It may be the appeal of certain political 
figures, or that the rural population find themselves more affected by the economic 
transformation, and that the vote is to large extent a protest vote that at each election has 
helped a new party win. In 1995, the rural vote was divided between several parties, but 
mainly between the left-of-centre Democratic Party “Landlord”, which won the election, 
Latvian Unity Party, the populist People’s Movement “For Latvia” and the Farmers’ Union & 
Christian Democratic Union list. As a conclusion, the “dualism” of  Latvian national-
liberalists, into competing radical and moderate opinions which existed in the 1920’s and 
early 30’s, has reappeared under new circumstances and is represented by new parties.
Conservatism in the Latvian political “tradition” in the inter-war years and before the 
revolution appears to be mainly associated with a sympathetic attitude, promotion and/or 
defence of  Baltic German dominance, interests and/or culture. One such Latvian party was 
lawyer Fridrichs Veinbergs’ People’s Party (von Hehn 1966:8). Veinbergs “despised 
socialism” and had no faith in the viability of Latvian independence (Plakans 1997:158). His 
“mouthpiece” was the Latviesu Avizes, which was founded in 1822 by a Baltic German 
intellectual who engaged in the education of the peasantry and created a newspaper that was 
published in the Latvian language. The newspaper later took on a militant tone in opposition 
to the activities of the Latvian “national awakening” and became “a defender of Baltic 
German privileges”, according to Plakans (1997:101). Conservatives like Veinbergs were 
excluded from the People’s Council and the Constituent Assembly. Albert Zalts (1926) 
employs a ‘conservative’ designation or category in addition to ‘liberal groups’ and 
‘democratic groups’; the liberal groups correspond to the moderate reformers among the pro-
independence nationalists, while the democratic groups correspond to the radical reformers
among the pro-independence nationalists. Among parties designated as conservative by Zalts 
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is  the National Farmers’ Union. Formed in 1924, it  supported collaboration between the 
wealthier strata of Latvian farmers and the landed Baltic German nobility, the estate owners. 
The Land Reform had been implemented, and the National Farmers’ Union sought to 
minimize its effects (Zalts 1926:14). The party was basically defending big owners’ private 
property rights against the objectives of socialism and the “bureaucratic tutelage” (“die 
Formundschaft des Bürokratismus”), as encroachment on private property was seen as a threat 
to free enterprise. The party also held nationalism to be the foundation of the state and the 
“unified Latvian people”; and further that the Christian culture should be the adequate basis 
for a “healthy development of the population”. According to Zalts, the conservative tendency 
of the party was expressed in the programme: A total defence of private property rights, free 
enterprise and labour; it warned against a social legislation that was not in accordance with 
the existing (assumingly: economic, BS) conditions, but in favour of  nationalism for the sake 
of  unity, and the Christian culture. Also among the small ‘conservative’ category was a 
marginal party called the Christian-National Union,  whose main concern was the role of the 
christian (Lutheran) faith in society. The majority of bourgeois Latvian parties were more or 
less “indifferent” to religious matters (Zalts, 1926:19). Among its leaders were prominent 
members of the Lutheran clergy (Plakans, 1997:72,78). 
A major distinction between the conservatives and the liberals (right liberals) in pre-
and post-revolutionary Latvia is the attitude with respect to whether or not collaborate with 
the old regime and its adherents.127 This was a crucial question at the time when the farmers 
began to form parties; from 1917 (Zalts, 1926:13). Zalts counts the Latvian Farmers’ Union 
(1917) among the liberal groups which did not collaborate with the Baltic German nobility. 
The party attempted to soften the provisions of the Land Reform, but the Farmers’ Union 
supported and carried out the radical reform. The National Farmers’ Union, formed in the 
wake of the Land Reform, represented the farmers who were in favour of collaborating with 
the estate owners, and is categorized by Zalts as conservative. A question is whether the 
‘conservative’ attitude among Latvians was more a phenomenon in the countryside, among 
wealthy farmers, than in the cities, among the wealthier segment of the Latvian bourgeoisie. 
A Latvian party belonging to the right wing of the broad “liberal” (‘centre’) category 
(among the liberal groups in Zalts’ categorization) is the National Union (1919-1921), also 
called the National Centre (in 1921 called the National Centre Party/Independent Bloc) (Zalts, 
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1926:18). Its prominent leader was Arveds Bergs, a lawyer, who became a leading figure of 
the “ultranationalist right wing” (Plakans, 1997:33). Bergs was among Latvians leading the 
relief efforts among Latvian refugees in St. Petersburg during the First World War. He 
collaborated with Karlis Ulmanis’ authoritarian regime following the coup d’etat in 1934 (von 
Rauch, 1995:159). His right-wing faction represented the views and interests of a tiny, 
wealthy part of the Latvian  bourgeoisie; industrialists, traders and also certain intellectual 
groups (Zalts, 1926:18). Their political goals were economic stability, minimal social reforms 
and a strong central political power in order to secure stability. The influence of this party was 
undermined by the extra-parliamentary organization of right-wing radicals in the late 1920s 
(von Rauch, 1995:93, von Hehn, 1966:17). 
It appears that nationalism was a common political principle shared by the Latvian 
bourgeoisie in the 1920s and 1930s. The defining contrast between conservative and right 
liberal parties; the attitude to whether or not collaborate with the former Baltic German estate 
owners; makes no sense today. Conservatism is difficult to define as a political theory at it 
rejects explicit ideology and advocates pragmatism (Robertson 1993:107). The content of 
conservative politics may change from generation to generation because different generations 
“may have different things to preserve.” In Latvia today, several parties define themselves as 
conservative. To some parties on the right, a liberalist view on economic issues goes along 
with a conservative view on issues concerning the nation and the family institution and often 
also (Christian) religion. The People’s Party define itself as a conservative party which 
emphasizes the promotion of European culture, traditions and values of the Christian world.128
The People’s Party base itself upon four cornerstone principles: Freedom, Justice, Private 
Property and the Nation-State. The Party promotes the nation-state principle, but explicitly 
admit minority population protection of their cultural identity. The party sees the defence of 
Latvia’s independence served within the EU and NATO.  The promotion of christian values is
common to other European Christian-Democratic parties. Another party that explicitly defines 
itself as conservative, is For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK. The programme (English 
version129) states: We are a conservative political organization which is founded to strengthen 
the state independence and sovereignity on the basis of the principle of legal succession of the 
Republic of Latvia proclaimed on the 18th of November 1918 and the Constitution of 1922 
(…)”. The party is against “an extreme liberalism permitting an unlimited development of 
market economy” which the party says leads to “a sharp contrast between rich and poor, mass 
128
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strike and social disturbances, that is a natural ground for leftist ideas (…)” and sees it as the 
responsibility of the state “to protect the poor and socially ruined”. TB/LNNK supports a 
“socially responsible market economy”. Common for all the parties along the centre-right 
axis, in the 1920’s and 1990’s, is the rejection of  “leftist ideas” (Marxism and socialism), and 
the promotion of a unified nation-state. Under post-Soviet circumstances and during the 
transition from state economy to market economy, and the ongoing process of social 
differentiation, it seems rather premature to try and establish clear-cut definitions that can 
distinguish between “liberals” and “conservatives” in a meaningful way, for example when 
concerning parties like Latvia’s Way, the People’s Party and New Era. 
Another aspect to the existence of several parties that look rather similar is observed 
by Margarethe Lindemuth who found that the existence of several bourgeois parties and 
groups in 1905 –1907 did not result from profound ideological (“Ideelle”) contrasts, but rather 
from minor disagreements on “formalities and tactics” as well as “personal antagonisms” 
(“Gegensätze”) which made impossible the formation of a single, larger Latvian bourgeois 
party (Lindemuth 1969:77).  Such tendencies are present in Latvian politics also today. For 
example, flolowing the 2002 elections, New Era party leader Einars Repse became Prime 
Minister of a centre-right coalition, while the People’s Party (of Andris Skele) was left in 
opposition, although both parties are members of the association of European conservative 
parties.
7.4 A Multivariate Analysis of the 1998 Survey
To which extent can changes in new party system be explained by changes in the voter 
population and new socio-structural contrasts since the 1940s? I will introduce results of a 
multivariate analysis of the 1998 survey data. The results are presented in Figur 7-3 to Figure 
7.7. An explanation of the multivariate analysis and of how to interpret the plots is given in 
Chapter 3.4.2.
The following is a very important result: Most of the variations in the voter 
characteristics (X-variables) and party choice (Y-variables) were found not to be explained. 
For the Y-variables (party choice) only 6% of the variation is explained by the first PLS-
component, and 1% by the second PLS component - 7% all together. For the X-variables 
(voter characteristics) 10% of the variation is explained by the first PLS-component and 10% 
of the second component (20% all together). It means that other X-variables than the ones 
included in the survey stands for the variation in Y, or party choice is more or less random.
An X-variable that might explain more of the party choice but not included in the 1998 
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survey, may be for example “parents’ party preference”. Similarly, a possible reason for 
randomness with respect to party preference might be that it is not clear to the voters what the 
different parties stands for. Also party choice may have been motivated by party leaders or 
other front figures.
The variables included in the analysis in Figure 7-3 (and Figure 7-4) are Nationality, 
Region, Urban/Rural Area, Occupation, Income, Age and Gender. 
In addition, the survey included questions about the motivation for party preference. 
The following alternatives were given: a) I didn’t like any of the electoral lists, but I voted for 
the list I consider the least bad, b) I didn’t have much confidence in those I voted for, but I 
voted for them because I was dissatisfied with the incumbent politicians, c) I voted for the 
electoral list that I believe represents the best candidates, ideas and program, d) I voted for the 
list that contained my favourite candidate, e) I voted for the most professional and competent 
candidates, f) I voted for those I expect to further my personal interests, g) Those I voted for 
are the best both for the country and for people in my situation, h) I didn’t vote for the party 
that is closest to me, but for a related electoral list with real chances to enter the 7th Saeima, i)
I voted in support of the ethnic group I belong to and j) Hard to say, no answer. 
An analysis with these questions where included as X-variables (in addition to the 
other X-variables) gave more or less same degree of explanation of the X- and Y-variables 
(Figure 7-5). The Y-variables were explained 6% and 2% by the two first PLS components 
respectively. However, it must be underlined that the analysis do after all explain some of the 
variation, and leaves three interesting findings: Firstly, by looking at Figure 7-3 (and Figure 
7-4) it is found that “nationality” likely is the most salient variable (First PLS component). 
Secondly, Riga and rural area (‘Urban-Rural’ variable) appears to be the Second PLS 
component. Thirdly, the other PLS-components (no. 3-8) explain less than 1% of the Y-
variations. (Shown in “Explained Validation Variance Plot”, a graphic not included here.)
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Figure 7-3: The figure shows plot from multivariate (regression) analysis of the 1998 survey. The variables 
included in this analysis are: Nationality, region, urban/rural area, occupation, income, age and gender. The 
axis show the most important PLS-component (labelled PC1) describing the party choice on the “x-axis”, and 
the second most important PLS- component (labelled PC2) describing the party choice on the” y-axis”.
Figure 7-4: A scaled-up version of  Figure 7-3, to look at the variables in the center of the plot.
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Figure 7-5: The same as Figure 7-3, including also motivation for party choice as X-variables
Figure 7-6 shows “Score Plots” corresponding to the “Loading Plots” in Figure 7-3 
(and Figure 7-4). The plots distinguish by colour between respondents belonging to a) 
different nationality groups, b) different places of residence, c) different regions (election 
districts) and d) income level. Figure a) strengthen the interpretation of “Nationality” as the 
first PLS-component. The figure shows that the three nationality categories are grouped 
together along the first PLS-component (the X-axis), Latvians to the right and Russians to the 
left. Figure b) strengthen the interpretation of ‘Urban-Rural’ as the second PLS-component. 
As seen, Riga dwellers (pink) are in the upper part of the diagram, whereas rural dwellers 
(green) are found at the lower (opposite) part. In Figure c) Latgale respondents are found in 
the rural/Russian quadrant, which corresponds well with demographic data. Riga dwellers are 
the same as the ones in plot b) and are of course located at the same place, as a group in the 
upper part of the ‘Urban-Rural’ axis. The Figure further shows that the other regions, 
Zemgale, Kurzeme and Vidzeme can not be distinguished from each other. A majority of 
these residents are Latvian. Figure d) shows that the respondents can not be distinguished with 
respect to income level. The same applies for education and occupation. This means that 
neither income, education or occupation appear to be significant with respect to party 
preference. 
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Figure 7-6: Shows “Score plots” of the analysis shown in Figure 7-3 The plots distinguishes by colour between 
respondents belonging to a) different nationality groups, b) different places of residence, c) different regions 
(election districts) and d) income level.
a) Latvian=blue, Russian=green, and “Other nationalities”=pink. 
b)Rural area=green, Riga=pink, and “Other city=blue
c) Riga=green, Latgale=pink, Zemgale=brown, Kurzeme=dark blue, and Vidzeme=light blue
d) < 31 LVL=green, 31-50 LVL=dark blue, 51-80 LVL=pink, >80 LVL=light blue. Light grey represents 
missing information about income.
Figure 7-5 shows that the motivation category ‘Ethnic Group’, which correspond to “I 
voted in support of the ethnic group I belong to” appear to describe the second PLS-
component. Similarly the motivation categories related to voting for parties with “Favourite” 
and “Best” candidate appear to be on the other end of a an “motivation” PLS-component. 
However, a score plot shows that “motivation” values are more or less randomly 
distributed, and that “motivation” is not (part of) the second PLS component. The data 
material suggests that ‘Ethnic Group’ is primarily associated with TB/LNNK voters, which 
probably explains most of the “extreme” location of “Ethnic Group”.
To sum up, Figure 7-3 - Figure 7-6 indicate that the X-variables (describing the voters) 
that most clearly explains party preference is nationality, with ‘Russian’ and ‘Latvian’ as the 
extreme values. ‘Other nationality’, on the other hand, is more neutral (lies closer to the 
origin). With respect to the Y-variables (party preference), the People’s Concord Party (which 
a) Nationality. b) Urban/rural 
c) Region d) Income
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in 1998 included Socialist Party candidates) and For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK are the 
main opposing parties along the nationality variable. The People’s Party, too, is equally close 
to ‘Latvian’ (Figure 7-4). The explanation why TB/LNNK is not closer to the ‘Latvian’ value, 
compared to Concord’s position much closer to ‘Russian’, may be explained by the relatively 
low election support for TB/LNNK, and the fact that the majority of the Latvian votes are 
distributed among several other parties. The effect of the ‘Latvian’ value is dispersed. In 
1998, 19.9 per cent of the Latvian voters voted for TB/LNNK, whereas 58 per cent of the 
Russian voters voted for the Concord Party (2.7 per cent of the Latvian voters voted for the 
Concord Party, but none of the Russian voters voted for TB/LNNK). The explanation why the 
People’s Party matches TB/LNNK’s position along the ‘Nationality’ axis appears to be the 
high all-over Latvian support for TP (29.2 per cent). TP emerged as election winner in 1998, 
and received also 9.8 per cent of the ‘Russian’ vote and 11.1 per cent of the vote of ‘Other 
Nationalities’. The “Russian” support for TP distinguishes the party’s electorate from that of 
TB/LNNK in spite of the similar location along the “Nationality” component.  
If we look at the second most important PLS-component in Figure 7-3 (and Figure 7-
4), which describes the ‘Urban-Rural’ variable, TB/LNNK appears as the most “urban” party 
(Riga) whereas the Farmers’ Union (which was not elected to the seventh Saeima) and 
Latvia’s Way are closer to the “rural” end (Figure 7-4). The People’s Party, People’s Concord 
Party and the Social Democratic Union appear neutral with respect to the urban-rural 
component. The position of TB/LNNK closer to the “Riga” end support the assumption that 
the “nationality conflict” from the Latvian side is more politically significant in Riga where 
very many (Russian) Soviet migrants live. A question, then, is whether this tendency will 
become even more pronounced as more and more non-citizens become naturalized and use 
their ballot. A polarization in Riga, where approximately a third of the country’s population 
live, may have a great impact upon the national elections as well as local elections. The 2002 
survey data however suggest a different development than the one of 1998, which leaves 
many questions open until the 2006 election.
The findings of the multivariate analysis, of the 1998 post-election poll, indicate that 
the two variables that can explain variations with respect to party preference are ‘Nationality’ 
and “Place of Residence” (the ‘Urban-Rural’ variable). Notably, the values that matter are 
‘Russian’ and ‘Latvian’, and not so much ‘Non-Latvians’ versus ‘Latvian’. The findings seem 
to underscore the “nationality” contrast as one mainly between Russians and Latvians.
Figure 7-3 (and 7-4) further shows co-variance between Latgale (‘Region’) and 
‘Russian’, and ‘Russian’ and ‘Other city’ (the ‘Urban-Rural’ variable). Russian voters are 
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found mainly in Riga, Daugavpils and other big cities. The position of the X-loading ‘Latgale’ 
in direction of X-loadings ‘Russian’ and ‘Village, Countryside’, and Y-loading ‘Concord 
Party’ indicates that Russians living in the countryside in Latgale also primarily voted for the 
TSP. Whether the ‘Nationality’ variable and the ‘Urban-Rural’ contrast will become 
permanent cleavages, is too early to tell. The term ‘cleavage’ is associated with long lasting 
contrasts that become permanently expressed by political representation. The findings here 
suggest a weak tendency, only, and only with respect to ‘Nationality’ and ‘Place of 
Residence’.  
The analysis of the 1998 survey data suggests a positive co-relation between residing 
in the countryside, low Education and low income, whereas higher income and higher 
education (‘Post-University’) co-relate with ‘Riga’. (In Figure 7-4 it can be seen that income 
has a positive value along the second PLS-component (the Y-axis). Skilled worker co-relates 
with Riga, whereas “Unskilled worker” co-relates with “Russian”. The latter may indicate a 
socio-structural impact of the Soviet “export” to Latvia of unskilled labour. 
Does the material reveal any emerging socio-economic cleavage? To study this, a 
modified analyses was performed, where ‘Education’, ‘Income’ and ‘Occupation’ were the 
selected X-variables (with all Y-variable included). Next, Y-variables that were closely 
positioned in this plot were grouped together and analyzed in relation to the three X-variables. 
TB/LNNK and the People’s Party (TP) were grouped together, as were the People’s Concord 
Party (TSP), the Farmers’ Union (LZS) and “Other Parties”. The resulting Loading Plot, 
shown in Figure 7-7, indicates a slight tendency: 1 % of the Y-variation is explained by the 
three “socio-structural” variables, with ‘Income’ apparently as the most decisive component. 
TB/LNNK+TP+Other Parties and TSP+LZS are counterparts in this plot, with the former 
group closer to the higher income end, and the latter somewhat closer to the lower income 
end. However, the one per cent explanatory value must be characterized as low, and the effect 
on party choice by the socio-structural component, mainly income, must be said to be weak. 
With regard to the Social Democratic Party, Latvia’s Way and the New Party, the selected 
socio-structural variables are neutral. It is difficult to interpret the second PLS component, 
since there is no linearity with respect to ‘Education’ or ‘Occupation’. The explanatory value 
is less than 1 %.
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Figure 7-7: Loading plot of analysis comprising income, education and occupation as X-variables and with 
TB/LNNK and the People’s Party (TP) grouped together, and the People’s Concord Party (TSP), the Farmers’ 
Union (LZS) and “Other Parties” grouped together.
The findings are interesting for two reasons: Firstly, that relatively low explanatory value of 
the socio-structural variables is contrary to expectations with respect to Rokkan and Lipset’s 
findings in West-European party systems where the economic cleavage is found in all systems 
and is usually a fundamental cleavage. It is possible that an operational definition of socio-
economic cleavage, here by income, education and occupation, is a too simplistic definition. 
A plausible explanation for the weak explanatory value may be the transitional character of 
the economy and society at large, where other factors than one’s position in the social 
structure, income, education and occupation decide the voters’ party preference. 
Secondly, the slight tendency that many respondents who voted for TB/LNNK and the 
People’s Party belong to groups with high income and high education, and oppositely; that 
respondents who voted for TSP and the Farmers’ Union belonged to groups with low income 
and low education, may suggest that a socioeconomic cleavage may be developing and may 
become more significant, but in 1998 it was not. The four Saeima elections that have been 
121
held, as well as changes of constellations within the Saeima and shifts of governments during 
the election periods, reveal a somewhat chaotic and confusing picture. It is not necessarily so 
that the voters have a clear-cut idea about the parties and their policies. The fact that new 
parties have emerged the winner at each election suggests that there’s a degree of 
ambivalence among the voting population. 
Rokkan and Lipset found the socioeconomic cleavage to be shared by all the party 
systems in all the countries they studied. It seems that, while this cleavage was profound in 
Latvia in the 1920s and 1930s, it has so far not clearly materialized in post-Soviet, post-
communist Latvia. 
As to the low explanatory value of the two first PLS components identified 
(‘Nationality’ and ‘Place of Residence’), the result may be explained by various factors such 
as relevant variables lacking in the material, or that the relationship between the parties and
the voters is not established in any firm or lasting manner. This analysis of the voter level 
adds only very limited information to the assumed relationship between the socio-structural 
and socio-cultural basis, and party preference. 
7.5 Conflicts and Contrasts: Final Comments
Data similar to the 1993-2002 survey does not exist for the pre-war elections, and a 
comparison can be only tentatively made on the basis of approximate knowledge of the social 
structure and political representation. Clearly, the conflict along the ‘class’ status dimension 
represented a profound cleavage in the first democratic era. The nationality cleavage emerged 
and was mobilized in the late nineteenth century, becoming closely intertwined with class 
issues and the issue of independence. The conflicts were more or less transformed into a 
cultural-national conflict and ideological conflict in the pre-war democratic period. 
The national-cultural conflict between Latvians and Russians has similarities with the 
conflict between Latvians and Baltic Germans, but the former is not rooted in a class 
cleavage. The conflicts have in common an ideological component, related to the ideological 
position of the deposed rulers (conservative/communist), which makes the present-day 
structure of political oppositions appear as a “mirror image” of that of the pre-war years. 
There were two socio-structural (economic) dimensions in the 1929s and 1930s, 
‘class’ and ‘countryside/city’. The multivariate analysis indicates a tendency towards an 
urban/rural contrast by 1998, but it is premature to talk about a lasting political cleavage. 
Contrasts between city and countryside is a “classic” dimension identified by Rokkan and 
Lipset. It has been a salient dimension in Latvia before, and may become again. 
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Social and economic differences cannot, as yet, be viewed in terms of class contrasts. 
Social and economic advantage or disadvantage does not relate to nationality – or to being a 
citizen or permanent resident. The countryside is still dominantly “Latvian”. 
Latgale remains an ethnically mixed district but the expressively separatist character of 
the pre-war years appears to be gone. Riga remains an ethnically mixed city. Latgale and Riga 
are districts where the nationality variable become more salient than in the rest of Latvia. The 
mobilization of votes for TB/LNNK, TSP, LSP and PCTVL seem to indicate a possible 
polarization along national lines, but the tendency may have been reversed (2002), and at 
present socio-economic factors does not appear to increase the salience of the nationality 
variable by polarization, which seems to have been the case in the late 1920s and early1930s. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
Conflicts related to class contrasts and nationality were profoundly decisive for the formation 
of political opposition in Latvia in the 1920s, along a national-cultural (nation-building) and 
economic dimension. They were initially reinforcing conflicts, as nationality, expressed by 
language and other cultural features, and class, were traditionally two sides of the same coin 
in the region until the proclamation of the democratic republic. Additionally, a regional 
contrast has played a profound role in Latvian pre-war politics, due to the different historical 
development of eastern Latgale. Among Latvians in particular, an important socio-structural 
contrast was between landowning farmers and rural workers. The creation of a worker-to-
peasant segment led to a transformation of a part of the class conflict in the countryside. In 
addition, there was a mobilized contrast between the (Latvian) intellectual, urban elite and the 
radical working class. The urban elite was less consolidated along this dimension. Political 
conservatism found scarce support, related, as it was, to the former rulers.
Some of the pattern has re-emerged after the readoption of independence and 
democracy in Latvia. Yet one profound conflict in Latvian history, which was identified by 
Rokkan and Lipset as a central conflict within all democratic party systems, is still almost 
non-existing: The socio-structural conflict, as expression of a class cleavage, finds only weak 
statistical expression, according to the findings in this thesis. It is highly possible that new 
socio-structural contrasts will find firmer expression within the party system in the future. The 
apparent absence of the class cleavage may, partly, be explained by the impact of  Soviet 
communist regime’s promotion of the working-class which may for some time have paralyzed 
the mobilizing potential related to socialism and ‘class’ identity. It seems other issues and 
other factors are more decisive to the voters. One of two ‘continuous’ parties, The Latvian 
Social Democratic Party, finds only minor support, and not primarily among its traditional 
electorate. 
The old nationality contrast remain one of profound importance in Latvian politics; 
between the ‘native’ nationality and the ‘conquering’ nationality. The nationality dimension 
contain also an ideological factor, concerning the attitude towards the former, non-democratic 
regime and institutions. This leave different ideological flavours to Latvian nationalism which 
in the 1920s appeared as a radical opposition, whereas today it appears more conservative or 
liberal. 
The regional component has re-emerged, but with a somewhat different expression. 
The catholic element is there, but hardly politically salient, nor is the cultural diversity. In 
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stead, Latgale’s differentness consists of  its relatively higher concentration of non-native 
Latvians; mostly Russian and other Slav inhabitants. They do not vote anymore, to any extent, 
for separate, local parties, but for the so-called pro-Russian parties. The contrast appears 
rather like polarization, and not in terms of pluralism. The regional dimension remains, but 
with a different expression. 
Another significant change is the reduced importance of agriculture and similarly less 
politically important role of farming parties compared to the pre-war era. The second 
‘continuous’ party, the Farmers’ Union, is still relevant but play only a minor role      
A question that has been tentatively answered in the course of this thesis is about the 
relevance of Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset’s party system theory and in particular the 
cleavage concept. The idea that certain contrasts and conflicts becomes “structural” and 
lasting in a society has relevance – yet a weakness concern the mobilisation and expression of 
cleavages and the exact operationalization of  ‘cleavage’ within a system where conditions for 
the organisation and expression of political opinion and disagreement has been very 
oppressive. It can be hard to say whether we observe genuine cleavages, or if they are 
currently important conflicts and contrasts that can turn out to be short-lived, and change. 
A question that has emerged in the course of this study is the possible impact of  
feudal traditions in Latvia. Could Heidi Bottolf’s notion of an ‘elite cleavage’ be somehow 
related to a long-lasting tradition of largely ignoring the greater population, and concerned 
with small group interests and “parties” among a relatively tiny elite? The feudal system 
existed to some degree until the Russian revolution. After Soviet occupation and annexation, 
another elite system was established with the presence of a nomenclature and the supreme 
powers of the Communist Party (see for example Michael Voslensky, 1986) . The question is 
whether the responsiveness of Latvia’s still young democracy has developed enough to 
function as a thoroughly integrating system between the political elite and the voters. The 
question concerns the role of political parties as tools of political integration; integrating the 
voters through the system’s responsiveness and, in consequence, its legitimation. 
      *******
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APPENDIX A: The Saeima 1922-1931130
Table A- I: Marxist and social democratic parties and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 1922-1934
Number of Seats
Party 1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
Socialists/Social Democrats (total) 38 37 36 28
Social Democrats (LSDSP)          30 31 25 20
Latgalian Social Democrats (J.Opincans)                            1 1
Bund (Jewish socialists)                          1 1 1
Moderate Social Democrats131 7 4 2
Independent 1 1
Peasants’ and Workers Faction                                                             6 7
Table A- II: Liberal and radical bourgeois parties (“Centre parties”) and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 
1922-1934
Number of Seats
Party 1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
The centre (total)                       10 7 9 13
Democratic Centre              6 3 3 6
Workers’ League132 1 1
Progressive Union 3
Economic Association133 1 1
Radical Democrats            1
Independent Democrats                                              1
Christian Labourers                                                                                 1
Latgalian Progressives 4 2 3 2
Table A- III: Agrarian parties and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 1922-1934
Number of Seats
Party 1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
Agrarian (total) 28 31 29 34
Farmers’ Union 16 16 16 14
New Settlers and Smallholders                                      3 4 9
New Farmers 3 3
Catholic and Christian Farmers of Latgale (Rancans)                    3 5 6 8
Progressive Farmers of Latgale (F.Trasuns)               4 2 3 3
Independent Farmers of Latgale                                    1
Devastated Territories                              1 1
Christian Farmers of Zemgale                  1
Table A- IV: Right (conservative) parties and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 1922-1934
Number of Seats
Party 1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
The Right134 (total) 9 9 8 8
Christian Union 6
National Union 4 3 2
National-Christians                                  4 2 4
Houseowners’ Union                                                        1 1 1
Latgalian Association 1 2 1 1
National Farmers                             1
New Farmers Union 1
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 Based on tables by Albert Zalts, 1926 and Alfred Bilmanis
131
 1931: Progressive Union (Centre). Margers Skujenieks’ party.
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Table A- V: Minority parties and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 1922-1934
Number of Seats
Party 1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
Minorities 15 16 18 17
Russian Old Believers 1 2 2 2
Orthodox Russians                                                         2 2 2
Union of Russian Civil Servants             1 1 2 1
Russian Farmers’ Union 1
Russian National Democrats 1
German block                   6 5 6 6
Agudat Israel135 2 2 1 2
Mizrachi136 1 1 2 1
National Democrats                                1
Tze’ieray Tzion (Zion’s Youth) 137 1 1 1
Polish Party 1 2 2 2
135
 Association of Israel, orthodox clerical Jewish party related to the Hasidic movement, headed by Mordechai 
Dubin. (“History of Latvian Jews” p. 68,85, by Josifs Steinmanis Daugavpils 1995/New York 2002)
136
 According to Zalts, Mizrachi won two seats in the First Saeima, but Mendel Bobe (72) in Josif  Steimanis 
(p.87) recorded one seat for Mizrachi. Bobe recorded one seat also for a party named National Democrats, which 
is not mentioned by Zalts or Bilmanis.
137Ceire Zion (in German), supporters of Max Laserson’s ’Labour Zionism’ (History of Latvian Jews pp. 84-87)
In 1931, Tze’ieray Tzion and Zionist Socialists merged into one party, Zionist Socialists of Latvia. 








Total number of seats 100 100 100 100
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APPENDIX B: 5th-8th Saeima
Table B- I: Parties and the number of deputies in the Saeima, 1993-2002.








LC (Latvia’s Way) 36 17 21 0
LNNK (Latvia’s National Independence 
Movement
15 8 (b) 17 (c) 7 (c)
TB (For Fatherland and Freedom) 6 14 17 (c) 7 (c)
KDS (Christian Democratic Union) 5 8 (a) 0 (e) ----
LZS (Farmers’ Union) 12 8 (a) 0 12 (f)
DCP (Democratic Centre Party 6 ---- ---- ----
SLAT (Concord for Latvia/
National Harmony Party) (95-98)
13 6 16 ---- (d)
LK (Equal Rights Movement)/ Latvian 
Socialist Party (1995-) 
7 5 16 (d) ---- (d)
DP “Saimnieks” (Democratic Party 
“Landlord”
---- 18 0 ----
TKL (People’s Movement For Latvia) ---- 16 0 ----
LTP (Latvian People’s Party) ---- ---- 24 20
LSDA (Latvian Social Democratic 
Alliance)
0 0 14 0
JP (The New Party) ---- ---- 8 ----
JL (New Era) ---- ---- ---- 26
“For Human Rights” ---- ---- ---- 25 (d)
LPP (Latvian First Party) ---- ---- ---- 10 (g)
Total number of seats 100 100 100 100
a) United List of LZS, KDS and Latgale Democratic Party
b) Latvian National Conservatie Party LNNK and LZP (Latvian Green Party)
c) ATB/LNNK (Alliance “For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK)
d) Including the National Harmony Party, Latvian Socialist Party/Equal Rights Movement and the Russian Party
e) Alliance of KDS (Chr. Democratic Union) , DP (Labour Party) and LZP (Green Party)
f) Green and Farmers Union, a merger of the Farmers Union and Green the Party
g) Alliance of christian parties – KDS, Christian Peple’s Party (reformed LTF)
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APPENDIX C: Post Election Surveys 1993 – 2002
All the results are weighted by percent for each sub-group. This means for instance that for 
party choice measured by nationality, the sum of Latvian votes are 100%, and the sum of 
Russian votes are 100%.
Party- and Election Alliance Abbreviations:
Lidztiesîba (Equal Rights) = Lidz
Latvijas Socilistisk Partija (Latvian Socialist Party) = LSP
"Par cilveka tiesibam vienota Latvija" (For Human Rights in a United Latvia) = PCTVL
Saskana Latvijai – Atdzimsana Tautasaimniecibai 
(Concord for Latvia – Rebirth of the Economy) = SLAT
Tautas Saskaas Partija (People’s Concord Party) = TSP
Latvijas Vienibas Partija (Latvian Unity Party) = LVP
Demokratiska Centra Partija (Democratic Centre Party) = DCP
Demokrtisk partija "Saimnieks” (Democratic Party ”Landlord” = DPS
Latvijas Demokrtisks Darba Partija (Latvian Democratic Labour Party) = LDDP
Latvijas Sociâldemokrâtiskâ Strâdnieku Partija (Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party) = LSDSP
Koalicijas “Darbs un Taisnigums”  (Social Democratic Coalition “Labour and Justice”) = SDK
Latvijas Socialdemokratu Apvieniba (Latvian Social Democratic Union) = LSDA
Jauna Partija (The New Party) = JP
Latvijas Cels (Latvia’s Way) = LC
Tautas Partija (The People’s Party) = TP
Jaunais Laiks (New Era) = JL
Latvijas Zemnieku Savienîba (Latvian Farmers’ Union) = LZS
Zalo un Zemnieku Savieniba (Green and Farmers’ Union) = ZZS
Latvijas Kristîgi Demokratu Savienîba (Christian Democratic Union) = KDS
Latvijas Pirma Partija (Latvia’s First Party) = LPP
Latvijas Nacionalas Neatkarîbas Kustîba (Latvian National Independence Movement) = LNNK
Tevzemei un Brîvîbai (For Fatherland and Freedom) = TB
Tautas Kustiba Latvijai (People’s Movement ”For Latvia”) = TKL
Nationality (1993, 1995, 1998 and 2002):
Table C- I: Results of the post election survey in 1993. The table shows the distribution of party choice measured 
by nationality. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Nationality Lidz SLAT DCP LC LZS KDS LNNK TB Other
Latvians, n=482 0.8 7.1 5.6 38.4 10.8 7.1 12.7 5.4 12.2
Non-Latvian, n=111 13.5 35.1 3.6 23.4 9.0 4.5 3.6 1.8 5.4
Table C- II: Results of the post election survey in 1995. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by nationality. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Nationality LSP TSP LVP DPS TKL SDC LC LZS & KDS LNNK & LZP TB Other
Latvians, n=471 1.1 1.5 7.5 20.7 11.1 5.1 14.5 6 9.4 15.8 7.4
Russians, n=66 22.3 23.2 7.3 18.6 8 4 6.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 7.8
Others, n=21 9.8 21.8 20.5 21.1 4.7 17.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7
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Table C- III: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by nationality. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Nationality TSP LSDA JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
Latvian, n=703 2.7 14.9 7.7 29.2 17.2 19.9 8.4
Russian, n=112 58.0 8.0 5.4 9.8 9.8 0.0 8.9
Other, n=45 31.1 13.3 8.9 11.1 26.7 4.4 4.4
Table C- IV: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by nationality. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.




n=640 3.6 4.1 19.8 35 13 5.7 10.8 5.6 2.4
Russian, 
n=140 75.5 1.3 4.2 7.4 1.9 0.6 1.4 0.5 7.1
Other, 
n=50 41.7 6.7 5.8 24.8 4.1 2.3 10.2 0.0 4.5
Place of Residence (1993, 1995, 1998 and 2002):
Table C- V: Results of the post election survey in 1993. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by place of residence. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Residence Lidz SLAT DCP LC LZS KDS LNNK TB Other
Riga, n=158 5.7 17.1 7.0 29.7 5.1 5.7 12.0 7.6 10.1
Other town, n=225 4.0 12.0 5.8 33.8 10.7 6.7 14.2 3.6 9.3
Rural area, n=210 0.5 9.0 3.3 41.9 14.3 7.1 6.7 3.8 13.3
Table C- VI: Results of the post election survey in 1995. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by place of residence. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.

















Riga, n=137 6.8 6.9 4.3 19.5 2.1 4.6 10.8 1.3 13.6 20 10.1
6 bigger 
cities, n=93 8.6 12.6 18.9 12.4 5 17.6 2.7 5.1 12.7 4.4
District 
center, n=49 2 2.4 4.3 31.9 9.9 7 10.8 3.6 4.2 13.9 10
Other city, 
n=61 1.1 8.2 27.6 9.1 8.9 11.5 3.9 8.8 13.9 7.1
Village, n=40 4.9 12.3 23.3 6.5 15.1 20.4 2.1 12.8 2.6
Countryside, 
n=178 2 2 16.8 17.8 16.5 2.8 14.8 7.9 5.7 6.8 6.9
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Table C- VII: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by place of residence. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Residence TSP LSDA JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
Riga, n=204 14.2 17.2 7.8 21.1 10.8 22.1 6.9
OtherCity, n=325 16.6 10.8 8.9 24.9 17.2 16.3 5.2
Town, Village,Country-side, n=331 4.5 15.1 5.7 29.3 19.9 13.3 12.1
Table C- VIII: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by place of residence. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.












15.4 4.5 25.2 24.6 7.1 5.1 7.4 5 5.6
Other city, 




7.2 3.5 19.4     27.1 17.6 4.6 13 5.7 2
Region (1995, 1998 and 2002):
Table C- IX: Results of the post election survey in 1995. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by region. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Region LSP TSP LVP DPS TKL SDK LC LZS & KDS LNNK & LZP TB Other
Riga, n=137 6.8 6.9 4.3 19.5 2.1 4.6 10.8 1.3 13.6 20 10.1
Vidzeme, n=141 1.6 14 16.1 14.9 4.9 10.8 8.5 7.8 11.7 9.9
Kurzeme, n=103 2.1 2.6 2 21.8 20.1 5.6 16.3 7 6.3 13.8 2.3
Zemgale, n=94 1.3 2.5 4.9 24.9 18.1 9.5 14 4.6 4.1 13.1 3.1
Latgale, n=83 10.1 10.9 13.6 22.8 4.2 0.0 19.2 5.7 2.9 2.8 7.9
Table C- X: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by region. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Region TSP LSDS JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
Riga, 204 14.2 17.2 7.8 21.1 10.8 22.1 6.9
Vidzeme, n=220 5.0 13.6 5.5 24.1 21.4 20.5 10.0
Kurzeme, n=163 1.2 12.3 10.4 37.4 14.7 17.2 6.7
Zemgale, n=123 2.4 17.9 5.7 31.7 19.5 16.3 6.5
Latgale, n=150 35.3 8.7 8.0 16.7 18.0 2.7 10.7
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Table C- XI: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by region. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.




n=226 30.7 3.2 7.8 38.6 4.4 5.7 4.6 2.5 2.6
Vidzeme, 
n=197 5.1 3 27.9 33.7 7.8 4.7 9.5 6.4 1.9
Kurzeme, 
n=128 5.5 6.3 25 24.7 15.4 5.9 12.5 2 2.6
Zemgale, 
n=137 10.2 3.5 14.9 31.9 9 2.6 17.5 7.4 3
Latgale, 
n=142 33.3 4 7.1 12.2 22.3 3.7 5.9 3.9 7.7
Income (1998 and 2002):
Table C- XII: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by income. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
INCOME TSP LSDS JP TP LC LNNK & TB
Other
Up to 30 LVL, n=193 13.0 15.0 9.3 23.8 16.1 11.4 11.4
31 - 50 LVL, n=238 13.4 13.0 7.1 23.1 18.5 16.4 8.4
51 - 80 LVL, n=240 9.6 15.8 7.5 25.0 15.4 19.6 7.1
81 LVL and more, n=109 9.2 13.8 3.7 32.1 15.6 21.1 4.6
Table C- XIII: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by income. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.




n=61 26.5 8.6 18.4 15.05 18.05 0 8.55 0 4.9
LVL 21 -
40, n=135 16.15 3.55 20.5 26.35 14.85 5.1 4.3 3.6 5.7
LVL 41 -
60, n=232 18.5 2.2 15.35 31.45 9.45 3.7 9.65 6.2 3.5
LVL 61 -
80, n=117 12.25 7.6 15.3 28.5 9.05 6.5 14.05 4 2.75
LVL 81 -
100, n=86 16.55 3.45 13.3 32.6 7.15 5.65 13.45 3.35 4.6
LVL 101 -
150, n=50 21.25 5.65 9.4 43.9 11.6 3.3 0.0 4.85 0.0
LVL 101 -
250, n=90 22.6 2.8 12.4 44.2 6.7 4.3 2.9 4.2 0.0
LVL >250, 
n=18 2.5 0.0 23.7 42.1 3.7 11.7 9.9 0.0 6.4
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Education (1998):
Table C- XIV: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by education. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
EDUCATION
(
TSP LSDS JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
Primary incomplete, n=54 14.8 13.0 5.6 9.3 42.6 5.6 9.3
Primary complete, n=125 12.0 12.0 8.0 26.4 16.0 19.2 6.4
Secondary incomplete, n=50 4.0 22.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 16.0 8.0
Secondary complete, n=458 13.1 14.6 6.8 25.5 14.2 16.4 9.4
University incomplete, n=70 1.4 12.9 8.6 40.0 17.1 12.9 7.1
University complete, n=97 12.4 10.3 7.2 22.7 19.6 21.6 6.2
Post-Uni incomplete, n=1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Post-Uni complete, n=4 0.0 25.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0
Age (1998):
Table C- XV: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by age. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group
AGE TSP LSDS JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
15-24, n=73 11.0 1.4 9.6 38.4 15.1 16.4 8.2
25-34, n=171 21.6 12.9 8.2 28.1 15.8 9.9 3.5
35-49, n=193 9.8 14.5 8.3 26.9 14.0 16.6 9.8
50-64, n=245 7.3 19.2 5.3 25.3 14.7 19.2 9.0
65-74, n=178 9.0 12.4 7.9 17.4 24.2 19.1 10.1
Occupation (1998 and 2002):
Table C- XVI: Results of the post election survey in 1998. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by occupation. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.
Occupation TSP LSDS JP TP LC LNNK & TB Other
Unemployed, between jobs, n=84 21.4 14.3 7.1 23.8 10.7 8.3 14.3
Responsible for home, not working, n=31 3.2 25.8 3.2 32.3 19.4 9.7 6.5
On maternity leave, n=17 11.8 23.5 5.9 41.2 11.8 5.9 0.0
Retired, n=294 9.5 13.9 7.8 21.1 20.1 17.0 10.5
Student school/university, n=29 6.9 0.0 6.9 58.6 13.8 10.3 3.4
Self-employed, n=48 8.3 8.3 4.2 33.3 14.6 20.8 10.4
In paid employment, n=351 12.3 14.0 8.0 25.1 16.0 19.1 5.7
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Table C- XVII: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by occupation. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.




n=74 22.5 2.7 13.5 26.5 13.8 5.4 9.5 2.5 3.7
Housewife, n=33 26.8 6.1 22.1 15.5 15.5 2.7 6.4 4.8
Retired, n=267 14.7 4.4 14.1 35.2 7.5 6 8.1 6.6 3.4
Student at 
school/university, 
n=43 29.8 19.5 22.5 11.5 5 2.6 2.3 6.9
Self-employed, 
n=28 20.8 3.2 16.3 35.2 11.1 9.8 3.6 0
Farmer, n=12 16.9 42 25.1 8.1 7.9 0
Manager, 
general 
manager, n=48 17.9 12.5 40.9 5.8 4 10.5 6.4 2
Worker, n=135 17.4 7.6 17.3 26.9 8.7 5.4 8.5 2.2 5.9
Civil servant, 
n=184 15.4 2.7 18.9 27.6 13.7 3.8 12.1 4.6 1.1
Religion (2002):
Table C- XVIII: Results of the post election survey in 2002. The table shows the distribution of party choice 
measured by religion. The results are weighted by percent for each sub-group.




n=268 1.5 2.4 19.5 40.8 10.5 6.2 10.9 5.9 2.2
Roman Catholic, 
n=205 9.8 6 13.5 29.5 14.3 5.9 11.3 6.8 2.9
Orthodox, n=103 61.7 4.4 5.1 12.5 4.8 0.8 4 0.8 5.9
Old-believer, 
n=45 81.1 1.9 4.7 1.6 10.6
Baptists, n=9 10.4 10.1 8.5 12.7 9.9 12.9 35.6 0
Other, n=18 11.7 18.7 17.9 13 38.7 0
To none, n=128 12.1 2.3 25.2 36.2 10.5 3.3 4.6 2.3 3.5
Hard to say, no 
answer, n=54 9.4 7.8 24.4 25.6 13 6.6 8 5.2 0
